In this study, I investigate whether the opportunity to attend a school other than a student’s assigned neighborhood school reduces criminal activity, especially among disadvantaged youth. Many of the schools chosen by the students were “better” on traditional indicators, such as student test scores and teacher characteristics. All of them, however, were preferred by the applicant over the default option. The analysis therefore sheds light on whether efforts to expand school choice can be an effective crime-prevention strategy, particularly when disadvantaged students can gain access to “better” schools.

We know that criminal offenders often have low levels of education: only 35 percent of inmates in U.S. correctional facilities have earned a high school diploma, compared to 82 percent of the general population. Criminal activity is concentrated among minority males; it begins in early adolescence and peaks when most youth should still be enrolled in secondary school. The schools these young men would attend are typically in high-poverty urban neighborhoods, have high rates of violence and school dropout, and struggle to retain effective teachers. Such schools may be a particularly fertile environment for the onset of criminal behavior. Yet little research has been conducted to determine the effect of school quality on crime.

In this study I explore this question using data from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) school district (CMS) to measure the impact of school quality on arrest and incarceration rates. I take advantage of the CMS districtwide open-enrollment school-choice plan, which until recently let students choose where they wanted to go to school and employed lotteries to admit students to oversubscribed schools. I compare the criminal activity of students who won the lottery to attend their first-choice school to that of students who lost the lottery.

I find consistent evidence that attending a better school reduces crime among those age 16 and older, across various schools, and for both middle and high school students. The effect is largest for African American males and youth who are at highest risk for criminal involvement. In general, high-risk male youth commit about 50 percent less crime as a result of winning the school-choice lottery. They are also more likely to remain enrolled in school, and they show modest improvements on measures of behavior such as absences and suspensions. Yet there is no detectable impact on test scores for any youth in the sample.

School Choice in CMS

With more than 150,000 students enrolled in 2008–09, Charlotte-Mecklenburg is the 20th largest school district in the nation. The CMS attendance area encompasses all of Mecklenburg County, including Charlotte and several surrounding cities. Overall, CMS is racially and demographically diverse. About 45 percent of the students in CMS middle and high schools in 2003 were African American, less than 10 percent were Hispanic (although the Hispanic population was growing rapidly over this period), and about 50 percent were eligible for free or reduced-price lunches. Individual CMS schools vary widely in demographic composition: CMS high schools in 2003 ranged from less than 10 percent to close to 90 percent nonwhite, and were also dissimilar in average test scores and rates of high school graduation.

From 1971 until 2001, CMS schools were forcibly desegregated under a court order. Students were bused all around the district to preserve racial balance in schools. After several years of legal challenges, the court order was overturned, and CMS was instructed that it could no longer determine student assignments based on race. In December 2001, the CMS school board instituted a policy of districtwide open enrollment for the 2002–03 school year. School boundaries were redrawn as contiguous neighborhood zones, and children who lived in each zone were guaranteed access to their neighborhood school. Under busing, schools were racially balanced, but the surrounding neighborhoods remained highly segregated. Thus the redrawing of school boundaries led to concentrations of minority students in some schools.

The first open-enrollment lottery took place in the spring of 2002. CMS conducted an extensive outreach campaign to ensure that choice was broad-based, and 95 percent of parents submitted at least one preferred school; parents could submit up to three (not including their neighborhood school). Admission for all students from outside the neighborhood zone was subject to grade-specific limits. The lottery process for oversubscribed grades gave preference first to students who previously attended the school and their siblings, then to low-income students applying to schools that previously did not have a majority of low-income students, and finally to students applying to a school within their “choice zone” (which would guarantee them access to district-provided transportation). I study the effects of winning a seat at a preferred school in the 2002 lotteries on student outcomes through 2009, seven years after the lotteries were conducted.

Because nearly all rising 12th graders received their first choice, I restrict my study to students in grades 6 through 11. I also exclude the 5 percent of students who were not enrolled in any CMS school in the previous year. About 60 percent of the remaining students chose (and were automatically admitted to) their neighborhood school. About 75 percent of applicants to nonguaranteed schools were in lottery priority groups in which the probability of admission was either zero or one. Even though these students chose a nonguaranteed school, there is no randomness in whether they were admitted, so I do not use them in the study. The resulting sample consists of 1,891 high-school students (grades 9–11) and 2,320 middle-school students (grades 6–8). Compared to all students in CMS, these students were more likely to be African American and eligible for free lunch; they also had lower test scores and higher rates of absence and out-of-school suspensions (see Figure 1).

Data

Since the mid-1990s, the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) has required all districts to submit data that include demographic information, attendance rates, and behavioral outcomes, yearly test scores in math and reading for grades 3 through 8, and subject-specific tests for higher grades. I used these data, along with internal CMS files that contain student-identifying information such as name, date of birth, and exact address in every year. This information enabled me to match CMS students to arrest records from the Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Office, which include all arrests of adults (age 16 and over in North Carolina) that occurred in the county.

I measure crime severity in two ways, both of which are intended to capture the idea that not all crimes are equal. First, I use estimates that economists have developed of the social cost of crimes, which include tangible costs, such as lost productivity and medical care, as well as intangible costs, such as impact on quality of life; these estimates are extremely high for fatal crimes. (The estimated social cost of murder is $4.3 million in 2009 dollars. The next costliest crime is rape, which is estimated at $125,000.) To avoid the results being driven entirely by a few murders, in my main analysis I limit the cost of murder to twice the cost of rape. The second measure of severity weighs crimes by the expected punishment resulting from a successful conviction. Neither measure accounts for justice system costs such as police or prisons.

Methodology

If the school lottery is truly random, the winners and losers will on average have identical observed and unobserved characteristics. With a large enough sample, a simple comparison of outcomes between winners and losers would identify the causal effect of winning the lottery. In reality, CMS conducted many lotteries (for each school and grade). The number of students in each lottery is relatively small, so my analysis combines data from all of the middle-school and all of the high-school lotteries. My results reflect the average difference in outcomes between winners and losers across all of the lotteries conducted at each level.

The result is the “intent-to-treat” effect of winning a lottery; it is an intent because students offered a place in their first-choice school did not always take it (for example, they may have moved out of the district). Students who won the lottery are more than 55 percentage points more likely than losers to attend their first-choice school in the first year, and on average spend an additional 1 to 1.5 years enrolled in that school overall. One can therefore obtain a rough estimate of the effect of actually attending the first-choice school (as a result of winning the lottery) by doubling the results presented below.

I examine the impact of winning the lottery on crime separately for groups of students with different propensities to commit crimes, with a focus on the highest-risk group. Because students with adult arrest records can be tracked all the way back to kindergarten in some cases, I use all of the potential predictors of criminal behavior—test scores, demographics, behavior, and neighborhood characteristics—to calculate an index of crime risk. The students in the top 20 percent of this crime-risk index are disproportionately African American males and eligible for free lunch (see Figure 1a). Their test scores are on average one standard deviation below the North Carolina state average, and they are absent and suspended many more days than the average student (see Figure 1b). Because high-risk students are overwhelmingly male, I exclude females from all of the analyses. The results comprise a final sample of 1,014 high-school students and 1,081 middle-school students.

High-school lottery winners attend schools that are demographically very similar to the schools attended by lottery losers, while middle-school winners attend schools that are less African American and higher income on average. All lottery winners travel farther to attend their first-choice school, but the distance is greater for high school students than for middle school students.

High-school lottery winners in the high-risk group and all middle-school lottery winners experience modest increases in standard measures of school quality. Their peers’ average test scores are about 0.15 standard deviations higher, and the new schools have higher-quality teachers, measured in terms of the fraction of teachers with less than three years’ experience, the fraction that are new to the school that year, the percentage of teachers with an advanced degree, and the share of teachers who attended a “highly competitive” college as defined by the Barron’s rankings. For youth in the high-risk group, the gain as measured by these quality indicators is roughly equivalent to moving from one of the lowest-ranked schools to one around the district average.

Results

I find that winning a lottery for admission to a preferred school at the high school level reduces the total number of felony arrests and the social cost of crime. Among middle school students, winning a school-choice lottery reduces the social cost of crime and the number of days incarcerated. Importantly, I find that these overall reductions in criminal activity are concentrated among students in the highest-risk group. Indeed, I find little impact either positive or negative of winning a school-choice lottery on criminal activity for the 80 percent of students outside of this group.

Consider first the results for high school students in the high-risk group. Among these students, winning admission to a preferred school reduces the average number of felony arrests over the study period from 0.77 to 0.43, a pattern driven largely by a reduction of 0.23 in the average number of arrests for drug felonies (see Figure 2). The average social cost of the crimes committed by high-risk lottery winners (after adjusting the cost of murders downward) is $3,916 lower than for lottery losers, a decrease of more than 35 percent. (Without adjusting for the cost of murder, I estimate the reduction in the social cost of crimes committed by lottery winners at $14,106.) High-risk lottery winners on average commit crimes with a total expected sentence of 35 months, compared to 59 months among lottery losers.

Among high-risk middle-school students, I find no effect of winning a school-choice lottery on the average number of felony arrests. Although the number arrests for violent felonies falls, this is offset by an increase in the number of property arrests. Because violent crimes carry greater social costs, however, winning a school-choice lottery reduces the average social cost of the crimes committed by middle school students by $7,843, or 63 percent. It also reduces the total expected sentence of crimes committed by each student by 31 months (64 percent).

An important limitation of this analysis is that I do not have access to data on juvenile crime. Especially for students in the middle school sample, this could mask big differences in juvenile offending in the early years after the lotteries were conducted. As an alternative, I examine the effect of winning the lottery on school disciplinary outcomes such as absences and suspensions, as well as on test scores. Among the high-risk group, lottery winners are absent slightly less than the lottery losers are. The effect on high school suspensions in 2003 is relatively large, but the other school discipline effects are small and statistically insignificant.

In contrast to the results for crime and disciplinary outcomes, I find no evidence that winning admission to a preferred school leads to test-score gains. But I do find some impacts on enrollment, grade progression, and grade attainment for high-risk youth. For example, high-risk middle-school lottery winners are 18 percentage points more likely than lottery losers to be enrolled in CMS in their 10th-grade year. The effect on 11th-grade enrollment is about half the size (9 percentage points), and there is no impact on persistence into 12th grade.

Despite the impacts on enrollment and progression, there is no detectable increase in high school graduation rates. Because I am limited to CMS administrative data, it is difficult to distinguish dropouts from subsequent GED recipients or transfers who may have graduated elsewhere. Administrative records are particularly problematic for high-risk youth, who sometimes disappear from CMS well before they are old enough to do so legally. The graduation rate is only about 25 percent among high-risk high-school students, and currently only about 10 percent among high-risk middle-school students, although some who are still enrolled may yet graduate. Additionally, a bit less than 10 percent of the high-risk middle-school sample never appears in any high school grade but subsequently appears in the arrest data. Because any intervention aimed at high school students would miss this group altogether, this suggests that high school might be too late for the youth at highest risk of criminal activity.

Explanations and Policy Implications

Overall, I find that winning the lottery to attend a first-choice school has a large impact on crime for high-risk youth. High-risk lottery winners experienced roughly a 50 percent reduction in the measures of criminal activity that weight crimes by their severity.

I consider four possible explanations for the reduction in crime among high-risk lottery winners. The first is incapacitation, which advances that winning the lottery entails longer bus rides to and from school, thus occupying youth during high-crime hours. The second is contagion, in which winning the lottery prevents crime by removing high-risk youth from crime-prone peers or neighborhoods, thereby reducing contemporaneous exposure of high-risk youth to criminogenic influences. These first two explanations would predict a strong initial effect that fades over time. If, for example, drug-market activity is concentrated within a few schools, we might expect large differences in criminality in the high school years that diminish as enrollment in the chosen school ends and lottery winners and losers return to the same neighborhoods. When I examine the effect of winning a school lottery separately at different points in time after the lotteries were conducted, however, I find larger effects in later years. I therefore conclude that there is little support for the incapacitation and contagion explanations since they do not fit the pattern of results over time.

A third possibility is that the reduction in crime comes from the skills students gain by attending a higher-quality school. If the schools attended by lottery winners do a better of job of teaching skills that increase students’ ability to find employment, they will stay enrolled in school longer, delaying the onset of criminality through the peak period of offending behaviors. Moreover, youth with more and better schooling will gain access to more and better opportunities for paid work, making crime less attractive. Based on a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the relationship between enrollment and criminal activity in my sample, I estimate that the effects of winning a school lottery on enrollment could potentially explain about 45 percent of the impact on criminal activity in the high school sample, but only about 10 percent in the middle school sample.

Alternatively, peer networks formed in middle or high school could have a persistent influence on adult criminality without affecting skills directly. In my own data, I find relatively little evidence that the propensity of a student’s peers to engage in criminal activity influences the degree to which he commits violent crimes. This may be due in part to the high rate of early dropout among violent felons. However, having crime-prone peers in middle school substantially increases the likelihood of committing a violent crime, especially for youth in the high-risk group. Based on this relationship, I estimate that changes in peers can explain roughly 9 percent of the impact on violent arrests in the middle school sample.

Regardless of the mechanisms by which admittance to a preferred school influences criminal activity, the fact that these impacts are concentrated among high-risk students has important implications for the design of school-choice programs. It may make sense for oversubscribed schools of choice to give preferential admission to students at greatest risk of criminal activity. To illustrate this point, I use my results to evaluate the consequences of two different types of lotteries: 1) those giving priority to the highest-risk students and 2) a simple lottery similar to those virtually all charter schools nationwide are required to use to admit students when the schools are oversubscribed. The actual CMS lottery system gave preferences to low-income students who applied to schools with a low fraction of low-income students. As a consequence, many poor (and high-crime risk) students were automatically admitted to schools while other students had to win the lottery.

If slots in oversubscribed schools were systematically allocated to the highest-risk students, the social cost of crime would fall by an additional 27 percent relative to the actual CMS assignment mechanism. A more realistic form of targeting is the method actually pursued by CMS, giving preference to low-income students within the lottery system. I estimate that this policy choice lowered the social cost of crime by about 12 percent, relative to a simple charter-style lottery with no preferential treatment. Although this analysis does not consider the possibility that a greater concentration of high-risk students could have adverse effects on other students, it nonetheless highlights the likely beneficial consequences of giving preference to disadvantaged students in the admissions process for oversubscribed schools.

Conclusion

In this study, I find that winning a lottery for admission to the school of choice greatly reduces criminal activity, and that the greatest reduction occurs among youth at the highest risk for committing crimes. The impacts persist beyond the initial years of school enrollment, seven years after the school-choice lottery was held. The findings suggest that schools may be an opportune setting for the prevention of future crime. Many high-risk youth drop out of school at a young age and are incarcerated for serious crimes prior to the age of high school graduation. For these youth, who are on the margins of society, public schools may present the best opportunity for intervention.

The end of busing and the implementation of open enrollment in CMS was a significant policy change. The four neighborhood high schools to which most of the lottery applicants were assigned lost more than 20 percent of their enrollment in a single year. In subsequent years, two of these schools were restructured as magnet schools offering specialized programs in a small school setting. Two middle schools that lost significant numbers of students were subsequently closed. The open enrollment policy thus sent a strong signal of parental demand to CMS that may have resulted in the shutting down or restructuring of low-performing schools. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 included a provision that allowed parents to transfer students from “persistently dangerous” public schools, but many states have set the legal threshold so high that very few schools qualify. The results here suggest that, to the extent that low-quality schools are also persistently dangerous, allowing students to leave them might benefit individual students as well as society as a whole.

David J. Deming is assistant professor of education at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. This article is adapted from a study in the November 2011 issue of the Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Washington is at a crossroads on K–12 education policy. Policymakers can 1) continue down the path of top-down accountability; 2) devolve power to states and districts, thereby returning to the status quo of the mid-1990s; or 3) rethink the fundamentals, do something different, and empower parental choice.

The federal government’s involvement in K–12 education has accelerated through the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. The best evidence indicates that this substantially heightened federal role has had only modest impact on student achievement, far short of what had been hoped. It might be that further centralization would yield more benefits, but it is doubtful that more federal control is politically possible, and, in any case, any additional yield is uncertain.

The second option—devolving recently accumulated federal power to the states—underlies recent reauthorization proposals for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) that allow each state to establish its own accountability system and that require teeth only for the very lowest-performing schools. It is unclear to us how releasing states and school districts from federal accountability and granting them maximum flexibility is anything more than a return to the status quo. It is the regrettable consequence of that approach that motivated increased federal involvement in the first place.

The Koret Task Force at the Hoover Institution (see sidebar, page 16), of which I am a member, believes that an evolved form of the ESEA that retains rigorous accountability is preferable to returning control of public schooling to local public-school monopolies and states, which will fall into old habits all too quickly. But we believe that the best interests of the nation require something other than either a return to the happy days of local school governance or evolutionary improvements to the type of top-down accountability found in No Child Left Behind.

We need a fundamentally new approach.

We propose to reform the nation’s schools on the basis of two principles that have served the nation exceedingly well throughout its history: federalism and choice. The federal structure of our government offers an opportunity to specify the role of Washington strategically, to leverage what it clearly can do best, while allocating to states and locales what they are best suited to do. Our particular view of federalism is disciplined by the laws of economics and empirical experience, a perspective known as fiscal federalism. The second organizing principle is choice. Much has been written and studied regarding choice in education—on charter schools, vouchers, choice among district schools, and much more—but the idea, so powerful in our economy and in other enterprises, including higher education, has rarely been examined in the context of federalism and the appropriate roles of Washington and lower levels of government.

A New Framework

What is fiscal federalism? Fiscal federalism argues that government services are most efficiently delivered if provided closest to the taxpayers or consumers receiving them, and that competition among local governments for residents and taxpayers will improve those services. In the context of public education, the challenge is to identify the areas of constraint for local providers of education services, determine which can be best addressed by state government, and assign the remainder to Washington.

But there is a fundamental flaw in fiscal federalism theory as it applies to education: the ability of taxpaying parents of school-age children to vote with their feet (leave school districts with which they are dissatisfied) is severely constrained for the low-income populations that are most likely to find themselves served by low-performing schools. This lack of geographical mobility for large segments of the population undermines the competitive pressure that low-performing schools and school districts would otherwise expect to face. This leaves those districts vulnerable to the interests of whoever is powerful at the local level, more often than not organizations that represent teachers who are employed by school districts, rather than to the influence of parents and taxpayers.

One way to correct the strong tendency of local school bureaucracies to cater more to adult than student interests is to intervene from above, the course of action taken by Washington over the last 15 years. We argue that this has been only weakly effective while imposing a heavy regulatory burden on schools. We propose instead to create real competition for students and the public funding that accompanies them among the providers of K–12 education services. Considerable research indicates that schools respond to competitive pressure. In a systematic review of 41 empirical studies on this topic through 2002, Columbia University researchers Clive Belfield and Henry Levin found that “a sizable majority report beneficial effects of competition.”

In our proposal, funding must follow students and be weighted to compensate for the extra costs associated with high-need students if schools are to compete for students and if parents are to have real choice. Parents must have the widest possible choice of schools for their children and be armed with good information on the performance of schools. Informed choice that is accompanied by financial consequences for schools will create a marketplace for schooling that will evolve toward greater responsiveness to what parents want, will be more innovative, and will become more productive.

A Role for Washington

The federal government currently funds a wide range of K–12 education initiatives (see Table 1). The task force has identified just four functions that are essential to its role in education: creating and disseminating information on school performance in each classroom and program effectiveness, including information on individual student performance; enforcing civil rights laws; providing financial support to high-need students; and enhancing competition among providers.

Information: The provision of information on the condition of education and on the results of education research is primarily a public service. In such situations, a serious free-rider problem exists: because it is impossible to prevent a class of consumers who have not paid for the information from consuming it, far too little evidence will be produced if it is not supported by an organization with the entire nation’s interests at heart. The free-rider problem is one reason that state and local authorities cannot be entrusted with the task of knowledge production. Furthermore, evidence does not merely need to be produced; it needs to be based on high-quality data. Gathering and auditing data are almost pure public services. Thus, it is easy to justify federal support for research, data gathering, and dissemination of information. Without valid information on the performance of students at each school relative to that of their peers across the country, the entire education enterprise flies blind, leaving parents, teachers, school managers, and policymakers with nothing more than intuition and consensus as the basis for making decisions.

Civil Rights: When state and local actions in education are discriminatory, the federal government should step in to enforce civil rights laws. Acts of unjust discrimination, such as those that would deny a student an educational experience for which the student is qualified based solely on race, gender, disability, or other protected status, are costly to society. Students who fail to be educated may need cash transfers as adults; they might take up crime or engage in other antisocial behaviors. Owing to mobility and society-wide redistribution, we all suffer in these cases. Thus, the federal government, and not merely state and local governments, has an obligation to curb discrimination.

Compensatory Funding: Regardless of whether the underlying cause is disability, lack of English proficiency, or poverty, high-need students are more expensive to educate than other students. Failure to provide additional resources can provide an incentive for other students to move to another school if they are able. The burden that the high-need student produces will thus be disproportionately borne by those who are too immobile to avoid it, most likely other high-need students. The federal government can counteract these inequities through cash transfers. The difficulty is figuring out the right financial supplement and the best mechanism for distributing it.

Title I of the ESEA and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) are designed to disburse funds to states and school districts for the education of high-need students. Rather than the complicated federal schemes under which funds are currently disbursed to districts, funds should be attached to the student. Individual schools would receive federal funds based on student counts, with a weighting formula to adjust for factors such as the increased burden of educating high-need students and for regional differences in costs. Sometimes called “backpack funding,” weighted funding that follows the student has been shown to direct proportionally more funds to schools that serve needy students than traditional distribution schemes.

Choice and Competition: The federal government can and should restrict education monopolies and support school choice for parents and students. The current system, which relies on residential mobility to drive school districts to improve education services, does not work well enough to improve education outcomes or to ensure equity. Such a system consigns the poor and immobile to inferior schools and leaves the control of schools in the hands of those who benefit most from the status quo. The simple feature of eliminating a default school assignment by the school district—thus requiring every parent to engage in school choice—eliminates socioeconomic differences in the likelihood that parents will shop for schools. Further, if parents could exercise school choice through web-based portals that highlight the important variables of school performance, socioeconomic differences in knowledge could be muted. Here, again, the federal government has a role to play, for example, by funding open competitions for designers and implementers of school-choice portals.

Market-based competition cannot prevail in public education unless the consumers of public education can choose where to be schooled. We propose that as a condition of the receipt of federal funds to support the education of individual students, schools be required to participate in an open enrollment process conducted by a state-sanctioned authority. Such a process would maximize the matches between school and student preferences. Unified open-enrollment systems that encompass as many choices as possible from the regular public, charter, private, and virtual school universes are essential to the expansion of choice and competition in K–12 education. These systems have to be designed so that all schools have the same time frame for applications and admission decisions, and so that they cannot be gamed by either schools or applying families.

The federal government has a legitimate role in overseeing the marketplace for schooling, including the architecture of parental choice systems. It is in the interest of society that the concentration of high-need students not increase in particular schools. Choice systems have to be carefully and explicitly designed to avoid students being sorted by race, economic background, and other conditions. Several options exist for ensuring that schools cannot discriminate against groups of students, including a lottery system (currently required in federal regulations for start-up charter schools), controlled choice (in which algorithms are used to maintain balanced enrollment), and a financial or fee supplement attached to students in protected classes.

Charter Schools

To ensure a supply of schools from which families may choose, states should establish a system for authorizing charter schools that enables the charter sector to expand to meet demand; that provides funding under the same weighted formula that applies to all other publicly supported schools; and that offers charter schools access to capital commensurate with district school funding. Where there are charter schools, they are frequently the only alternative to regular public schools for low- and moderate-income families. Relative to statewide averages, charter schools tend to attract a disproportionate number of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch as well as minority students, especially African Americans. Initial test scores of students at charter schools are usually well below those of the average public-school student in the state in which the charter school is located.

Research on the effectiveness of charter schools in raising student achievement presents a mixed picture. In general, charter schools that serve low-income and minority students in urban areas are doing a better job than their traditional public-school counterparts in raising student achievement, whereas that is not true of charter schools in suburban areas. Charter schools do require careful oversight through appropriately funded authorizing bodies, equitable funding via a backpack model, and the opportunity to grow based on their ability to attract students. Fulfilling the latter condition means that states that do not allow charter schools, or that arbitrarily cap their growth, or that turn their authorization over to the very school districts with which charters compete should reform their practices. The Obama administration included these conditions in Race to the Top. They should be incorporated into the reauthorization of ESEA.

Cybercharters and Other Choice Schools

Bringing the provision of K–12 education services into the 21st century by unfettering technology as a delivery mechanism will substantially enhance competition and productivity. Unfortunately, virtual courseware and distance learning providers often must make their sales to school districts rather than to individuals. School districts are likely to be reluctant customers because their operations are disrupted by distance learning. The result is that market demand is suppressed and investment in new technologies for K–12 education curtailed.

Much of the anticompetitive force of local school districts is exercised through requirements that link publicly supported education services to geographical constraints. A leading example is restrictions on cybercharter schools, i.e., schools that offer most or all of their instructional programs over the Internet and do not have brick-and-mortar physical locations where students assemble. To the extent that such schools are allowed to operate at all, they typically do so in the context of charter school laws. These laws include conditions such as a minimum number of hours of daily instruction that do not make sense for courses that are delivered over the Internet, can be taken at a student’s own pace, and frequently define completion in terms of mastery rather than seat time. Further, there is currently no provision in any state’s laws or at the federal level for students to attend cybercharter schools that are out of state in the sense of having no physical place of business within a state. States and school districts should be prohibited from establishing policies that unreasonably interfere with the provision of education services by out-of-state or out-of-district providers, including online charter schools and distance learning providers. They should, instead, make enrollment in such schools readily available.

The federal government has a long history of promoting interstate markets through its authority under the U.S. Constitution’s commerce clause. As the judicial interpretation of the commerce clause has evolved over time, it has come to include the federal authority to nullify state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism (the so-called dormant or hidden commerce clause). The dormant commerce clause could be applied to the provision of education services through the Internet, that is, the federal government could take legal action or support legal claims against states and local school districts that restrict or prohibit access to Internet-based education services that are provided outside district or state borders.

In cybereducation, as in many areas of school administration and performance, it is useful to compare K–12 with postsecondary education. In 2006, the most recent year for which national data are available, postsecondary institutions reported more than 12 million separate distance-learning course enrollments. Two-thirds of all postsecondary institutions offered distance learning courses, and there were more than 11,000 individual programs of study that could be completed entirely online. The contrasts with K–12 education are stark; there were only about 1 million distance-learning enrollments in K–12 in 2007.

Cybereducation for postsecondary students is a national rather than a local marketplace. A student can take a distance learning course from the University of Arizona, and the course credit can apply to graduation requirements at a large number of colleges and universities, without geographical restrictions. Further, if the student has qualified for federal student grants or loans, those are attached to the student, i.e., backpacked. The federal government is indifferent to distance learning versus place-based learning and to geographical boundaries in the provision of financial aid to high-need postsecondary students, whereas in K–12, that aid is funneled through local public-service monopolies that hold captive the students in their geographical catchment area. The federal government also recognizes regional and national accrediting bodies for higher education institutions. By simply shifting its policies on K–12 education to match those it has adopted for postsecondary education, the federal government could provide to parents something nearly every parent wants—the right and opportunity to choose where their child is schooled—and create a powerful engine for innovation and productivity.

Although the promise and potential of parental choice is nowhere more evident than in the realm of technology, the arguments for allowing students ready access to cyberschools extend to interdistrict school choice, charter schools, private schools, and vouchers as well. When combined with the availability of good information on school performance to parents and backpack funding, these options could create a dramatically different landscape for schooling than is currently available in the United States.

Moving Forward

The approach we recommend places the federal government in a central role in providing information and compensatory funding and in promoting a competitive and information-rich marketplace for education services. Mechanisms we espouse, such as student-based funding, open enrollment systems, charter schools, and virtual education, are having some success in breaking open the current system, but they require very special circumstances at the state and local level. We understand that our proposals, if adopted, would represent a fundamental shift in the federal government’s role in K–12 education. An attempt to reauthorize ESEA, IDEA, and Head Start to conform to our recommendations may well fail, in part because what we propose will appeal more to some states than to others. There is nothing wrong with such differences. Indeed, the federalism we espouse is built on the advantage that is conferred to citizens by having government policies and services determined as close to home as possible. There is a legislative way forward consistent with our proposal and federalism, one with a rich legislative history and experience of success at the federal level:

Let states opt out of the statutory and regulatory requirements of ESEA, IDEA, Head Start, and other relevant federal laws in exchange for creating a marketplace of informed choice and competition. Some states will find throwing off the federal yoke in exchange for providing maximum education choice for their citizens politically attractive and viable. Those states can serve as the laboratory for the proposals we have put forward. If these initiatives fail to advance student achievement, social equity, and education productivity, and if they lose the support of a state’s electorate, they will be abandoned, and the state will return to the federal fold. If, instead, some states experience the success we think is likely, other states would find the risk of coming onboard manageable and, we think, face escalating demand from their citizens.

The education system clearly has vast consequences for this nation’s economy, society, and world leadership. The federal government has a crucial role to play in protecting and promoting precisely those national interests that lower levels of government cannot. We believe the most promising approach is to move decisionmaking closer to the consumers of K–12 public education by unleashing pent-up demand and empowering parents to choose schools for their children.

Grover J. “Russ” Whitehurst is a member of the Koret Task Force on K-12 Education and director of the Brown Center on Education Policy at the Brookings Institution.

The full report of the Hoover Institution’s Koret Task Force on K-12 Education is available at www.choiceandfederalism.org.

This would be a big change in a short period. Through most of 2011, the Obama Administration reaped accolades for its intention to allow states to take a new course vis-à-vis the Elementary and Secondary Education act (a.k.a. NCLB). In September, the President got wall-to-wall coverage of the official announcement of his plan to offer waivers to the states to give them “more flexibility to meet high standards.”

Keep in mind, the change we’re making is not lowering standards; we’re saying we’re going to give you more flexibility to meet high standards. We’re going to let states, schools and teachers come up with innovative ways to give our children the skills they need to compete for the jobs of the future. Because what works in Rhode Island may not be the same thing that works in Tennessee—but every student should have the same opportunity to learn and grow, no matter what state they live in.

Set aside the debate about the conditions he attached to those standards. Set aside the small matter of Constitutionality and separation of powers. On the issue of flexibility itself, virtually everyone seemed to be in agreement (at least in theory): The 10-year-old law is broken and it’s time to fix it. In particular, Adequate Yearly Progress needs to go the way of the dinosaurs and be replaced by something very different. Even on Capitol Hill, for all the misgivings about Duncan’s unilateralism, there was broad consensus that states should be given much greater leeway to design next-generation accountability systems. (Leeway that both Republican and Democratic governors asked for in an NGA policy statement released last week.)

The idea of flexibility is so popular, in fact, that the President reiterated it in his State of the Union address:

Let’s offer schools a deal. Give them the resources to keep good teachers on the job, and reward the best ones. And in return, grant schools flexibility: to teach with creativity and passion; to stop teaching to the test; and to replace teachers who just aren’t helping kids learn. That’s a bargain worth making.

So far so good. It certainly appeared from the rhetoric that the Administration would make every effort to approve reasonable proposals from states, including the 11 that applied in November for the first round of waivers (the round for which results are now imminent). The era of “Washington knows best” in education would come to an end.

But no. Thanks to excellent reporting by Associated Press correspondent Christine Armario, we now have access to letters the U.S. Department of Education sent to these states in December. Which document that federal micromanagement is still the order of the day.

Consider the missive sent to Massachusetts—the first-place finisher in the Race to the Top, the state with the highest achievement in the land, the one that has seen dramatic gains across all subgroups of students, a strong supporter (for better or worse) of the Common Core standards. One might assume that the Bay State would be given the benefit of the doubt. But no.

Here’s an excerpt from the Department’s response to the Massachusetts waiver request:

Please address concerns identified by peers regarding subgroup accountability, including:

• • Without sufficient safeguards to ensure attention and action when an individual subgroup is struggling over a number of years, the use of the “high needs” combined subgroup could lead to individual subgroups not meeting their goals even when the “high needs” combined subgroup is moving forward, and therefore undermine the goal of improved achievement for all students.
  • Massachusetts’s current n-size for subgroups is too high and should be reduced.
  • Schools with high English Learner populations may not be receiving appropriate, targeted interventions.

And another:

• • Please address concern that without differentiating schools within Level 2, there are insufficient incentives to improve achievement for all groups of students. In particular, please address the concern that annual measurable objectives (AMOs) are not used along with other measures to provide incentives and supports to other Title I schools that are not making progress in improving student achievement and narrowing achievement gaps.

(That’s just the tip of the iceberg; read the whole thing yourself.)

All of these issues can be debated ad nauseum by policy wonks. For example, when creating an A to F rating system, what should qualify a school for an A? Strong achievement? Strong growth over time? If the school misses an achievement or growth target for one subgroup (say, special education kids) should that disqualify it for an A? What if all subgroups are doing well but there’s still a big achievement gap?

Whatever your view on these arcane matters, the real issue at stake is whether the feds, or the states, should make such calls. How can the President promise a state like Massachusetts “flexibility to meet high standards” and then second-guess its attempt to rationalize its accountability system?

So how will this go down?

• The Department of Education will announce that most of the 11 states that applied were approved for flexibility. At first, this will lead to a Kumbaya moment.
• Upon closer inspection, observers will notice that the amount of flexibility granted on accountability is tiny. Approved plans will amount to minor changes away from the AYP system we’ve got today.
• The number of states planning to apply for waivers by February 21 will drop precipitously, as they realize that it’s just not worth the effort.
• All of this will embolden members of Congress to talk (again) about the urgency of fixing No Child Left Behind for real (though nothing will come of it this year).

-Mike Petrilli

This blog entry originally appeared on the Fordham Institute’s Flypaper blog.

Call this the test score hypothesis. It explains reformers’ enthusiasm for test-based accountability; for “college and career-ready standards”; for teacher evaluations based, in significant part, on student outcomes; for “data-based instruction”; and for much of the rest of the modern-day reform agenda. After all, if reading, math, and science knowledge and skills are so directly linked to the life chances of individual kids, and of the livelihood of the country as a whole, why not get the education system focused like a laser on them?

But is this hypothesis correct? Is stronger academic performance related to better life outcomes for kids and better economic outcomes for nations?

In a word: yes. As Kevin Carey noted recently, the big Chetty et al study didn’t just demonstrate the importance of teacher effectiveness. It also offered strong support for the Test Score Hypothesis.

If you believe standardized tests are worthless or highly flawed or deeply inadequate or even troublingly limited in accuracy and scope–and many reasonable people believe these things–then you could dismiss or downplay value-added measures of teacher effectiveness, by definition….But now the CFR study says that teachers who are unusually good at helping students score high on standardized tests today aren’t just unusually good at helping students score high on standardized tests tomorrow. They also have an unusual effect on the likelihood of students going to college, going to a good college, earning a good living, living in a nice place, and saving for retirement. In other words, whatever the limitations of standardized tests may be, test-based value-added scores do, in fact, provide valuable information about the things most people care most about.

Then there’s the international evidence. As Eric Hanushek has been arguing vociferously for years, there’s a direct link between academic achievement (as measured by math and science tests) and a country’s economic growth.

The level of cognitive skills of a nation’s students has a large effect on its subsequent economic growth rate. Increasing the average number of years of schooling attained by the labor force boosts the economy only when increased levels of school attainment also boost cognitive skills. In other words, it is not enough simply to spend more time in school; something has to be learned there.

Hanushek further argues that the only way to solve our country’s long term fiscal challenge is to grow our way out of it. If we could indeed boost the cognitive skills of our students, even by a little, our structural deficit would go away.

So student achievement matters a lot. But does it matter the most? It’s hard to make the case anymore that test scores are irrelevant. But what remains unknown is whether reading, math, and science are the most important things that schools could be teaching. As Dana Goldstein noted back in December,

I’ve been struck again and again by the newness of the idea that schooling is primarily a matter of academic achievement…. It is only really since “A Nation at Risk” that we’ve had a national dialogue about academic excellence for every child. This is a much-needed development in American culture, but its discontents are numerous: A lack of attention paid to the civic, social, and artistic benefits of schooling, and the ways in which children are (ideally) shaped as moral, cultured, socially-responsible people by their teachers and school communities. 

We might all want schools to walk and chew gum at the same time—to boost “academic achievement” while also developing “moral, cultured, socially-responsible people.” But our policies—especially school-level accountability and test-based teacher evaluations—focus on academic achievement alone.

The nagging question then—the “known unknown”—is whether other stuff matters more—both to kids’ life chances and to the country’s economic success. What if, for instance, “social and emotional intelligence”—knowing how to relate to others—is more important than many reformers have been willing to acknowledge? What if these interpersonal skills are what help lift poor kids out of poverty and enable economies to succeed? Or other “soft skills” and attributes like grit, perseverance, industriousness, the ability to delay gratification, and so forth?

In that case, is it smart to push Head Start centers to focus overwhelmingly on pre-literacy and pre-numeracy skills (as many of us have)? Is it wise to cut time for recess, to trim extracurriculars, or to push for the maximum amount of homework, to be completed by solitary would-be scholars? Does it make sense to ask teachers to obsess about student achievement over everything else?

The private school sector, which many reformers admire, is not so conflicted. Every high-end school boasts about its commitment to the “whole child,” to kids’ intellectual, emotional, social, and physical development. These schools would never consider their graduates to be well-educated without an appreciation for the arts, participation in sports, a commitment to community service, and the development of strong character. And judging by the admissions policies of the nation’s great universities, our elite higher education institutions hold this holistic view, too. Are these non-academic attributes just “extras”—luxuries that schools serving poor or working class kids just can’t afford? Or are they as essential as academics, for everyone?

Reading, math, and science matter a lot, but they are almost certainly not enough. That is why we must tread carefully when designing next-generation school accountability and teacher evaluation systems. If we accidentally create incentives for schools and teachers to focus solely on academic achievement and ignore the rest, we could be making our children and our nation less competitive, not more so. Let us proceed with care.

-Mike Petrilli

This blog entry originally appeared on the Fordham Institute’s Flypaper blog.

Behind the Headline
The Case for Special EducationVouchers
Education Next | Winter 2010

Former State Assemblyman Michael Benjamin makes the case for special ed vouchers in New York City in an op-ed appearing in today’s Post. Jay Greene and Stuart Buck explained how special ed vouchers work and dispelled myths about the vouchers in an article appearing in the Winter 2010 issue of Ed Next.

“[Y]ou simply cannot fix America’s schools by `scaling’ charter schools. It won’t work. Charters schools offer proof of the concept that great teaching is a huge difference-maker, but charters can only absorb a tiny fraction of the nation’s 50 million public schoolchildren. Real reform has to go beyond charters – and it has to include the unions. That’s what Brill figured out.”

Wrong. Like many education establishmentarians, Nocera makes the mistake of confusing pedagogy and governance. The former—e.g. great teaching—is a hard nut to crack and Nocera is right to suggest, as does Brill, that there perhaps aren’t enough great teachers in the pipeline (or in charter schools) to educate all 50 million public school students.

But there is certainly no such impediment to `scaling’ charters. Every public school in America could be a charter school tomorrow if policymakers would allow it. Would that “fix” America’s schools? Not necessarily. But it would help.

The other problem with the scaling argument is that it assumes that big is beautiful—that no matter how successful you are, if you can’t replicate your methods of success, then your model won’t be useful to the American public school system. That is true only if you assume a governance structure like the one we now have: a system managed from above. The monolith that we now call public education is dominated by special interests, including unions, that are able to dictate education policy by keeping their hands on a few levers of control (mainly on Capitol Hill and in state capitals).

It is not so much that “reform has to go beyond charters” as it is that real reform must embrace choice—choice at the individual level. In fact, scaling up is really about scaling down.

The new MDRC study of New York City’s small schools seems to make the point perfectly. To quote from the document,

During the past decade, New York City undertook a district-wide high school reform that is perhaps unprecedented in its scope, scale, and pace. Between fall 2002 and fall 2008, the school district closed 23 large failing high schools (with graduation rates below 45 percent), opened 216 new small high schools (with different missions, structures, and student selection criteria), and implemented a centralized high school admissions process that assigns over 90 percent of the roughly 80,000 incoming ninth-graders each year based on their school preferences.

At the heart of this reform are 123 small, academically nonselective, public high schools. Each with approximately 100 students per grade in grades 9 through 12, these schools were created to serve some of the district’s most disadvantaged students and are located mainly in neighborhoods where large failing high schools had been closed. MDRC researchers call them “small schools of choice” (SSCs) because of their small size and the fact that they do not screen students based on their academic backgrounds.

And, according to MDRC, these schools worked. Graduation rates were nearly 10 points higher in the small schools. And the positive effects were spread out to all subgroups, including minorities and the poor.

“Are these small schools perfect?” writes Joe Williams in a New York Post op-ed. “Of course not. In fact, the MDRC report adds to the growing evidence that, while New York City is graduating students at a higher rate than a decade ago, most of these kids are still not ready for college…. Bloomberg and his would-be successors should read the MRDC report from the vantage point of those whose job it is to drive change.”

Williams is right to call out “those whose job it is to drive change.” But that change, as the dramatic restructuring of the system that MDRC studied in New York City shows, must be bold. And it suggests that the question we must ask is “How do you `scale up’ small?”

- Peter Meyer

This post was originally published on the Fordham Institute’s Board’s Eye View

Or so they say, until push comes to shove. And then many of the players discover that they don’t like flexibility after all. They want to change federal policy in theory but not in reality.

It’s not just the President’s bizarre State of the Union request that states raise their compulsory attendance age to 18. (Perhaps that would help to trim the dropout rate, though the studies suggesting so rely on 40-year-old data.) I’m assuming that he was merely using the bully pulpit to promote a pet idea, not suggesting a new federal mandate.

No, I’m referring to the Army of the Potomac’s reaction to John Kline’s ESEA proposal and to Chairman Tom Harkin’s and Rep. George Miller’s response to the waiver requests put forward by several states.

In both cases, we hear somber leaders express concern that the moves will “undermine the core American value of equality of opportunity in education” and move away from “the critically important gains for our students’ civil rights and educational equity that NCLB achieved.”

So what’s the beef? See this from Harkin’s and Miller’s letter to Arne Duncan about the waiver requests:

In its analysis of the eleven waiver applications, the Center on Education Policy found that nine state applicants will base almost all accountability decisions on the achievement of only two students groups; i.e., all students and a “disadvantaged” student group or “super subgroup.” We fear that putting students with disabilities, English language learners and minority students into one “super subgroup” will mask the individual needs of these distinct student subgroups and will prevent schools from tailoring interventions appropriately. Therefore, we urge you to consider each applicant’s subgroup performance measures as significant and coherent components of overall accountability and require applicants to articulate meaningful and effective interventions for schools that are low performing or have subgroups that fail to progress.”

There’s a name for what Harkin and Miller are calling for: the Adequate Yearly Progress system. This is exactly what we’ve got now! So they seem to be saying: “We favor flexibility, as long as nothing really changes.”

There are two debates going on here. One is over the policy specifics; for example, are “super subgroups” a good idea? The second is over power and control: Who should get to decide if super subgroups are a reasonable way forward? If your answer to the second question is “Uncle Sam” then you’re not really a proponent of state flexibility after all. Lefty reformers, civil rights groups, Chairman Harkin, and Representative Miller: I’m talking about you.

-Mike Petrilli

This blog entry originally appeared on the Fordham Institute’s Flypaper blog.

In the first round, the state supreme court in 2004 struck down a statewide voucher program enacted by the legislature for the benefit of students in low-performing districts. The plaintiffs alleged, and the court narrowly concurred, that the program violated a provision of the state constitution that school boards “shall have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts.” The court held that to require school districts to turn over some locally raised money to private schools, as the law did, offended that provision.

This seemed to suggest that a program adopted by a local school board might survive, and a test recently emerged. Suburban areas with high-performing school districts have shown little support for vouchers, so it was surprising to have the first locally enacted voucher program come from Douglas County, a Denver suburb with one of the highest median incomes in the country. School choice advocates, however, had targeted the district in school board elections. As a result, the normally nonpartisan elections turned partisan in 2009, when the Republican Party endorsed a slate of four candidates and handily defeated candidates endorsed by the teachers union.

Those efforts bore fruit in March 2011 when Douglas County’s school board unanimously approved the Pilot Choice Scholarship Program. Through this plan, any student who had been enrolled in district schools for at least one year could apply for a voucher of approximately $4,600, equal to 75 percent of state per-pupil funding, to attend a “partner” private school, with the school district keeping the other 25 percent. Religious schools would not have to waive admission requirements to participate, but would have to offer an exemption for voucher students who wished to be excused from religious services. Of the 19 initial partner schools, 14 were sectarian. The school board capped the program at 500 students but expected it to expand. As the third-largest district in the state, Douglas County serves more than 61,000 students.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), along with Americans United for Separation of Church and State, sued, citing a host of constitutional offenses, including violating the ban on support for private schools and churches (the state’s Blaine Amendment), the ban on religious tests, the guarantee of religious freedom, the uniformity requirement in the education clause, the prohibition on support for private institutions, and, for good measure, the guarantee of local control. After a three-day hearing in August, state district court judge Michael Martinez granted the ACLU’s request for a permanent injunction. Clearly alarmed by the religious instruction that would occur at religious schools—“not only is the risk of religion intruding into the secular educational function great, that risk is inevitable and unavoidable due to the very structure of the Scholarship Program”—Judge Martinez accepted nearly all of the ACLU’s claims.

Voucher supporters lined up to assist Douglas County in defending the program. The Daniels Fund, a well-regarded and influential foundation in the Rocky Mountain region, pledged $530,000 for legal expenses. In addition, the libertarian Institute for Justice filed an appeal on behalf of several families whose children were granted vouchers.

While the ACLU obviously has a grab bag of provisions at its disposal going forward, one risk is its reliance on the state Blaine Amendment. If state courts rule that the amendment requires that religious students and institutions be treated differently than secular ones, as Martinez’s ruling seems to imply, it could potentially raise a federal challenge under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a violation of free exercise and equal protection. The most promising outcome for Douglas County would be for Mickey Mouse to meet the U.S. Constitution.

Joshua Dunn is associate professor of political science at the University of Colorado–Colorado Springs. Martha Derthick is professor emerita of government at the University of Virginia.

Yes, answers Roland Fryer in an amazing study released this month.  Based on earlier work, he identified 5 features of charter schools that helped them produce strong results: “increased time, better human capital, more student-level differentiation, frequent use of data to inform instruction, and a culture of high expectations.”  Fryer then somehow convinced the superintendent and school board in Houston to pursue these five reforms in a serious way in 9 struggling traditional public schools. (CORRECTION — the Houston folks report that they were eager to pursue some promising reforms and required no convincing.  They should be commended for that.) Here, in brief, is what they did:

To increase time on task, the school day was lengthened one hour and the school year was lengthened ten days. This amounts to 21 percent more school than students in these schools obtained in the year pre-treatment and roughly the same as successful charter schools in New York City. In addition, students were strongly encouraged and even incentivized to attend classes on Saturday. In an effort to significantly alter the human capital in the nine schools, 100 percent of principals, 30 percent of other administrators, and 52 percent of teachers were removed and replaced with individuals who possessed the values and beliefs consistent with an achievement-driven mantra and, wherever possible, a demonstrated record of achievement. To enhance student-level differentiation, we supplied all sixth and ninth graders with a math tutor in a two-on-one setting and provided an extra dose of reading or math instruction to students in other grades who had previously performed below grade level. This model was adapted from the MATCH school in Boston – a charter school that largely adheres to the methods described in Dobbie and Fryer (2011b). In order to help teachers use interim data on student performance to guide and inform instructional practice, we required schools to administer interim assessments every three to four weeks and provided schools with three cumulative benchmarks assessments, as well as assistance in analyzing and presenting student performance on these assessments. Finally, to instill a culture of high expectations and college access for all students, we started by setting clear expectations for school leadership. Schools were provided with a rubric for the school and classroom environment and were expected to implement school-parent-student contracts. Specific student performance goals were set for each school and the principal was held accountable for these goals.

And the result:

In the grade/subject areas in which we implemented all five policies described in Dobbie and Fryer (2011b) – sixth and ninth grade math – the increase in student achievement is dramatic. Relative to students who attended comparison schools, sixth grade math scores increased 0.484σ (.097) in one year. In seventh and eighth grades, the treatment effect in math is 0.125σ (.065) and is statistically significant. A very similar pattern emerges in high school math: large effects in ninth grade and a more modest but statistically significant effect in tenth and eleventh grade, which suggest that two-on-one tutoring is particularly effective. The results in reading exhibit a different pattern. If anything, the reading scores demonstrate a slight decrease in middle school, though not statistically significant, and a modest increase in high school. Impacts on attendance – which are positive and statistically insignificant – are difficult to interpret given the longer school day and longer school year.

Strikingly, both the magnitude of the increase in math and the muted effect for reading are consistent with the results of successful charter schools. Taking the treatment effects at face value, treatment schools in Houston would rank third out of twelve in math and fifth out of twelve in reading among charter schools in NYC with statistically significant positive results in the sample analyzed in Dobbie and Fryer (2011b).

Using data from the National Student Clearinghouse, we investigate treatment effects on two college outcomes: whether a student enrolled in any college (extensive margin) and whether they chose a four-year college, conditional on enrolling in any college (intensive margin). Calculated at the mean, students are 6.2 percentage points less likely to attend college, though the effect is not statistically significant. Conditional on attending college, however, treatment students are 17.7 percentage points more likely to enroll in a four-year institution, relative to a mean of 46% in comparison schools – a 40% increase.

Traditional public schools can get results like a KIPP school without having to actually become KIPP schools. They just have to imitate a few of the key features employed by KIPP and other successful charter schools. This is incredibly encouraging news. It means that traditional public schools are really capable of making significant progress if only they become more open to learning from successful charter schools. They can make that progress without having to cure poverty and all other social ills (although I’m sure that would be nice too).

Of course, there are serious concerns about bringing these reforms to scale, which Fryer considers in his conclusion. He dismisses union opposition as a serious obstacle based on the fact that the unionized school system in Denver is pursuing a similar reform strategy. I’m not so easily convinced that unions nationwide will jump aboard a plan that involves huge turnover in staffing and significantly more hours and days per year. Cost is another barrier to bringing this reform strategy to scale, but he notes that the marginal cost is only $1,837 per student and the rate of return on that investment would be roughly 20%.

But the most serious concerns seem to be fidelity to implementation and shortages of quality labor. We could all be heart surgeons if we just did what heart surgeons do. But there are only so many people capable of doing that work and not every office building can be re-organized as a hospital. Then again, successful teaching isn’t exactly heart surgery (although it can be just about as important), so perhaps there is real hope of bringing this to scale. We won’t know until we try it in more places with more schools.

- Jay Greene

• It worked!

As Mark Schneider shows in his recent paper for Fordham—and as Eric Hanushek and others demonstrated before him—poor, minority, and low-achieving students made huge progress in math, and sizable progress in reading, during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Their most recent scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress indicate all-time highs for most grades and subjects. These students are typically performing two grade levels ahead of where their peers were fifteen years ago in math, and are reading at least one grade level higher. So how to explain these historic gains? While we can’t draw causal conclusions from NAEP, we can make educated guesses. What’s clear is that states that adopted “consequential accountability” in the nineties saw big test-score jumps, and the late-adopter states saw similar progress once No Child Left Behind kicked into action. So, while other factors could have been in play, too (such as efforts to reduce class size or the cessation of the crack-cocaine epidemic), there’s a pretty good case that testing and accountability succeeded in spurring higher student achievement, at least at the bottom of the performance spectrum.

• But it couldn’t work forever. As Schneider argues, the test-score gains sparked by NCLB-style accountability appear to have hit a plateau. We’re back to anemic progress in most grades and subjects, particularly in the states (like Texas) that embraced testing and accountability first. That shouldn’t be too surprising. While the initial pressure (and shame) provided by consequential accountability appears to have changed behavior at the district and school level, after a while being called a “failing school” loses its sting. Furthermore, holding “schools” accountable has rarely equaled holding individuals accountable—real-live teachers and principals who might lose their jobs. Once it became clear that NCLB was all bark and no bite, schools could return to the status quo ante.
• The trade-offs are real. The good news is that we’ve seen enormous progress for our lowest-achieving students. The bad news is that we’ve seen languid progress for our highest achievers. The good news is that math scores are way up and, to a lesser degree, reading scores are up, too (especially for poor and minority kids). The bad news is that history and science have been squeezed out of the elementary school curriculum, particularly in high-poverty schools. Whether these trade-offs were worth it depends on your point of view. Personally, I’d prefer a policy that aims for more balance: achievement gains across the performance spectrum, not just at the bottom; and a more holistic view of what it means for students to be well educated. Literacy and numeracy are (obviously) not enough.
• Pet ideas from both parties crashed and burned. The Democrats gave the country the “white elephant” gift of the “highly qualified teachers” mandate, a policy that succeeded in turning the nation’s teachers against NCLB from the very beginning; managed to tie up myriad schools (including charters) in all manner of red tape; and gravely threatened Teach For America, one of the most promising reforms of the NCLB era. From the Republicans we got “supplemental educational services,” a.k.a. free tutoring. This was more of an impulse than a fleshed-out idea. It was never clear whether SES was meant to be a sanction for failing districts (if you don’t improve your test scores, we’ll take some of your Title I money away from you); a serious effort at parental choice; or a way to “extend” learning time for needy kids. Regardless, its entire design was predicated on cooperation from school districts, which were responsible for facilitating the flow of funds away from their coffers and into the hands of nonprofit and for-profit providers. As my Italian grandmother would have said, “Fatta chance.
• It’s time for something new. On this point, virtually everybody agrees. But what should the next phase of education reform entail? The contours are now taking shape. First, there’s agreement that, for accountability to be real, it has to be placed upon real-live people, not just amorphous “schools.” That means, first and foremost, holding teachers accountable for their performance. Thus the interest in: more sophisticated teacher-evaluation systems, tenure reform, performance pay, and all the rest. Second, there’s broad consensus that we need to balance the “tough love” approach of accountability with the “helping hand” of capacity-building: Providing teachers with tools like a coherent curriculum—linked to the new Common Core standards—so they don’t have to make it all up on their own. And third, we can all glimpse the promise of digital learning, if technology can be harnessed effectively and if the political and governance roadblocks can be removed. But what’s the appropriate (and politically feasible) federal role in all of this? In all of these reforms, Uncle Sam’s involvement will be—and should be—minimal. The political thirst for aggressive federal involvement in education has been quenched, and the dollars to fund it spent. Plus these “next wave” reforms require nuance, care, and thoughtfulness to get them right—attributes not associated with Uncle Sam. In other words, reform will continue, but the federal government will lead from behind. As well it should.

Happy birthday, No Child Left Behind. And here’s hoping that you don’t make it to eleven.

-Michael Petrilli

This post also appeared on Flypaper.

Many educators and elected officials, including more than a few members of Congress, regard “No Child Left Behind,” the well-known moniker of George W. Bush’s 2001 education act, as a discredited “brand.” Indeed, the very acronym NCLB is about to be tossed into the dustbin of history in favor of its progenitor, ESEA (the Elementary and Secondary Education Act), or perhaps some new title yet to be devised on Capitol Hill. There are many reasons why NCLB has been discredited, including, to quote Kevin Carey, the “apocalyptic language out there, that standards and tests have ruined American public education, driven the best teachers out of the classroom, etc., etc.”

Yet, as the data presented below demonstrate, NCLB—and the accountability movement it embodied, codified, and symbolized—contributed to a major change in the performance level of American students in math. The data also suggest, however, that the accountability movement has likely reached a point of diminishing (or perhaps even no) returns. While moving on from NCLB is probably essential to produce further growth in student performance, “consequential accountability” was an important and meaningful education reform and ought not be dismissed as a failed initiative.

Debates over the effects and effectiveness of NCLB almost always revolve around national and state scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). Not surprisingly, the release in November 2011 of the newest NAEP Mathematics and Reading Report Cards set off a new round of discussion about the impact of NCLB and accountability more generally. Given the ongoing fights surrounding the overdue reauthorization of ESEA/NCLB, the debate over the effects of accountability is more important now than ever.

Remember that NCLB’s system of consequential accountability (in which schools face cascading penalties for failure, e.g., replacement of the school’s principal, reconstitution, closure, etc.) was built upon the experience of many states that had already developed such systems before 2001. There is considerable agreement that states adopting consequential accountability before NCLB experienced more rapid growth in their test scores relative to non-adopting states. However, as Hanushek and Raymond note, as NCLB took hold, all states became “effectively consequential accountability states.” Perhaps not surprisingly, after NCLB, states that were new to the accountability regime experienced faster growth on NAEP assessments than states that had introduced their own accountability regimes before 2001.

The Case of Texas

Texas was one of the first states in the nation to adopt strict and consequential accountability. The Texas experience was fundamental to the framing of NCLB, as George W. Bush took the lessons and practices of Texas along with him when he moved from Austin to Washington. Thus, looking at the growth in NAEP scores in Texas relative to changes in the nation as a whole allows us to tease out some lessons about the effects of accountability on student performance and to speculate about the effectiveness of accountability past, present, and future.

As we look at these data, we should remember that, while NAEP is rightfully viewed as the “gold standard” of assessments, it is not the ideal instrument for detailed statements of cause and effect. We should further keep in mind one of the prime maxims of statistics: Correlation is not causation.

The Remarkable Growth in NAEP Math Scores

It is well known that, as measured by NAEP, American students have improved substantially in math (more in fourth grade than in eighth) and little in reading over the last two decades. Separate and apart from overall averages, there has been continuing concern for the level of skills among racial/ethnic minorities as well as concern for the effects of accountability on low- versus high-performing students (specifically, whether or not NCLB placed so much attention on low-performing students that high-performing students were neglected and suffered as a result). Looking at trends in Texas versus the nation presents some insights into these issues.

Fourth-Grade Mathematics

Consider Figure 1, which graphs the average scale scores on NAEP’s math assessment for fourth-grade students in Texas and in the United States as a whole. The growth in the performance of these students is nothing short of remarkable. Using the very rough rule of thumb that a 10-point change in NAEP scores equals about one year of learning, in 2011 our fourth graders are about two years ahead of where they were in 1992. But, as the figure shows, Texas and the nation marked their peaks of achievement at two distinct points in time.

In 1992, students in Texas were performing at the same level as the students in the nation. In the 1993-94 school year, Texas introduced its system of consequential accountability and, by the time of the next NAEP assessment in 1996, Texas fourth-graders had surpassed their peers nationwide. Between 1992 and 2000, math scores across the nation began to creep up; during the same period, a growing number of states began to adopt accountability systems.

By 2003, NCLB had turned every state into a consequential accountability state, and the rate of increase nationwide in math scores between 2000 and 2007 was remarkable. While Texas students continued to outperform the nation as a whole through 2007, the sharp uptick in national performance after 2000 narrowed the Texas lead substantially. Indeed, the last two assessments, in 2009 and 2011, show no significant difference between fourth graders in Texas and fourth graders nationwide.

We return to these overall patterns later, but first we turn to the performance of three groups of students who served as particular focal points of NCLB and the accountability movement more generally: blacks (Figure 2), Hispanics (Figure 3), and low-performing students (Figure 4), defined here by the cut score identifying those students performing at NAEP’s 10th percentile.

At the beginning of the series in 1992, black and Hispanic fourth-grade students in Texas scored slightly higher than their nationwide peers, while those low-performing students at the 10th percentile in Texas achieved at the same level as those at the 10th percentile nationally.

Between 1992 and 2000, the scores of Texas students in all three groups increased faster than those of their peers nationwide, with the size of the gap between student in Texas and the nation widening to well over 10 points for each group. Between 2000 and 2003, nationwide, the gains for students in each group increased dramatically but then slowed substantially. Gains among Texas fourth graders were sustained over a longer period of time, but also show evidence of little growth since 2005, with Hispanic and the lowest-performing students actually scoring lower in the latest assessments than in 2007.

The growth in fourth-grade math achievement represents one of the most significant success stories in contemporary American education. Again, the reader is reminded that, while correlation is not causation, the introduction of consequential accountability in Texas and then across the nation coincided with impressive spikes in the performance of students in fourth-grade math, and in particular among the students of most concern to NCLB and the accountability movement more generally.

Eighth-Grade Mathematics

NAEP test results for eighth-grade math represent a somewhat weaker reflection of this striking pattern (Figure 5). The first NAEP eighth-grade math assessment was in 1990, at which time Texas eighth graders lagged the nation by 5 points. That gap disappeared by 2000. By 2005, as the strong fourth-grade performers moved into the eighth grade and as the Texas system of consequential accountability continued to gain traction, Texas eighth graders moved past their national peers, producing a gap of 6 points. Whether eighth-grade test scores can continue to grow, given the flattening scores at the fourth grade, is something that remains to be seen.

Among black and Hispanic eighth graders, Texas students started at about the same place as their national peers in 1990. Over time, however, they experienced steady growth in performance, producing a widening gap with the nation. Indeed, the size of the gap for black students (in favor of Texas) has increased from 6 or 7 points before 2000 to 10 points in the last three assessments (Figure 6). The size of the gaps in favor of Hispanic students in Texas has been somewhat more variable, and was not statistically significant before 2000 (Figure 7). But this gap has grown to over 10 points in the last three assessments. Similarly, the cut score defining the lowest 10th percentile has risen more rapidly in Texas than in the nation as a whole (Figure 8), becoming statistically significant in 2000 and almost doubling in size from 2000 (7 points) to the latest assessment in 2011 (13 points).

High-Performing Students

A frequent criticism of the accountability movement and NCLB was that the focus on racial and ethnic minorities and on the lowest-performing students led to a neglect of the nation’s highest-performing youngsters.

Here we define high-performing students as those performing at NAEP’s 90th percentile. Fourth-grade math scores for these students both in Texas and in the nation display sharp increases since 1992 (Figure 9). The cut score for the top performers nationwide stood at 259 in 1992 and steadily rose to 276 in 2011, a gain of 17 points. The highest-performing fourth graders in Texas saw a correspondingly large jump in cut scores from 256 in 1992 to 273 in 2005. (Interestingly, half of that gain occurred between the assessments immediately preceding and following implementation of the state’s accountability system in 1993-94). Since 2005, however, there has been no statistically significant change in cut score for those Texas youngsters, although the national cut score for high performers has continued to rise—producing a statistically significant difference (to the disadvantage of Texas) in the two most recent administrations of NAEP.

Eighth-grade math scores among the highest performers also improved substantially over the period, gaining 14 points nationally and 17 points in Texas (Figure 10). The sharpest gains for these high-performing eighth graders in Texas were between 2000 and 2005, building on the improvement made in math by Texas fourth graders four years earlier. Gains continued thereafter at somewhat slower rates, likely reflecting the slower growth in fourth-grade math skills.

The growth in NAEP scores of the highest-performing students in Texas and the nation essentially mirrors the gains made by student groups that were focal to the policy goals of NCLB. Whatever changes more directly focused on specific target populations apparently spilled over to affect the performance of high performers as well. And just as we saw evidence of diminishing effectiveness in recent years for average, minority, and low-performing students, there is evidence that the spillover effects of accountability on high-performing students are also wearing thin. The recent absence of growth in Texas fourth-grade math skills among these high-performing students may portend the end of a remarkable period of growth among the highest performers in the second-largest state in the union.

The Disappointing Case of Reading Scores

The improvements in NAEP math scores were an unquestionable success for America’s fourth and eighth graders and even more so for students in Texas. However, neither the nation as a whole nor Texas has done nearly as well improving students’ reading skills. Figure 11 shows no significant difference between the reading scores of fourth-grade students in Texas and in the nation as a whole, except in 2003, and minimal improvement across the board. And Texas’s eighth graders have significantly lagged the nation since 2003: by 2 points in 2007 and by 4 to 5 points in every other assessment between 2003 and 2011 (Figure 12).

Accountability and NCLB Were a Success, But…

In 1972, Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldridge proposed a theory of evolutionary change that emphasized what they termed “punctuated equilibrium.” Their core insight was that complex systems will exist in long periods of stasis. Rather than coming in small incremental steps, change is often characterized by abrupt radical transformations caused by events external to the existing system. Perhaps the most dramatic example is the relatively sudden disappearance of dinosaurs associated with a meteor crashing into the Earth and changing the climate. As a result, the dinosaurs’ long reign was replaced by a new equilibrium dominated by mammals.

In 1993, political scientists Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones introduced this theory to the study of public policy, and it has since become a common lens through which to view change in social systems. Baumgartner and Jones argued that policy generally changes only incrementally, until some event, such as change in the party control of government or sizable shifts in public opinion, lead to large policy alterations. In their approach, large changes in external conditions (what Baumgartner and Jones term an “exogenous shock”) are often needed to produce change in complex social and political systems.

The pattern of test scores in Texas and the nation suggest that consequential accountability—adopted early by Texas, then by more states, and finally by the nation as a whole—was a shock to the U.S. school system that altered the ecosystem and led to a different outcome than had existed before. Over a relatively short period, math performance in fourth and eighth grade abruptly shifted to higher levels of performance. For example, between 2000 and 2005—the five years spanning the introduction of accountability via NCLB—the average math scale score nationwide at the fourth grade rose by 12 points, roughly a year of learning. In the same period, the average scale score for black fourth graders rose by 18 points, for Hispanic students by 17 points, and the cut score defining the 10th percentile of performance increased by 16 points. The corresponding changes among eighth-grade math scores are small only in comparison: 6 points nationwide, 11 points for black students, 10 points for Hispanic students, and 8 points for those students at the 10th percentile.

To be sure, an important lingering issue is the absence of growth in reading scores in Texas and in the nation as a whole. Many have argued that the foundation for reading, compared to math, is far more dependent on what happens early in children’s lives—before they enroll in school—and that improving reading skills is therefore much harder to accomplish. Whatever the explanation, clearly the absence of growth reflects a failure of the accountability “meteor” to affect reading levels in a fundamental way.

There is once final pattern to note: As would be expected when viewed through the punctuated- equilibrium lens, once the disruption of consequential accountability has wrung all changes out of the system, a new stasis should take hold. Indeed, Texas, an early adopter, led the nation to higher scores and seems to be ahead of the nation in reaching a new plateau where changes are minimal compared to what came in response to the introduction of an accountability system. The nation, which lagged Texas in adopting accountability, now seems to be entering a period of little change in test scores.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, accountability was an exogenous shock that produced radical gains in math if not in reading. But we now need a new shock to prevent a prolonged period of stasis and stagnation. Scanning the heavens for the next meteor, the most likely candidates to come crashing into the school ecosystem are the Common Core and the better measurement of teacher performance. If the United States is lucky, one or both of these shocks will produce yet another major uptick in math scores. If we are really lucky, these shocks will produce upticks in reading and other subject areas as well.

Mark Schneider, a former commissioner of the National Center for Education Statistics, is a vice president at American Institutes for Research and visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. This article was commissioned and also published by the Fordham Institute.

So argues Mark Schneider, a scholar, analyst, and friend whom we once affectionately (and appropriately) named “Statstud.” Schneider, a political scientist, served as commissioner of the National Center for Education Statistics from 2005 to 2008, and is now affiliated with the American Institutes for Research and the American Enterprise Institute. In his new analysis, he digs into twenty years of trends on the National Assessment of Educational Progress—the “Nation’s Report Card.”

We originally asked Schneider to investigate the achievement record of the great state of Texas. At the time—it feels like just yesterday—Lone Star Governor Rick Perry was riding high in the polls, making an issue of education, and taking flak from Secretary Arne Duncan for running an inadequate school system. We wondered: Was Duncan right to feel “very, very badly” for the children of Texas? Had the state’s schools—once darlings of the standards movement and prototypes for NCLB—really slipped into decline since Perry took office? What do the NAEP data really show?

Schneider agreed to take on the project but quickly concluded that there’s a larger and more interesting story to tell than simply the saga of Texas. It was true, he noted, that Texas’s achievement slowed during the Perry years, particularly as compared to the rest of the country. But rather than pin that development on the governor, Schneider saw a more likely explanation: As an early adopter of standards, testing, and accountability, Texas got a head start on big achievement gains, most of which it realized in the 1990s when George W. Bush was governor—and also a head start on flat-lining thereafter, during Rick Perry’s tenure.

Indeed, the Lone Star State made Texas-sized gains from the early- to mid-1990s, as its accountability system got traction. But as other states followed suit, they too hit the achievement fast-track, leading to sizable national gains from 1998 to 2003. Since then, however, Texas’s progress has cooled, and the same is now happening to the country as a whole. It’s not that Perry was a worse “education governor” than Bush (or, for that matter, Ann Richards) before him, but that he presided over an accountability strategy that was running out of steam.

It’s an intriguing argument, and one that deserves serious consideration, even more so as the U.S. marks the tenth anniversary of the enactment of NCLB and tries to figure out what the next version of that law should entail. If school-level accountability, as currently practiced, is no longer an effective lever for raising student achievement, then what is? If we need another “meteor” to disrupt the system, where should we look? Mark suggests that the Common Core and rigorous teacher evaluations have potential. We also see promise in the digital-learning revolution. But other shocks to the system might work even better. What are they?

-Chester E. Finn, Jr. and Michael Petrilli

Personally, I’m most interested in the states’ plans around accountability. Partly that’s because this is the only part of this waiver process that I find legitimate and legal; the Department of Education has no business demanding that states adopt and implement the Common Core standards or rigorous teacher evaluations. But if it’s going to allow states to opt-out of the law’s Adequate Yearly Progress system, it certainly has the right to set boundaries around the alternatives. And partly it’s because the major sticking point in the current negotiations over ESEA reauthorization comes down to accountability, and how much leeway to give the states.

So what do these 11 states want to do differently on the accountability front? Particularly when it comes to identifying schools that should be subject to some sort of sanctions or interventions? Here’s what the future holds if the Department of Education gives its assent:

1. A deadline for getting all kids to “proficiency” will go the way of the dinosaur. None of the states opted to set a deadline for universal proficiency. A few agreed to reduce the number of not-yet-proficient students by 50 percent over the next six years, but most developed their own twist on “annual measurable objectives.”

2. A focus on growth will eclipse the need for “subgroup accountability.” Models such as the one proposed by Colorado would set “annual measurable objectives” at the kid-level. Schools would be expected to help all students make enough progress to get them to a college-and-career ready standard by high school. (For high achieving students who are already approaching this standard, schools would be held accountable for making sure they grow at least a year’s worth of learning every year.) This is exactly the right concept–have a real-live standard (college readiness) and ask schools to aim at getting all kids to it by graduation. That will require making the most rapid progress for the students who are furthest behind. Since those kids are more likely to be poor and from minority groups, it makes subgroup accountability per se unnecessary. (Though the Administration’s guidelines still require it.)

3. Subjects beyond reading and math will count again. Seven of the states are taking the opportunity to expand the subjects included in their accountability systems. Colorado will look at writing, science, and ACT results; Florida will add writing and science; Georgia will include science and social studies for grades 3-8 and a whole suite of exit exams for high school; Kentucky and Oklahoma add science, social studies, and writing; and Massachusetts and Tennessee will both add science to the mix. This should be helpful in counteracting the narrowing of the curriculum.

In other words, the states are presenting sensible alternatives to the antiquated Adequate Yearly Progress model. That doesn’t prove that “states are good” and “the feds are bad.” On the contrary, it just shows that our thinking and technology around accountability have improved over the ten years since NCLB was enacted. But it does lay down a challenge to Arne Duncan, his peer reviewers, and his team: Say yes to these proposals or be  accused of a “Washington knows best” mentality.

-Mike Petrilli

This post also appears on Flypaper.

Checked by Eric A. Hanushek

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) was scheduled for reauthorization in 2007, and its future has in recent months garnered renewed attention. Yet so far, Congress has found it impossible to reach sufficient consensus to update the legislation, as competing groups want to a) keep all the essential features of the current law as a way of maintaining the pressure on schools to teach all students, b) modify the federal law by moving to a value-added or some alternative testing and accountability system, or c) eliminate federal testing and accountability requirements altogether, reverting to the days when the compensatory education law was simply a framework for distributing federal funds to school districts. Critics of NCLB’s testing and accountability requirements have a litany of complaints: The tests are inaccurate, schools and teachers should not be responsible for the test performance of unprepared or unmotivated students, the measure of school inadequacy used under NCLB is misleading, the tests narrow the curriculum to what is being tested, and burdens imposed upon teachers and administrators are excessively onerous.

But in all the acrimonious discussion surrounding NCLB, surprisingly little attention has been given to the actual impact of that legislation and other accountability systems on student performance. Now a reputable body, a committee set up by the National Research Council (NRC), the research arm of the National Academy of Sciences, has reached a conclusion on this matter. In its report, Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Education, the committee says that NCLB and state accountability systems have been so ineffective at lifting student achievement that accountability as we know it should probably be dropped by federal and state governments alike. Further, the committee objects to state laws that require students to pass an examination for a high school diploma. There is no evidence that such tests boost student achievement, the committee says, and some students, about 2 percent, are not getting their diplomas because they can’t—or think they can’t—pass the test. The headline of the May 2011 NRC press release is frank and bold in the way committee reports seldom are: “Current test-based incentive programs have not consistently raised student achievement in U.S.; Improved approaches should be developed and evaluated.”

Needless to say, the report can be expected to play an important role in the continuing debate over NCLB. Upon its initial release, the report captured top billing, appearing on Education Week’s front page. Certainly, the NRC intends for the report to influence the NCLB conversation, rushing a draft version to the media five months before the completed report was available to the public.

Unfortunately, the NRC’s strongly worded conclusions are only weakly supported by scientific evidence, despite the fact that NRC’s stated mission is “to improve government decision making and public policy, increase public understanding, and promote the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge.”

The Report

Reports from the NRC are generally treated as highly credible. The NRC convenes panels of outside experts who volunteer their time to provide consensus opinions on issues of policy significance. And this particular panel includes a number of especially qualified researchers (see sidebar). The committee chair, Michael Hout, is a member of the National Academy of Sciences; 7 of the 17 panel members have named professorships; 2 are deans (of law and education schools); and a majority have published articles about testing, accountability, or incentives.

When it comes to gathering together the general literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the use of incentives in various contexts, the committee’s work is solidly constructed. But this strong scientific discussion of theory and empirical analysis of incentives and accountability breaks down when it comes to the committee’s core purpose: evaluating accountability regimes in education that employ incentives and tests.

The report comes to two policy conclusions: NCLB and state accountability systems have proven ineffective and state-required high-school exams are counterproductive. The unequivocal presentation of the conclusions is clearly designed to leave little doubt in the minds of policymakers. When the underlying evidence is examined, however, it becomes apparent that neither conclusion is warranted. Instead of weighing the full evidence before it in the neutral manner expected of an NRC committee, the panel selectively uses available evidence and then twists it into bizarre, one might say biased, conclusions.

Selecting Evidence

To get a grasp of the bias that motivated the report’s authors, consider how its first conclusion is phrased:

Test-based incentive programs, as designed and implemented in the programs that have been carefully studied, have not increased student achievement enough to bring the United States close to the levels of the highest achieving countries.

Note especially that the conclusion does not say that there is no evidence that testing and accountability work. It says that testing and accountability, by themselves, cannot lift the United States to the level of accomplishment reached by the world’s highest-achieving countries, an extraordinary standard for evaluating a policy innovation. To catch up to the leading countries would require gains of at least half of a standard deviation, or roughly two years of learning (see “Are U.S. Students Ready to Compete?” features, Fall 2011). No individual reform on the public agenda—neither merit pay, class size reduction, salary jumps for teachers, nor Race to the Top—can claim or even hope for anything close to that level of impact. The appropriate question is not whether testing and accountability is a panacea, but whether it has proven worthwhile.

By that more appropriate standard of judgment, the committee’s own data indicate that testing and accountability have proven effective, if not quite the spectacular success promised by those who enacted NCLB into law. The committee report tells us that the average estimated impact of these interventions is 0.08 standard deviations of student achievement. In other words, the average student in a state without accountability would have performed at the 53rd percentile of achievement had that student been in a state with an accountability system, all other things being equal.

That estimate may well be too low. The report states that “our literature review is limited to studies that allow us to draw causal conclusions about the overall effects of incentive policies and programs,” and then it goes on to describe several types of studies that would be excluded by this criterion. Where does the 0.08 come from? The committee considers a review from 2008 of 14 studies, and 4 studies conducted after that review. The review presents an average impact of 0.08. The NRC committee apparently felt no need to look any further and ignored the fact that a majority of the 14 studies would not come close to meeting its standard of enabling a “causal conclusion.” The committee determines that one of the more recent studies also supports an estimate of 0.08, although that study’s authors prefer estimates that are much higher. The 14 earlier studies and the 4 later ones produce a wide distribution of estimated impacts, but the committee makes no attempt to investigate whether the unusual estimates suggest circumstances under which accountability seems particularly effective (or ineffective). The committee chooses to emphasize the studies with negative findings (10 percent) while downplaying a number of those that have positive findings (90 percent). Thus the NRC mantra, repeated with slightly different wording throughout the report: “Despite using them for several decades, policymakers and educators do not yet know how to use test-based incentives to consistently generate positive effects on achievement and to improve education.” Apparently, the inconsistent results heralded in the press release reflect the 10 percent of studies that differed from the overwhelming majority.

Small Gains Add Up

Let us put this concern aside and consider the increment in student performance of 0.08 standard deviations of individual achievement that the committee presents as its best estimate. Is that so small an effect that it cannot justify continuation of testing and accountability? Consider that this is the average effect of a program that has been implemented on a national scale, affecting students across the country. We are hard pressed to come up with any other education program working at scale that has produced such results. Moreover, these average gains are the result of accountability systems that many people believe have important flaws. Even larger gains might be expected if those flaws could be corrected, as many experts, though not the NRC panel, have suggested.

The estimated benefits from a 0.08 standard deviation gain in student performance vastly outweigh its estimated costs. The cost of designing, administering, grading, and reporting the results from statewide examinations have been estimated at between $20 and $50 per pupil, a trivial sum considering that per-pupil education expenditures in the United States run above $12,000 annually. Most reforms—including class size reduction, merit pay, across-the-board raises for teachers, in-service training programs, or the scaling up of charter schools—would cost many, many times as much. For these innovations to have the same kick for every dollar invested, results would have to be improbably large.

The NRC, instead of considering these actual costs, suggests that implicit costs in the form of narrowed curricula are the most important, but it provides no evidence for its view.

What might the economic impact of a 0.08 standard deviation improvement in average achievement nationwide be? Along with University of Munich professor Ludger Woessmann, I have estimated the impact on U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of higher levels of student achievement. These estimates project the historical pattern of growth to determine the result of gains in student achievement, calculate the additions to GDP over the next 80 years, and discount them back to today so that they are comparable to other current investments. A 0.08 improvement has a present value of some $14 trillion, very close to the current $15 trillion level of our entire GDP, and equivalent to $45,000 for every man, woman, and child in the U.S. today. In other words, an inexpensive program that affects every student nationwide can, over the long run, have a very large impact, even if its average effect seems at first glance to be quite small. Indeed, if we figured testing cost $100 per student each year for the next 80 years and we tested all students rather than the limited grades tested now, the rate of return on the investment would be 9,189 percent. Google investors would be envious.

Several omissions from the report are also noteworthy. The report gives only passing attention to the positive impact of NCLB on the education of the most disadvantaged students, a consequence of the requirement to report performance by specific subgroups (e.g., racial and ethnic groups and the economically disadvantaged). The NRC report’s main reference to this feature of current accountability systems is that consideration of subgroup performance has added analytical difficulties because of the smaller samples.

Perhaps more telling, this panel of experts on testing and incentives makes absolutely no effort to describe how accountability programs could be improved. Being good researchers themselves, they do favor continued research on testing, however, and provide recommendations on what research should be done, which not surprisingly matches their own interests and expertise.

Lower the Bar?

The report also addresses a second, widely used accountability policy: high-school exit exams that hold students responsible for meeting a set of content standards. The report’s second conclusion reads,

The evidence we have reviewed suggests that high school exit exam programs, as currently implemented in the United States, decrease the rate of high school graduation without increasing achievement.

The panel strongly suggests that states that impose an exit exam should repeal this requirement. To understand this conclusion, it is necessary to understand the exams themselves and to evaluate the evidence behind the committee’s conclusion.

Currently, more than half of the states require that students pass a test of some sort to obtain a normal diploma (see Figure 1), and virtually all of these current requirements have been put in place since 2000. The tests almost always cover English and math, but many states add science and history. Test difficulty varies by state, but the modal level is grade 10. Although that standard may seem low, it is considerably more stringent than the standards that existed prior to 1990, when no state had a test reaching even the 9th-grade level. The current tests are not as high a barrier to high school graduation as they are often alleged to be, as a student may generally take the exam multiple times in order to achieve a passing score. And in all but three states (South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas), students can either appeal the test result, if they feel the score misrepresents their accomplishments, or obtain a diploma by some alternative path.

The motivations for administering exit exams are to create incentives for students to apply themselves to the task of learning and to set uniform (minimum) quality standards for the state’s schools. Such content standards provide guidelines to schools about what to teach. They also indicate to colleges and universities what knowledge and abilities a graduate can be expected to possess. And they give similar information to prospective employers.

According to the best available evidence (discussed below), perhaps 2 percent of students are induced to drop out of school either because of failure to pass the exam or because of fear of not being able to pass the exam. Implicitly, the committee assumes this consequence does considerable harm to the affected students, given the substantial economic rewards that accrue, on average, from receiving a high school diploma. But average effects do not necessarily apply to the 2 percent on the border line between graduating and failing to graduate from high school. The impact for this particular group of students is likely to be much less, unless you make the bizarre assumption that it is only the diploma—not what the student learns—that affects job prospects and future income. The people who are induced to drop out because they cannot pass a 10th-grade exam would most likely be near the bottom of the earnings distribution of graduates were they to be handed a diploma. The economic impact on these students will be much lower than the average difference between graduate and dropout.

Perhaps the best argument against exit exams is simple: If a student shows up for school for 12-plus years and cannot pass a 10th-grade exam, it must be the school’s fault, and it would be unfair to hold the student responsible. This argument, interestingly enough, is the precise opposite of one of the primary arguments against the testing and accountability provisions of NCLB: We should not hold schools responsible for low achievement, because achievement is affected by student motivation and family background characteristics beyond the school’s control. Taken together, the arguments embedded in the committee’s two conclusions imply that nobody—not schools, not teachers, not even students themselves—bears responsibility for low student achievement.

Interestingly, the committee’s conclusion with respect to exit exams does not pick up on the full report’s emphasis on the importance of the design features of incentive systems, which include warnings that tests aimed at ensuring minimum competency may lower expectations, and concerns about both the potential narrowing of the curriculum and the tendency for score inflation on a known test. Instead, the presumed problem is the inherent unfairness of denying a diploma to a student who has met the attendance and course distribution requirements for a diploma.

If the main objective is to maximize high school graduation, there are many ways to do that. We could eliminate all exams, even those administered by teachers. We could loosen up course requirements. We could offer the diploma after 10 or 11 years of schooling, instead of 12. Of course, nobody is willing to take such steps, even though class exams, course requirements, and the inclusion of the 12th grade of schooling all have negative impacts on graduation rates. So why then does the NRC promote the idea of eliminating a 10th-grade-level examination as a requirement for high school graduation on the narrow basis that a few students will, as a result, not earn the degree? Is the NRC also against the movement of many states toward increasing the required amount of math or moving to college and career-ready standards?

The Data Shuffle

Let’s examine the evidence the committee supplies for its exit exam conclusion. The report marshals three studies that explore the issue: two on dropouts and one on achievement. Evaluating the impact of exit exams on achievement is inherently difficult. Because the exams apply to everybody in a state at the same time, it is not possible to compare students of the same age within the same state to find out the impact of exams. It is possible, however, to look at different cohorts of students, for example, those who attended school before the exam was in place and those who attended after, and to compare these to similar cohorts in other states where no such change in policy took place. In conducting this type of study, one must rule out other differences, such as those in family background or those in state education policies that might also affect student performance over time. Even when these challenges are met, one cannot be entirely sure of the results, as exit exams may influence student and school performance even before they come into effect, if teachers and students know that they will soon be introduced, which is usually the case.

The committee tosses out every exit-exam study (save three) that has ever been conducted on the grounds that it is not possible “to draw causal conclusions about the overall effects of test-based incentives” (that is, the very same criteria the committee ignored in considering school-level accountability). Some of the excluded studies use the well-regarded quasi-experimental technique known as regression discontinuity analysis. In the committee’s view, “Such regression discontinuity studies provide interesting causal information about the effect of being above or below the threshold, but they do not provide information about the overall effect of implementing an incentives program.” That criticism is odd, since the impact of an exit examination is of special interest for exactly those students on the cusp of adequate levels of achievement. While these excluded studies are not really appropriate for studying achievement, they tend to show little impact of exit exams on dropout behavior or graduation outcomes.

The committee relies for its conclusion regarding exit examinations exclusively on a 2009 study by Eric Grodsky, John Robert Warren, and Demetra Kalogrides. Because of the significance of this piece of research for the committee project as a whole, it is worth considering in some depth. The Grodsky team identified trends in student achievement in each state that administers an exit examination by drawing on data provided by the long-term trend assessments of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). The long-term NAEP, begun in the late-1960s and continued with testing every few years, was designed to provide consistent score information to judge achievement of the nation as a whole. It was not designed to be used to evaluate the schools of any particular state or district. As a result, NAEP never collected in its long-term trend assessment a representative sample of students for any specific state, and the median number of tested students in each state was very small.

Grodsky et al. pretend that the NAEP provides them with just that: a representative sample of students for each state. They assume that the average performance of students in each state on the long-term NAEP provides an accurate measure of the average performance of students in that state, thereby violating the first principle of statistical sampling.

They then merge the information with information on the timing of the adoption of an exit exam by a state between 1971 and 2004. The study includes observations of math and reading achievement at 9 and 10 different points in time, respectively. The researchers report results for achievement of 13-year-olds and 17-year-olds separately, acknowledging that there are limitations to using either cohort. Thirteen-year-olds may be too young to detect the impact of exit exams, while the sample of 17-year-olds suffers from the noninclusion of school dropouts.

The Grodsky analysis encounters a further difficulty. For the most part, the researchers consider only the very early years, when exit exams were first introduced, a time when the exams were set at a very low level of difficulty, below that of a 9th-grade student. Only 1 percent of the observations included in their analysis are for states that had an exit exam rated at the 9th-grade level or higher, as most current examinations are.

Not only does the Grodsky team rely on inadequate data, but the analysis itself is flawed. Any attempt to see the effects of state tests should compare the changes that occur in the states that introduce them with changes in the states that do not. But the Grodsky study effectively tosses out all the information available for the 27 states that do not have an exit examination before 2004. As important, the analysis does not consider any measures of state policies except for exit exams, implying that any other policy changes for the three decades between 1971 and 2004 are either irrelevant for student performance or are not correlated with the introduction and use of exit exams.

The central finding is that exit exams do not have a statistically significant effect on test scores. But this insignificance could arise because of any or all of the above-mentioned problems rather than the absence of an effect of exit exams, as the NRC committee wants us to presume.

The committee’s estimate of the effects of exit exams on school dropout rates is less controversial. It relies on two quite reliable studies, although they are not without limitations: they study the effects of specific exit exams, which may not generalize to other arrangements. The studies indicate that perhaps 2 percent of potential high-school graduates would have received the diploma had it not been for the exit exams.

The committee touts the possibility of alternative incentives to exit exams: “Several experiments with providing incentives for graduation in the form of rewards, while keeping graduation standards constant, suggest that such incentives might be used to increase high school completion.” The key of course is just what the phrase “while keeping graduation standards constant” means. The idea behind exit exams is to ensure a minimum level of quality, as distinct from meeting the course completion requirements. Moreover, the report never makes the case that exit exams and other potential incentive programs are mutually exclusive. In principle, nobody would argue against employing other incentive programs as long as they were worth the expense and, as the committee says elsewhere, do not introduce perverse incentives of one kind or another.

The Takeaway

The NRC clearly wants to enter into the current debate about the reauthorization of NCLB. And the NRC has an unmistakable opinion: its report concludes that current test-based incentive programs that hold schools and students accountable should be abandoned. The report committee then offers three recommendations: more research, more research, and more research. But if one looks at the evidence and science behind the NRC conclusions, it becomes clear that the nation would be ill advised to give credence to the implications for either NCLB or high-school exit exams that are highlighted in the press release issued along with this report.

The framing of policy in the NRC report is simple: “The small or nonexistent benefits that have been demonstrated to date suggest that incentives need to be carefully designed and combined with other elements of the educational system to be effective.” Nobody would oppose careful design of incentives. Nobody would oppose evaluating the intended and unintended outcomes of incentives. And nobody would oppose combining carefully designed incentives with “other elements of the educational system to [make them] effective.”

The NRC is careful to offer no guidance on how NCLB or state exit exams might be modified to make them more effective. And the NRC is very careful not to offer any guidance on “other elements of the educational system.” The message that comes through is clear: keep working on test development, but never use tests for any incentive or policy purposes.

A better takeaway message might be, “Never rely on the conclusions of this NRC report for any policy purpose.”

Eric Hanushek is senior fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University and member of the Koret Task Force on K–12 Education.

American education has problems, almost everyone is willing to concede, but many think those problems are mostly concentrated in our large urban school districts. In the elite suburbs, where wealthy and politically influential people tend to live, the schools are assumed to be world-class.

Unfortunately, what everyone knows is wrong. Even the most elite suburban school districts often produce results that are mediocre when compared with those of our international peers. Our best school districts may look excellent alongside large urban districts, the comparison state accountability systems encourage, but that measure provides false comfort. America’s elite suburban students are increasingly competing with students outside the United States for economic opportunities, and a meaningful assessment of student achievement requires a global, not a local, comparison.

We developed the Global Report Card (GRC) to facilitate such a comparison. The GRC enables users to compare academic achievement in math and reading between 2004 and 2007 for virtually every public school district in the United States with the average achievement in a set of 25 other countries with developed economies that might be considered our economic peers and sometime competitors. The main results are reported as percentiles of a distribution, which indicates how the average student in a district performs relative to students throughout the advanced industrialized world. A percentile of 60 means that the average student in a district is achieving better than 59.9 percent of the students in our global comparison group. (Readers can find all of the results of the Global Report Card at http://globalreportcard.org. The web site contains a full description of the method by which we calculated the results. For a summary, see the methodology sidebar.)

For the purposes of this article, we focus on the 2007 math results, although the GRC contains information for both math and reading between 2004 and 2007. We focus on 2007 because it is the most recent data set, and we focus on math because it is the subject that provides the best comparison across countries and is most closely correlated with economic growth. Readers should feel free to consult the GRC web site to find reading results as well as results for other years.

The Example of Beverly Hills

It is critically important to compare exclusive suburban districts against the performance of students in other developed countries, as these districts are generally thought to be high-performing. The most wealthy and politically powerful families have often sought refuge from the ills of our education system by moving to suburban school districts. Problems exist in large urban districts and in low-income rural areas, elites often concede, but they have convinced themselves that at least their own children are receiving an excellent education in their affluent suburban districts.

Unfortunately, student achievement in many affluent suburban districts is worse than parents may think, especially when compared with student achievement in other developed countries. Take for example Beverly Hills, California. The city has a median family income of $102,611 as of 2000, which places it among the top 100 wealthiest places in the United States with at least 1,000 households. The Beverly Hills population is 85.1 percent white, 7.1 percent Asian, and only 1.8 percent black and 4.6 percent Hispanic. The city is virtually synonymous with luxury. A long-running television show featured the wealth and advantages of Beverly Hills high-school students (as well as their overly dramatic personal lives). If Beverly Hills is not the refuge from the ills of the education system that elite families are seeking, it’s not clear what would be.

But when we look at the Global Report Card results for the Beverly Hills Unified School District, we don’t see top-notch performance. The math achievement of the average student in Beverly Hills is at the 53rd percentile relative to our international comparison group. That is, one of our most elite districts produces students with math achievement that is no better than that of the typical student in the average developed country. If Beverly Hills were relocated to Canada, it would be at the 46th percentile in math achievement, a below-average district. If the city were in Singapore, the average student in Beverly Hills would only be at the 34th percentile in math performance.

Of course, people don’t think of Beverly Hills as a school district with mediocre student achievement. This is partly because people assume that affluent suburbs must be high achieving and partly because state accountability results inflate achievement by comparing affluent suburban school districts with large urban ones. According to California’s state accountability results, the average student in Beverly Hills is at the 76th percentile in math achievement relative to other students in the state. But outperforming students in Los Angeles, which is only at the 20th percentile in math relative to a global comparison group, should provide little comfort to Beverly Hills parents.

Los Angeles Unified is not the main source of competitors for Beverly Hills students, so the state accountability system encourages the wrong comparison. If Beverly Hills graduates are to have the kinds of jobs and lifestyles that their parents hope for them, they will have to compete with students from Canada, Singapore, and everywhere else. Beverly Hills students have to be toward the top of achievement globally if they expect to get top jobs and earn top incomes.

Results from Affluent Suburbs Nationwide

We can repeat the story of Beverly Hills all across the country. Affluent suburban districts may be outperforming their large urban neighbors, but they fail to achieve near the top of international comparisons (see Figure 1). White Plains, New York, in suburban Westchester County, is only at the 39th percentile in math relative to our global comparison group. Grosse Point, Michigan, outside of Detroit, is at the 56th percentile. Evanston, Illinois, the home of Northwestern University outside of Chicago, is at the 48th percentile in math. The average student in Montgomery County, Maryland, where many of the national government leaders send their children to school, is at the 50th percentile in math relative to students in other developed countries. The average student in Fairfax, Virginia, another suburban refuge for government leaders, is at the 49th percentile. Shaker Heights, Ohio, outside of Cleveland, is at the 50th percentile in math. The average student in Lower Merion, Pennsylvania, near Philadelphia, is at the 66th percentile. Ladue, Missouri, a wealthy suburb of St. Louis, is at the 62nd percentile. And the average student in Plano, Texas, near Dallas, is at the 64th percentile in math relative to our global comparison group.

All of these communities are among the wealthiest in the United States. All are overwhelmingly white in their population. All of them are thought of as refuges from the dysfunction of our public school system. But the sad reality is that in none of them is the average student in the upper third of math achievement relative to students in other developed countries. Most of them are barely keeping pace with the average student in other developed countries, despite the fact that the comparison is to all students in the other countries, some of which have a per-capita gross domestic product that is almost half that of the United States. In short, many of what we imagine as our best school districts are mediocre compared with the education systems serving students in other developed countries.

Pockets of Excellence

While many affluent suburban districts have lower achievement than we might expect, some districts are producing very high achievement even when compared with that of students in other developed countries. For example, the average student in the Pelham school district in Massachusetts is at the 95th percentile in math. That means that if we were to relocate Pelham to another developed country in our comparison group, the average student in Pelham would outperform 95 percent of the students in math. That’s very impressive.

Of course, Pelham is a small district that is home to Amherst College, among other institutions of higher learning, and serves a rather select group of students. But not all college-town school districts are equally high achieving. As we have already seen, Evanston, Illinois, is at the 48th percentile in math in a global comparison. Palo Alto, California, the home of Stanford University, is at the 64th percentile. And the average student in Ann Arbor, Michigan, home to the University of Michigan, is at the 58th percentile in math relative to students in other developed countries. So, the 95th percentile math achievement in Pelham is outstanding, even for college towns.

Spring Lake, New Jersey, has a similarly impressive record of having the average student at the 91st percentile in math. It is a very small and affluent community on the New Jersey shore that has somehow escaped the influence of Snooki and The Situation. Waconda, Kansas, a small rural community, also is at the 91st percentile. Highland Park, Texas, an affluent community near Dallas, is at the 88th percentile.

Interestingly, of the top 20 U.S. public-school districts in math achievement, 7 are charter schools (some states treat charter schools as separate public-school districts). And most of the 13 traditional districts remaining are in rural communities rather than in a large suburban “refuge” from urban education ills.

Pools of Failure

In total, only 820 of the 13,636 public-school districts for which we have 2007 math results had average student achievement that would be among the top third of student performance in other developed countries. That is, 94 percent of all U.S. school districts have average math achievement below the 67th percentile. There aren’t that many truly excellent districts out there.

Of the 13,636 districts, 9,339, or 68 percent, have average student math achievement that is below the 50th percentile compared with that of the average student in other developed countries. Most of our large school districts are well below the 50th percentile. This is especially alarming, because these lower-performing large districts comprise a much greater share of the total student population than do the relatively small higher-performing districts.

The average student in the Washington, D.C., school district is at the 11th percentile in math relative to students in other developed countries. In Detroit, the average student is at the 12th percentile. In Milwaukee, the average student is at the 16th percentile. Cleveland is at the 18th percentile. The average student in Baltimore is at the 19th percentile in math relative to students in other developed countries. In Los Angeles, the average student is at the 20th percentile. The average student in Chicago is at the 21st percentile in math. Atlanta is at the 23rd percentile. The average student in New York City is at the 32nd percentile in math. And in Miami-Dade County, the average student is at the 33rd percentile in math.

Not 1 of the largest 20 school districts is above the 50th percentile in math relative to other developed countries. Those districts contain almost 5.2 million students or more than 10 percent of the country’s schoolchildren. The rare and small pockets of excellence in charter schools and rural communities are overwhelmed by large pools of failure.

Previous Research

The Global Report Card is not the first analysis to compare the performance of U.S. students to international peers. Eric A. Hanushek, Paul E. Peterson, and Ludger Woessmann (see “Teaching Math to the Talented,” features, Winter 2011) used a very similar method to compare the performance of students in each state to students in other countries and arrived at similarly gloomy conclusions. Using state NAEP results for 8th-grade students and PISA results for 15-year-olds internationally, the researchers focused on the percentage of students performing at an advanced level in math. In almost every state, they found that we had far fewer advanced students than most of the countries taking PISA. They also narrowed the comparison to white students in the U.S. and to students whose parents had a college education to show that even advantaged students in the U.S. failed to achieve at an advanced level in math relative to their international peers. More recently, Hanushek et al. updated their analysis to examine the percentage of students in each state and across countries performing at the proficient level in math and reading.  The results were similarly disappointing.

The main difference between the GRC and the Hanushek et al. analyses is that in our study we push the comparison down to the district level. By focusing on white students and children of college-educated parents, Hanushek et al. clearly mean to convey that even students in elite suburban districts have mediocre achievement. Our contribution with the GRC is to name the districts so that people do not indulge the fantasy that their suburb’s record is somehow different from the disappointing performance of others with advantaged students in their state.

There are other important differences between the GRC and the Hanushek et al. analyses. We incorporate test results for U.S. students in all available grades (typically grades 3 through 8 and grade 10) rather than focusing on the grade closest to the 15-year-olds in the PISA sample. We could have focused only on 8th-grade results, as Hanushek et al. did, but in doing so we would have greatly reduced the number of test results on which we were doing the calculations for school districts. We preferred to gain precision in estimating the achievement in each district by increasing our sample size rather than restricting the sample to 8th graders in order to gain comparability in the age of the students under review.

The GRC analysis also differs from those of Hanushek et al. in that the latter focus on students performing at the advanced or proficient level, while we focused on the average student performance in both math and reading. Hanushek et al. concentrated on advanced or proficient performance because they were trying to compare our best students with the best abroad to show that even our best are mediocre. We did the same by highlighting the results for elite suburban school districts. Focusing on the average also avoids any dispute about how “advanced” or “proficient” are defined across different tests.

Gary Phillips at the American Institutes for Research has also conducted a series of analyses comparing state achievement on NAEP to international performance on a different international test, the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). Phillips arrives at somewhat less gloomy conclusions about U.S. performance, but that is because the countries included in TIMSS differ from those covered by PISA. Hanushek et al. rightly note that PISA provides a much more appropriate comparison for the U.S.: “Put starkly, if one drops from a survey countries such as Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, and New Zealand, and includes instead such countries as Botswana, Ghana, Iran, and Lebanon, the average international performance will drop, and the United States will look better relative to the countries with which it is being compared.”

This has sparked a debate among researchers about whether TIMSS or PISA provides a better set of countries against which we should compare the U.S. The Global Report Card circumvents this dispute by developing its own set of countries against which we compare U.S. students. The comparisons provided by TIMSS and PISA depend on which countries decide to take each test each time it is administered. And PISA scales its scores against the results for members of the OECD, which excludes countries like Singapore while including countries like Mexico. Our comparison group depends on PISA results, but it is also based on objective criteria, like per-capita GDP, to identify a set of developed economies that can be reasonably compared with that of the U.S. Our comparison group is a significant improvement on the self-selection of countries that choose to take a test as well as an improvement upon arbitrary membership in an organization like the OECD.

No Refuge

The elites, the wealthy families that have a disproportionate influence on politics, clearly recognize the dysfunction of large urban school districts and have sought refuge in affluent suburban districts for their own children. But the reality is that there are relatively few pockets of excellence to which these families can flee.

In four states, there is not a single traditional district with average student achievement above the 50th percentile in math. In 17 states, there is not a single traditional district with average achievement in the upper third relative to our global comparison group. And apart from charter school districts,  in over half of the states, there are no more than three traditional districts in which the average achievement would be in the upper third.

The elites in those states have almost nowhere to find an excellent public education for their children. But state accountability systems and the desire to rationalize the lack of quality options have encouraged the elites to compare their affluent suburban districts to the large urban ones in their state. These inappropriate comparisons have falsely reassured them that their own school districts are doing well.

This false reassurance has also perhaps undermined the desire among the elites to engage in dramatic education reform. As long as the elites hold onto the belief that their own school districts are excellent, they have little desire to push for the kind of significant systemic reforms that might improve their districts as well as the large urban districts. They may wish the urban districts well and hope matters improve, but their taste for bold reform is limited by a false contentment with their own situation.

But the elites should not take comfort from the stronger performance of affluent suburban districts relative to large urban districts. As the Global Report Card reveals, even our best public-school districts are mediocre when compared with the achievement of students in a set of countries with developed economies.

Of course, the Global Report Card does not isolate the extent to which schools add or detract from student performance. Factors from student backgrounds, including their parents, communities, and individual characteristics, have a strong influence on achievement. But the GRC does tell us about the end result for student achievement of all of these factors, schools included. And that end result, even in our best districts, is generally disappointing.

Jay P. Greene is professor of education reform at the University of Arkansas and a fellow at the George W. Bush Institute. Josh B. McGee is vice president for public accountability initiatives at the Laura and John Arnold Foundation.

LAUSD is being sued by a group that includes Alice Callaghan, a member of the Episcopalian clergy and the manager of Las Familias del Pueblo, a community center for the poor and homeless in downtown Los Angeles. Back in 1996, Callaghan organized 70 Spanish-speaking immigrant parents, who boycotted the Ninth Street Elementary School — calling for an end to failed bilingual-education methods and instead demanding that the school system teach the children of immigrant garment workers academic English as soon as possible.

Callaghan and this different group of parents are suing to enforce the Stull Act. The law goes back four decades and says that the board of trustees of each school district shall evaluate teachers, at least in part, by their student’s performance on the state’s standards-based tests. The law says “shall,” not “may.” It is mandatory that each district do this.

(The law is named for its sponsor, now-deceased Republican Assemblyman John Stull of San Diego, who received bipartisan support at the time for this statutory requirement that teachers be held accountable for the academic achievement of their pupils.)

The attorneys for the plaintiffs are Kyle Kirwan, a prominent Los Angeles litigator, and Scott Witlin, both partners at the law firm of Barnes & Thornburg. Their request for a court order was drafted in consultation with EdVoice, a Sacramento-based education-advocacy group. Before going to court, the plaintiffs sent a letter on Oct. 26 asking the district to comply. The letter stresses that for years the district has engaged in wanton lawlessness. In the letter, the plaintiffs’ attorneys say that the district “refuses to implement the Stull Act in complete abdication of its responsibility to its students, their parents, and the taxpayers of the district.”

The letter says that the district has never evaluated the teachers using student test scores, and, as a consequence, has never told teachers where they stood and counseled them on how to improve in terms of increasing their students’ learning – all of which are required by the law. “In short, the district has never complied with the Stull Act.”

The letter also points to the involvement of the teachers’ union United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA) in this lawbreaking. Compliance with the law, the letter says, has been “deliberately evaded” through a series of “complicitous” collective-bargaining agreements between the LAUSD and UTLA, at the expense of students — who deserve effective teachers.

Specifically, the district has been pretending that it can avoid compliance with the Stull Act by making collective-bargaining agreements with the teachers’ union that overrule a statute (the Stull Act) passed by the state legislature. It doesn’t work that way. Valid contracts are written under and within the law, not in violation of the law. The lawsuit seeks to end this make-believe in the service of lawbreaking.

In their Nov. 1 petition for a court order, the plaintiffs’ attorneys say that the UTLA has treated the public school system in Los Angeles as “a taxpayer-funded jobs and entitlement program” for adults, even when a teacher‘s performance would be considered “demonstrably unsatisfactory” when judged by pupil results.

The petition described how the teachers’ union adopted a strategy of “stonewalling” when it came to putting the Stull Act into effect. “In collusion with the District‘s governing boards and superintendents,” the petition says, the teachers’ union has blocked lawful evaluation of teachers and the “corrective action” needed to ensure that students get effective teachers.

As a consequence, “the adults‘ collective employment and political interests” are turning the children’s opportunity for learning while in school “on its head” and instead the system is providing job guarantees to teachers as well as “preserving the political power of the Board and the Superintendent.” All of this comes at the expense of children — particularly the “socio-economically disadvantaged.”

These shenanigans by the district and the union have been presented to the public in a way that is designed to pull the wool over people’s eyes: “The result has been a perversion of the evaluation system and a knowing effort to deceive the public using educational jargon.”

Witlin, one of the attorneys, told education policy analyst and blogger RiShawn Biddle: “The school district is supposed to exist for the benefit of the children and not for the adults.”

The teacher evaluation program that is in place in Los Angeles, according to the petition, “does not comply with the Stull Act” and “perpetuates a fraud on the community” by letting teachers get high evaluation ratings whether or not their students are learning the material listed in the curriculum-content standards.

The petition cites damning statements from LAUSD Superintendent John Deasy in which he condemns his own evaluation program for teachers. For example, he recently said: “I would argue that nobody has told me that the current system of evaluation, which is performance review, helps anybody. It is fundamentally useless. It does not actually help you get better at [your] work and it doesn‘t tell you how well you’re doing.”

Superintendent Deasy also stated: “One would have to argue: ‘So … there are schools where 3 percent of the students are proficient at math and 100 percent of the teachers are at the top rating performance.’ That doesn‘t make sense to me whatsoever. And it doesn‘t make sense because the rating performance does not actually help teachers get better.”

In terms of what actually happens, the district is condemned out its own mouth.

Back on March 13, 2011, retired Los Angeles school district teacher Doug Lasken and I wrote an opinion column for the San Francisco Chronicle about non-compliance with the Stull Act in Los Angeles and other California districts – so I could not be happier about this lawsuit, which may finally bring some justice for Los Angeles schoolchildren after years of the district’s deliberate dodging of the law. Success in Los Angeles will mean that districts across California will have to begin evaluating teachers properly and getting struggling employees the extra help they need to become effective teachers.

LAUSD has been negotiating with UTLA to try to put in place a pilot program with three percent of district teachers, who would be evaluated in part on student performance on the state’s standards-based tests. But these negotiations are deadlocked because of the refusal of UTLA to even study the idea of complying with the law.

The plaintiffs in this case reject the proposed pilot program, which has no guarantee of ever having meaningful evaluations that actually count, even for the volunteer participants in the pilot. They point out that LAUSD has a record of “years of non-compliance” with the Stull Act and that there is no reason to believe that the pilot would even expand to the other 97 percent of teachers. “Sadly, the District has abdicated its duty to the children.” The plaintiffs demand instead that LAUSD comply with the Stull Act as soon as practically possible “in its entirety.”

-Bill Evers

Addressing these challenges is the focus of three new white papers a Public Impact team led by Lucy Steiner recently produced with the support of the National Charter School Resource Center and the U.S. Department of Education’s Charter Schools Program. The papers in this series, co-authored by Steiner, Daniela Doyle and Joe Ableidinger, offer practical ways for city-based organizations to support creation of high-quality charter schools, foster development of talent pipelines, and guide prospective investors. Here’s a quick synopsis of all three papers.

Growing the best charter schools is one strategy Public Impact has previously addressed.  But starting excellent new schools is essential, too. Incubating High-Quality Charter Schools: Innovations in City-Based Organizations explores how the members of a national network of city-based organizations—the Cities for Education Entrepreneurship Trust—are using one promising approach to creating high-quality school options: incubating charter school leaders.

These are the major lessons learned by CEE-Trust member organizations:

• Attract and develop effective school or CMO leaders by building local and national recruitment pipelines, while also removing candidates who fall short.
• Partner strategically to help leaders open and operate high-quality charter schools and CMOs by delegating some training and support responsibilities to external partners and pooling resources and tools such as application materials with other incubators.
• Champion school leaders in the community both by introducing leaders to communities in advance of school opening and recruiting exceptional board members.
• Coordinate advocacy to support new charter leaders by enlisting partners to push for supportive policies, building relationships with local districts and authorizers, and publicizing success.

Developing Education Talent Pipelines for Charter Schools: A Citywide Approach explores how New Orleans and Indianapolis are developing robust talent pipelines to expand the supply of effective charter school teachers and leaders in their cities. The paper highlights the indicators of a robust talent pipeline so that charter supporters of all kinds can evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their own efforts.  The six indicators include:

• A facilitator who focuses specifically on the talent pipeline
• Local and national talent providers
• High-performing charter schools (because they become magnets for talent)
• Philanthropic funding for education talent initiatives
• Political support
• A favorable state policy environment

Developing City-Based Funding Strategies: Investments to Create a Robust Charter Sector outlines five lessons learned from veteran charter school investors:

• Address market failures by targeting a bottleneck in the sector that others are unwilling to fund or have not yet identified. School leaders and facilities are common examples.
• Have a laser focus on quality. Charter schools’ credibility and transformative powers rest in their quality.
• Scale what works. The charter sector has produced some remarkable proof points.  Yet the best charter schools serve just a tiny fraction of the students who need them, causing demand to far outstrip supply.
• Leverage investments by funding fewer projects more deeply.
• Identify opportunities for district collaboration. One of the best ways to maximize each dollar is to invest in efforts that not only improve the charter sector in a city, but the district school system as well.

While federal support and state-level legislative changes are crucial to wide-scale excellence in the charter sector, city leaders need not sit on the sidelines. Indeed, city-based organizations can take charge to attract and grow excellent charter schools using these strategies.

Last night was fun for the kids, but today is every education wonk’s favorite holiday: NAEP release day! Kevin Carey is already out with some savvy analysis; let me add some thoughts on the trends in reading.

The big news is that we finally eked out some statistically significant progress in 8th-grade reading. This goal has eluded us before, and has led commentators such as E.D. Hirsch to note that we’re not doing enough to build kids’ content knowledge and vocabulary. Initiatives like Reading First might have helped our youngsters to decode, goes the argument, but that’s not enough to create strong readers, especially as kids get older.

That’s still true, I think, but the NAEP results might indicate that those decoding skills are nothing to scoff at. The middle schoolers who took the NAEP last spring were in first grade in 2004–the heyday of Reading First implementation. It’s possible that scientifically-based reading instruction got them off to a better start as readers, and that head-start has been maintained through elementary and middle school. I can’t prove it (it’s NAEP–no one can prove anything!) but it’s a hypothesis worth exploring. Furthermore, the 8th graders who made the greatest progress since the early 2000s were the lowest-achievers–the very population Reading First was designed to help.

What’s disappointing is that 4th-grade reading results have held steady since 2007–after a big bump up (across all achievement levels) from 2005-2007. This one-time bump might be credited to Reading First (again, stress on “might”). But only a few states have continued making progress; in the last two years only Alabama, Hawaii, Maryland, and Massachusetts have done so. I can’t quite explain Maryland and Hawaii (OK, maybe they DO deserve Race to the Top funds, after all) but Alabama and Massachusetts have some of the most aggressive policies in place to promote research-based reading instruction. And it shows.

Again, these are just guesses. The big question going forward, it seems to me, is whether any of our reform efforts are like to lead to another big bump in test scores anytime soon. Large-scale initiatives like “accountability” and “parental choice” set the context for improvement, but they have rather indirect impacts on achievement. More focused instructional and teacher quality strategies–like implementing the Common Core standards or improving teaching through better evaluation systems–are more likely to result in big gains, it seems to me. Neither of those will be in full force until around 2013 or 2014. So I would expect more steady-state on NAEP scores for the time being, with our next big chance for major gains coming in 2015.

Those are my thoughts. What about you?

-Mike Petrilli

This post also appeared on Flypaper.

1. This is a big deal, folks. The ESEA reauthorization process hasn’t gotten this far since–well, ever. In 2007 the House education committee floated a draft bill which then died an ignominious death. The Senate HELP committee has never produced a bill . So to have a comprehensive bill marked up and sent to the floor represents a significant milestone.

2. President Obama and Secretary Duncan deserve credit for spurring the Senate into action. It’s not a coincidence that a bill emerged and a mark-up was held just weeks after the announcement of the Administration’s waiver package. And the discussion over the past few days makes it clear that Senators on both sides of the aisle are motivated to get their job done to stave off the waivers from taking effect. So while I’m not a fan of conditional waivers as a policy, I must admit that it was an effective tool for waking the Senate out of its slumber.

3. Republicans are in the driver’s seat. Yesterday’s unanimous Democratic vote might have been a display of party unity, but it also demonstrated a willingness to vote for almost anything. The Democrats want to send a bill to the President, and they will need Republican votes in order to do that. So expect GOP senators like Lamar Alexander to make their support contingent on key changes to the bill–and to get a lot of what they want. Meanwhile, the House bills (which are being put together in pieces) will surely come out to the right of the Senate. If Democrats want to get something across the finish line, they are going to have to accept something that looks a lot more like Alexander-Burr than Harkin-Enzi.

4. The civil rights groups and lefty reformers are getting rolled. What became clear from the mark-up is that there’s very little support in Congress for federal oversight of state accountability systems. Except for Colorado Senator Michael Bennet, nobody seemed interested in getting “annual objectives” or achievement-gap-closing metrics back into the bill. And where do the aggrieved lefty groups go from here? They won’t be able to get an accountability amendment passed on the Senate floor. There’s no way a House bill will include it. So then what? Try again in 2013? Why would anyone think the politics will be any better? (Same goes for federal intrusion into teacher evaluation.) The bottom line is that federal accountability hawks have lost this argument. It’s time to move on.

5. Let’s admit it: Harkin-Enzi is better than current law. I’ve still got a lot of beefs with it (especially around its high school interventions and inclusion of the highly-qualified teachers mandate). But for Reform Realists, it represents several steps in the right direction. It focuses the federal role on transparency instead of accountability. It encourages a look at student growth instead of a one-time snapshot. Thanks to Lamar Alexander’s work over the past week, it shows a willingness to let states take the lead on key issues like teacher evaluation and school turnarounds. Assuming that the  House bills will be even better, I would claim that reauthorization is finally heading in a hopeful direction.

-Mike Petrilli

No, that bill, authored by education-committee chairman Tom Harkin and ranking member Mike Enzi, is a hodgepodge of half-baked ideas that should alarm folks on the right and the left.

And sure enough, progressives have already made their opinions clear on why the bill should be stopped dead in its tracks. But it should offend conservatives (including the Reform Realists among us) too, though for very different reasons. Such conservatives should back the aforementioned proposal put forward by Senators Alexander, Burr, and others, instead.

Here are the Harkin-Enzi bill’s major offenses:

• An expansive new reach into high schools. While the legislation deserves credit for handing many accountability decisions back to the states, it would launch a whole new series of federal interventions in the nation’s worst high schools. Targeting “dropout factories” might sound like a good idea until you consider the Department of Education’s capacity (or lack thereof) for tackling something so complicated and complex from Washington.

• Maintaining the onerous “highly qualified teachers” mandate. One of No Child Left Behind’s most hated provisions is the requirement that teachers earn designation as “highly qualified.” Not only did this get the feds into the position of micromanaging teacher qualifications, it also did so in a clumsy way, focusing on paper credentials. The Administration’s waiver package moves to a policy of “non-enforcement” around this provision, signaling that it’s time to move on. And the Alexander proposal scraps it entirely. Meanwhile, Harkin-Enzi keeps the “highly qualified” rules in place for newly hired teachers.

• Rather than eliminating or consolidating wasteful programs, it adds new ones. As far as I can tell, few major programs are put on the chopping block, and several more are created, including a new initiatives for high schools, STEM, literacy, and “safe and healthy schools.” As the country is running a historic deficit, this is the best we can do?

Leading Republicans, including ranking member Enzi and Senator Lamar Alexander, have already signaled that they will vote to get the bill out of committee but can’t support “sending it to the president” in its current form. Here’s hoping that somewhere along the road to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue (House of Representatives, we’re looking at you!), these onerous provisions fall by the wayside.

Otherwise, Republicans would be wise to scrap the bill and start over—with Senator Alexander’s proposal as the jumping-off point. It’s a much stronger bill, closer in many ways to the Administration’s own Blueprint, and much more serious about re-calibrating the federal role in education. And if Democrats won’t go for that—well, wait for a more favorable environment in 2013.

-Mike Petrilli

This article first appeared in the Education Gadfly.

I must admit to a bias: I am a strong advocate of national standards, was intimately involved with their first iteration in the 1980s, and am delighted to witness their partial resurrection in a new guise.  As Robert Rothman observes, the new Common Core standards in English language arts and mathematics are not top-down driven reforms (one of the difficulties of the first national standards initiatives) or bottom-up efforts, which have suffered in the past when the states, with the singular exception of Massachusetts, tended to water down their individual attempts to the detriment, rather than the amelioration, of American public education.

The Common Core standards, to quote directly from the book’s introduction, “set expectations for student learning at every grade level,” and the book “describes the development process, the states’ adoption decisions, and early steps by states to implement them.”  Most important, the book explains in depth the content of the standards, what they expect of students, and how the assessment of student results is going to be carried out.

While all of this activity, strenuous and complex as it is, may seem to the educational neophyte to be more theoretical than practical, the fact of the matter is that within six months of the standards being issued in 2010, 43 states and the District of Columbia had adopted them.  Furthermore, they are designed to be “all or nothing.”  (It is difficult if not impossible to adopt some of them.)  They are written with every student in mind, rather than for the gifted few.  Their potential for transforming what is taught and raising the level of academic achievement nationally is truly extraordinary.

Why am I guilty of such unbridled optimism?  First of all, a great deal was learned from the pre-Common Core efforts. The first version of the national standards in the 1980s was vastly too ambitious.  Second, current federal education policy is very favorably disposed towards the common core initiative. Third, international comparisons with other highly developed countries, once shunned, are now fashionable.  They reveal that, no matter how the tests are framed, America is in the middle of the pack, well behind the likes of Finland, Singapore and Japan, in what we traditionally expect of our high school graduates. Fourth, other organizations are in the process of developing common core standards in science (to be released in 2012).  Assuming that they are of the same high quality as their 2010 counterparts, people may be emboldened to do the same for the other basic subjects, and thus escape from the current tendency to narrow the curriculum to the point of no return, a concern of particular moment to Diane Ravitch.  Fifth, unlike the situation in the 1980s, the charter school movement has matured to the point that its growth can provide a nationwide institutional context to pilot the teaching strategies appropriate to implementing the common core strategies.

Finally, there is a significant movement to align teacher education with these new standards.  Ross Perot once said to me “All teacher colleges ought to be torched.”  Such single-minded excoriation may be over the top, but there is no question that the new three R’s of teacher recruitment, retention and renewal are integral to any genuine education renaissance, and are indispensable to the implementation of the common core standards. Let’s hope that all of this really happens.  Robert Rothman certainly thinks there is a good chance it will.  After all, all these favorable circumstances are referenced in this informative volume.

-A. Graham Down

More book reviews by Graham Down can be found here.

For nearly a decade, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) has focused the attention of policymakers and researchers squarely on the achievement of low-performing students, with some apparent success. The math and reading scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress of the nation’s lowest-achieving 10 percent of 4th and 8th graders have risen sharply since 2000, continuing a trend that began in the 1990s. Yet some may wonder about the potential cost of this focus on higher-achieving students, for whom improvements over the same time period have been modest. Among the questions related to this debate is whether additional programs and resources should be devoted to students on the higher end of the spectrum, those considered gifted.

Three million students in the United States are classified as gifted, yet little is known about the effectiveness of traditional gifted and talented (G&T) programs. In theory, G&T programs might help high-achieving students because they group them with other high achievers and typically offer specially trained teachers and a more advanced curriculum. While previous research indicates that ability grouping is in fact correlated with higher achievement, these findings could be misleading if students placed in high-ability classrooms were likely to be successful for reasons that researchers are unable to measure, such as stronger motivation. To our knowledge, no existing studies offer convincing evidence on the causal effect of G&T programs on student achievement.

Our research begins to fill this gap with two studies of the G&T programs available to high-achieving middle-school students in a large urban school district in the southwestern United States which, to preserve anonymity we shall refer to as LUSD. Since 2007, all 5th-grade students in LUSD have been evaluated to determine eligibility for gifted and talented programs starting in 6th grade. Those students who are deemed eligible often are grouped in classes with other gifted students. They are also permitted to apply for admission to two middle schools that have oversubscribed magnet G&T programs.

The two studies use different methods to ask distinct but closely related questions. The first exploits the fact that eligibility for G&T programming in LUSD is determined by a well-defined cutoff in students’ evaluation scores. By comparing students who score just above the cutoff to those who score just below, the study provides evidence on the effect of enrollment in a G&T program on achievement for those students on the margin of eligibility. The second study takes advantage of the randomized lotteries that determine admission to the district’s two premier magnet G&T programs. By comparing students who win the lottery and attend the magnet G&T schools to those who lose the lottery and attend other “neighborhood” programs, the research provides evidence on whether the magnet G&T programs provide any additional benefits.

The results of both studies will be discouraging for those hopeful that current G&T programs provide a means to accelerate the progress of our most capable students. The first shows that barely eligible students who participated in LUSD’s G&T curriculum for all of 6th grade and half of 7th grade exhibit no significant improvement in test scores across a range of subjects, despite their being surrounded by higher-achieving peers and taking more advanced courses. The lottery study corroborates these results, as students admitted to the G&T magnet schools show little improvement in test scores by 7th grade, despite having higher-achieving peers and being taught by more effective teachers. The lone exception is in science, where students admitted to G&T magnet schools performed at substantially higher levels.

It is difficult to know what accounts for these puzzling results. Our best guess, which we discuss in detail below, is that being placed with higher-achieving peers is not all that it is cracked up to be. Students admitted to both types of G&T programs suffer a large drop in their relative rank in terms of grades within their classes, which could have adverse consequences that offset any benefits of improvements in their educational environment. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Let’s first take a closer look at the programs and the evidence on their effects.

Gifted Students in LUSD

LUSD is a large school district, with more than 200,000 students. The district is heavily minority and very low income; the minority population is more heavily Hispanic than African American. All LUSD students are evaluated for placement in middle-school G&T programs during 5th grade, including those who participated in the district’s G&T program in elementary school. In order to be deemed eligible for the middle school G&T program, a student must meet the eligibility criteria set forth in the “gifted and talented identification matrix.” The matrix converts scores on standardized tests—the Stanford Achievement Test for English-speaking students and the Aprenda exam for Spanish-speaking students with limited English proficiency—scores on the Naglieri Nonverbal Ability Test (NNAT), average course grades, teacher recommendations, and indicators for socioeconomic status into an overall index score.

While all students who meet these requirements qualify for the G&T program, not all end up being classified as G&T, because parents are allowed to opt out. Some students also enroll in the program initially but later withdraw. Schools in LUSD have a monetary incentive for attracting gifted students, as LUSD provides a funding boost of 12 percent over the average allotment for a regular student.

Gifted students in LUSD are far less likely to be economically disadvantaged and more likely to be white or Asian than other students in the district. They also perform at far higher levels on the Stanford Achievement Tests, which the district administers annually in five subjects: math, reading, language, social science, and science. Their advantage in math and reading test scores in 5th grade is roughly 0.7 of a standard deviation, which amounts to well over two years of academic progress (see Figure 1). By the time the same students have reached 7th grade, these gaps have widened to 1.5 standard deviations in math and 1.25 standard deviations in reading. While this pattern suggests that the students enrolled in the district’s G&T programs learn at a faster rate between 5th and 7th grade, it does not necessarily mean that the G&T programs are the cause. It is to that question we now turn.

Effects on Barely Eligible Students

Our first study examines the effects of participation in a G&T program on students who were just barely eligible to participate based on their overall index scores. We focus on students who were evaluated for G&T eligibility as 5th graders in the spring of 2008 for whom we are able to observe outcomes as 7th graders in the 2009–10 school year. Our outcome measures include Stanford Achievement Test scores and attendance rates, both of which are drawn from administrative data provided by the district. After restricting the sample to students near the G&T eligibility cutoff, we are able to examine these outcomes for roughly 2,600 students.

The method used in the study, known as regression discontinuity analysis, takes advantage of the fact that the district uses a strict numerical cutoff in the index score assigned to students as 5th graders in order to determine their eligibility to participate in the G&T program the following year. Because the students are unable to precisely manipulate their index scores, those scoring just below the eligibility cutoff should be very similar to those scoring just above the cutoff. We can therefore attribute any differences in student outcomes on either side of the cutoff to the effect of having being deemed eligible.

As noted above, not all eligible students end up participating in G&T programs due to factors such as a parent’s decision to opt out. Similarly, some students who do not initially qualify later become eligible through an appeals process that allows parents to submit an alternative standardized test score or through additional evaluations conducted in 6th grade. As a result, we use standard statistical techniques to account for the fact that the cutoff our regression discontinuity analysis exploits is “fuzzy” rather than sharp. This allows us to provide evidence on the effects of actual participation in the G&T program, not simply eligibility for it.

Before looking at student outcomes, we first used the same method to confirm that participation in the district’s standard G&T programs led to measurable differences in students’ educational experiences. Clearly, it did. The average achievement of the peers in G&T students’ classrooms were between 0.25 and 0.33 of a standard deviation higher in each core academic subject. Participation in the G&T program also increased the number of advanced courses in which students enrolled in 6th and 7th grade. We found no evidence, however, that the teachers to whom students in the G&T program were assigned were any more effective, as measured by their impact on student test scores.

Did these improvements in peer characteristics and curricular rigor translate into improved outcomes? Our results indicate that they did not (see Figure 2). Our estimates of the effects of G&T participation for barely eligible students are close to zero in all five subjects and are sufficiently precise to allow us to rule out with 90 percent confidence effects as small as 0.04 standard deviations (sd) in math, 0.07 sd in reading, 0.12 sd in language, 0.10 sd in social studies, and 0.19 sd in science. We also looked at the impact of G&T participation for specific student subgroups defined by gender, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and whether the students had been classified as gifted in elementary school. We found little evidence of differential impacts for students in any of these groups.

The Effects of G&T Magnet Programs

Why does the G&T program in LUSD not yield benefits for students on the margin of eligibility? One reason could be that the qualification boundary is set so low that such students are not able to take advantage of the programs’ purported benefits. Our second analysis, which uses experimental research methods to study the effects of enrollment in the district’s G&T magnet programs, is intended to shed light on this concern.

LUSD has 41 middle schools, of which 8 have G&T magnet programs, and 2 of these are oversubscribed. As a result, the district uses lotteries to determine which students will be admitted as 6th graders. Our analysis compares the performance of students who win the lottery and attend one of the G&T magnet programs to those who lose the lottery and either attend a neighborhood G&T program in the district, a magnet school based on a different specialty, or a charter school. Because the lottery is random, any differences in outcomes between lottery winners and losers can be attributed to the effect of enrolling in the G&T magnet program rather than one of these alternatives. Moreover, the results of this analysis will apply to the entire population of students who chose to apply.

Our lottery analysis is based on the sample of LUSD 5th-grade students determined to be eligible for G&T programs in 2007–08 who applied for admission to one of the two middle schools with an oversubscribed G&T magnet program. This group includes 542 students, 394 of whom were offered admission and 148 of whom were not. We find no statistically significant differences in the observed characteristics of lottery winners and losers, suggesting that the lotteries were in fact conducted in a random way.

The students in the lottery differ both academically and demographically from the students who were included in the regression discontinuity study. Not only do the lottery students have higher test scores than students at the eligibility cutoff, but their test scores exceed those of the average G&T student in the district. Lottery participants are also less likely to be on subsidized lunch, and less likely to be minority.

Of the 542 lottery participants, only 440 students, including 331 winners (84 percent) and 109 losers (74 percent), remain in LUSD by 7th grade. Fortunately, the observed characteristics of lottery winners and losers who remain in the district continue to be very similar. Even so, when analyzing the data we control for students’ demographic characteristics and prior achievement, and use weights designed to make the final sample comparable in terms of its observed characteristics to the set of students that initially applied for the lottery.

One disadvantage of this second study is that the lottery losers have a range of alternative experiences and most participate in standard G&T programs, so the comparison group’s educational experience is less clear than it was in the regression discontinuity analysis. Nonetheless, our data confirm that students admitted to the G&T magnet schools with lotteries seem to have experienced large improvements in their educational environment. Winning the lottery increased the average achievement of students’ classroom peers by as much as a full standard deviation in some subjects. And in contrast to the G&T program as a whole, students admitted by lottery to G&T magnet program were assigned to more effective teachers.

Turning to student outcomes, however, our results provide little evidence that attending a G&T magnet program leads to improvements in student achievement (see Figure 3). The one exception is science test scores, for which we estimate a positive effect of 0.28 standard deviations. Due to the relatively small sample sizes, all of the effects are imprecisely estimated and do not allow us to definitively rule out reasonably large positive effects. Even so, the estimated effects for math, reading, and social studies are negative, and the estimated effect for language is effectively zero.

Discussion

It is difficult to understand why we find little evidence that G&T programs positively affect achievement. A common concern with studies of high-achieving students is that the available achievement measures may not be well suited to discern improvements for this group. This would be particularly worrisome if we were using a state accountability exam targeted toward low-achieving students, but it is less of an issue with the Stanford Achievement Tests. Indeed, we found little evidence of students performing near the maximum levels on these tests in either the regression discontinuity or lottery samples. Although it is possible that the additional course material taught in G&T classes is poorly aligned with topics covered in the achievement test, research documenting the benefits of being placed with higher-ability peers suggests that we should see improvements, even if that were the case.

The effect of being placed in a higher-ability classroom may not necessarily be positive, however, especially for a marginal G&T student. In particular, the drop in ranking relative to one’s peers may have a negative effect: a marginal G&T student is likely to go from being near the top of the regular class to being near the bottom of the G&T class. Even students in the middle of the G&T distribution are likely to experience a loss of ranking in the magnet G&T schools as compared to their neighborhood schools. It may be that students are demoralized by the drop in their relative rankings or that teachers provide more resources to students at the top of the class.

Substantial evidence from educational psychology indicates that students who are placed in higher-achieving groups can suffer psychological harm. A commonly used measure is a student’s “self-concept,” how a student perceives her abilities relative to an objective measure such as achievement. A 1995 study by Herbert Marsh and colleagues compared G&T students to observably similar students in mixed G&T and non-G&T classes and found that G&T students show declines in their math and reading self-concept. More recent research has documented lower self-concept and greater test anxiety among gifted students in ability-segregated classrooms.

Although we do not have direct evidence on student confidence, we can make use of student course grades and rank within the class to probe for evidence consistent with this kind of effect. We evaluate the impact of G&T program enrollment in the regression discontinuity study and of attending a G&T magnet in the lottery analysis. In both cases, we find clear reductions in student grades. For the regression discontinuity sample, grades fall by a statistically significant 4 points out of 100 (3 points changes a grade from a B+ to a B, for example) in math and by 2 to 3 points in other subjects, although these effects are not statistically significant for 7th grade. For the lottery analysis, the grade reductions are even more dramatic, with drops of 7 points in math, 8 in science, and 4 in social studies.

It is also useful to consider how students’ rankings within their peer groups differ by treatment status, as this provides a direct measure of how a student may perceive his position in the overall distribution of student ability. We assume that students mostly compare themselves to their schoolmates who take the same courses in the same grade. Thus, we rank students within each school, grade, and course by their final course grades and then convert these rankings to percentiles. The rankings based on 7th-grade courses exhibit notable drops when students cross the G&T eligibility threshold. Controlling for race, gender, economic disadvantage, LEP (Limited English Proficiency), and prior gifted status, marginal G&T students have a relative rank in 7th grade that is 13 to 21 percentiles lower than similar students who were not admitted. Attending a premier G&T magnet in 7th grade generates a nearly 30 percentile ranking drop in all four of the courses examined.

In short, the necessary conditions are clearly met for a drop in relative ranking to play a role in offsetting the expected positive impact of more rigorous courses, more effective teachers, and higher-achieving peers. The possibility that G&T students are subject to such a mechanism suggests potential constraints on the benefits of programs that provide more similar peers and an increase in traditional education inputs.

One should not conclude from the lack of achievement results, however, that the G&T programs should be scuttled. Our analysis occurs in a district with a large number of relatively high-quality magnet programs, and thus the alternatives to the G&T programs may be strong. There may also be benefits that we are not able to capture, such as impacts on SAT scores, graduation rates, and college attendance. Further, our study examines a G&T program in one district. Certainly, districts vary in the approaches they take to educating gifted students, so it may be that similar studies of programs in other districts would yield different results. Nonetheless, this study does raise questions about the efficacy of G&T programs and the traditional model of ability-segregated classrooms.

Sa Bui is a doctoral candidate in economics at the University of Houston, where Steven Craig is professor of economics and Scott Imberman is assistant professor of economics.

In “Accountability’s End?“, Petrilli divides accountability supporters into four distinct groups, which I found accurate. His categories also make it a lot easier to explain why teachers have so much trouble explaining that we are not against all accountability, so much as we have seen the idea of accountability misused for political reasons. We also have ongoing experience with its unintended consequences.

The truth is that while many teachers disagree strongly with some of the groups described in Petrilli’s article, we are in agreement with others. Opinions among teachers vary, so I won’t claim to speak for all of us, but here are my reactions to each group as Petrilli describes them.

The Tough Lovers: This group wants to make sure that teachers are not unduly shielded from a tough economy and that only hard, competent workers stay on school payrolls. Personally, I don’t mind. I’ve never had a problem with being expected to do a good job – few teachers I’ve ever met have a problem with that. Then again, I have a smart and fair-minded principal who isn’t likely to bully me over some comment I’ve made at a faculty meeting. Not all teachers are so lucky. More so than in the private sector, teachers let go for poor performance – or perceived poor performance – will likely have their careers permanently destroyed. It would be nice to see increased “tough-love” in HR departments balanced out with options for good teachers who get stuck in tough situations.

The World is Flatters: This group supports things like STEM and the Common Core standards as a means to make American education more cohesive and keep us competitive with other countries. I have no major disagreements with this group, and have yet to hear from a teacher who does.

The Tight-Loosers: This group favors results-based accountability as a means to cut back on traditional regulation. On paper, the idea of using some type of end results as a means of giving teachers more autonomy sounds great. For example, I’d love English teachers to be able to read more novels instead of giving expensive, time-consuming, relatively useless bi-weekly assessments. At the same time, teachers get uneasy about the “tight-looser” camp because we’ve seen firsthand that standardized tests don’t tell us everything accountability hawks say they do. Plus, increased emphasis on test results has yet to be matched with more autonomy in most public schools – instead they are the justification for things like replacing novels with bi-weekly assessments. For now, I’d describe the way it plays out as the “tight-tighter” approach.

The Poverty Warriors: This group claims that test-based accountability will keep schools and teachers from shortchanging poor, minority students. It is generally arguments from this group – however well intentioned – that frustrate me the most. Teachers at low-income schools often choose to work there in spite of problems known to impact student achievement. The “poverty warrior” rhetoric has recast these teachers as lazy, racist conspirators against poor kids. It is disingenuous and unfair to suggest that non-teachers in clean, well-decorated offices with all the copy paper they could ever ask for somehow care more about poor kids than teachers who get up at 5AM and break up hallway fights and work with these kids every day.

Teachers have also seen how many accountability measures – even well-meaning ones – have unintended consequences that undermine their stated goals. When we bring this up, however, even if we are really only arguing with one of the four groups above, we get slapped with the label of being against everything all four groups stand for, and thus treated as lazy, against what’s best for children, unrealistic about what kids need to know, and un-caring.

If we had those four characteristics, why, exactly, would we have chosen this profession?

While I don’t agree with every statement in Petrilli’s article, I still hope a lot of people read it. It is definitely a starting point for a more thoughtful discussion of this issue.

-Roxanna Elden

Roxanna Elden is a National Board Certified Teacher in Miami, and the author of See Me After Class: Advice for Teachers by Teachers.

Are America’s highest achieving students being left behind?

A trio of recent studies and articles raises troubling questions about America’s “Achievement-Gap Mania.” Are we leaving our highest performing students behind in the quest to raise the test scores of students at the bottom? If so, what will this mean for our future international competitiveness?

Learn about the recent studies–Fordham’s Do High Flyers Maintain their Altitude? and the George W. Bush Institute’s Global Report Card—as well as Frederick M. Hess’s new National Affairs essay, “Our Achievement-Gap Mania.” And join a conversation about whether our focus on raising the bottom is blinding us to trouble at the top.

Panelists:

• Ulrich Boser, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress
• John Cronin, Director of the Kingsbury Center for Research on Academic Growth at the Northwest Evaluation Association
• Frederick M. Hess, Resident Scholar and Director of Education Policy Studies at American Enterprise Institute
• Josh McGee, Vice President for Public Accountability Initiatives at the Laura and John Arnold Foundation

Moderator:

• Chester E. Finn, Jr., President, Thomas B. Fordham Institute

Find more information on student achievement and the global report card here.

It’s official: Federal policymakers across the political spectrum are finally willing to admit that Congress overreached when it passed No Child Left Behind and put Uncle Sam in the driver’s seat on education accountability. First there was (Republican) Senator Lamar Alexander’s proposal to get the feds out of the business entirely, save for requirements around the worst five percent of schools. Then there was (Democratic) President Obama’s waiver package, which allows states to make a pitch for their own approach to accountability. And, this week, there’s the (bipartisan) Harkin-Enzi bill, authored by the chairman and ranking member (respectively) of the Senate education committee, which, well, it’s hard to tell exactly what it does, but it surely reduces the federal footprint around accountability. (Try making sense of the convoluted bill yourself. And quick—the mark-up is next week.)

But if the debate around the federal role in accountability is coalescing, a much bigger question remains wide open: Could we be watching the beginning of the end for the accountability movement in toto?

One harbinger might be California Governor Jerry Brown’s veto of a bill to tweak his state’s accountability system by adding “multiple-measures” to a test-score laden index. Brown’s complaint wasn’t the multiple measures per se, but the notion of data-based accountability writ large. “Adding more speedometers to a broken car,” he wrote, “won’t turn it into a high-performance machine.”

If those of us who support test-based accountability are going to push back against these arguments, we’d better get much clearer about what we’re fighting for. In other words: What are we talking about when we talk about “accountability”?

If we’re honest, we’ll admit that it means different things to different people:

• The Tough Lovers want to see people held accountable for doing their jobs. They are sick and tired of public-school managers who are sheltered from the harsh realities of market competition and who shy away from hard decisions. If someone doesn’t perform—whether he’s a clerk, a classroom teacher, or an assistant principal—they want to see him fired. They want to know that our civil servants are driving a hard bargain with vendors, setting smart budget priorities, eliminating wasteful and ineffective programs, and cleaning house on a regular basis to make sure that only hard workers stay on the payroll. And they hope that the pressure from accountability will motivate the system to get serious about results and care less about hurting people’s feelings or cow-towing to union demands.

• The Tight-Loosers see a move toward results-based accountability as an opportunity to cut back on traditional regulation. They embrace the charter-school bargain: Hold schools responsible for improving student achievement and get rid of all the other rules in return—the class-size mandates, the teacher-certification regimes, the crazy budget protocols, all of it. They hope that this will lead to better outcomes, but even if it doesn’t, they are almost certain that it will lead to better school environments, as educators are unburdened from the stifling command-and-control culture that pervades so many public-sector bureaucracies. And if it leads to truly disastrous schools, officials can always shut them down.

• The World-is-Flatters worry about America’s economic competitiveness and distrust local schools and parents to emphasize the right educational priorities. They see test-based accountability as way to force the education system to embrace the academic subjects (think STEM) and skills (think Common Core) that will build our “human capital” and fuel future economic growth. They have little respect for a system that stresses feel-good notions like “self-esteem” over hard work and rigorous preparation.

• The Poverty Warriors view accountability as one weapon in the battle on educational inequality. By shaming and sanctioning schools that don’t do right by poor or minority kids, they seek to shift resources (money, strong teachers, challenging courses) to the neediest schools and kids. They are happy to push for redistributionalist policies in other ways too—via school-finance reform, closing the Title I “comparability” loophole, etc.—but they see this brand of accountability as changing the political dynamics on the ground in ways that would favor kids who would otherwise be marginalized.

If we are to save “accountability,” we might need to shed one or two of these arguments. So which ones?

The Tough Lovers, it seems to me, are on the strongest ground politically. As a center-right country, the United States is more than happy to complain about bloated and inefficient government. And particularly now that so many people are out of work and struggling to make ends meet, a civil servant system that stresses job security is highly vulnerable to attack. I suspect that when people tell pollsters they support “accountability” in education, this is what they mean. They want people in the system to do their jobs or get fired.

The Tight-Loosers are politically safe, too, though their argument is unlikely to appeal to everyday voters, focused as it is on intergovernmental relationships and structures.

The World-is-Flatters, however, are starting to run into trouble. This is entirely predictable; in a country that values “local control” of our schools, we blush at the thought of far-away elites dictating the content to be taught in our schools. Further conflict ensues when well-connected parents and educators feel that their own niche schools—be they Waldorf or Montessori or whatever—are being violated by educational values that are foreign to them. Listen to many of the complaints of the “Save our Schools” types (or Governor Brown) and you’ll glimpse the old battles about traditional vs. progressive education. We’re a big, diverse country. Anything that tethers the pluralism of our education system is bound to face backlash.

But it’s the Poverty Warriors, by my read, who are in the most precarious situation. It’s not that they don’t have a strong case on the merits. Our education system is horrendously inequitable. It’s criminal to spend twice as much on the education of the rich as on the schooling of the poor. And we’ve all heard compelling stories about how NCLB-style accountability has given “political cover” to district and school leaders, allowing them to shift attention and resources to the kids most in need.

Still, as a center-right country, America is deeply suspicious of redistribution in any form. Furthermore, the Poverty Warriors haven’t been honest about their motives. Their slogan has been “leave no child behind” when it’s really closer to “take from the rich, give to the poor.”

Of course, that class warfare rhetoric won’t sell. Not back then, and certainly not now, in the midst of the Great Recession.

So where does that leave us?

The kind of “accountability” we should be promoting would be responsive to the arguments of the Tough Lovers, Tight-Loosers, and World-is-Flatters, while being flexible enough not to antagonize niche schools in our pluralistic society.

Such an accountability movement would continue to call for rigorous standards, regular testing, and interventions in schools that don’t measure up. It would be serious about untying the hands of managers, especially so they can “hold accountable” teachers and other staff who don’t pull their weight. And it would allow some sort of accountability opt-out for schools that don’t want to be part of the default system. This might look like charter-school agreements in the early days—customized contracts that consider “multiple measures” and qualitative judgments that are better aligned with the mission and approach of the schools being evaluated (like the ones you love, Governor “Moonbeam” Brown).

This approach to accountability is defensible, saleable, and workable—in other words, the kind of accountability worth promoting. To push the Poverty Warrior option, I predict, is to ensure accountability’s end. Which would you prefer?

-Mike Petrilli

This blog entry also appears in this week’s Flypaper.

I was prepared for a rant against all things reform when I started reading the New York Times Q & A interview with Maria Velez-Clarke, the principal of the Children’s Workshop School in Manhattan’s East Village, about the school’s C-grade from the City.  The school is “one of several small schools,” said the Times intro, “started in the 1990s by people who had worked at the widely praised Central Park East School.”

Central Park East?  The school started by Deborah Meier, current scourge of standardized tests, charters, accountability, and just about everything associated with Michael Bloomberg and Joel Klein, who initiatiated the school report cards program?  (See the Bridging Differences blog Meier shares with Diane Ravitch and this wonderful 1994 profile of Meier and her hugely successful Central Park East experiment written by veteran NYC educator Sy Fliegal.)  Children’s Workshop offers ballet and yoga, for heaven’s sake!

Instead of a progressive principal complaining about Gotham’s new accountability system squishing her student’s creative impulses, however, we hear an 18-year veteran school leader who was shocked by the C grade the school received in 2010 and determined to do something about it:

I shared it with absolutely no one because it was so devastating to me. I took it home. I sat with my husband and I said, “My God, do you know what this is going to do to morale?” And he looked at me and he said, “O.K., you have the weekend: have a pity party and then move on.”

Velez-Clark actually went to the Transit Museum and bought “C” buttons (for the C train), brought them to school, sat down with her staff and said, “O.K., now what do we have to do here in order to get off the C train and get on the B train?”

She then took her staff on a weekend retreat, where they reviewed every child’s test scores.  And what is most interesting about the school’s response is that Velez-Clark seems unafraid to admit that she has learned something that may be good for her students.

When she and her teachers began to dig into the test scores, for instance, they discovered

….a correlation between attendance and a child’s score. So we worked on attendance. I didn’t always send a note home before, but now sometimes if a child is absent too much, I have to send a letter home saying “this could lead to A.C.S. [Administration for Children's Services] coming to visit your house” or “your child is at risk of being held over because of attendance.”

The school didn’t stop being progressive, it simply integrated cultural history into its ballet lessons and nutrition and science into its yoga classes.

This is how it’s supposed to work.  Congratulations to the staff and children of Children’s Workshop for their B grade this year – and showing that it’s okay to do well in tests.

–Peter Meyer

This post also appears on Flypaper

For that reason, one must give a great deal of respect to Sandy Kress’s opinions.  And so I am encouraged when he tells me that the moves away from accountability and merit pay that have taken place recently in Texas were forced upon Governor Rick Perry and Robert Scott, the state’s education commissioner, by legislative pressures beyond their control.

But the fact of the matter remains:  Texas is backing away from education reform under its current political leadership. That is a shame, because Texas has historically led the way, not least because of Sandy Kress’s own commitment to the cause and effective leadership skills.

There are still good things that can be said about Texan schools. As I said in my original blog post, students within each ethnic group in Texas—white, Hispanic, and African American—are among the nation’s top performers, in some cases surpassing even the levels achieved in Massachusetts. Let’s hope the Texas political leadership can resist the anti-accountability forces in the months and years to come.

-Paul E. Peterson

First, a confession. I’m a big admirer of Paul Peterson. I share the values and concerns he reflects in his post.

As most readers of this blog know, I have been deeply involved in Texas reforms since they began to be implemented systematically in the early 90s. I have a strong and passionate commitment to keeping accountability, broadly defined, in place in our state.

I believe Governor Perry is strongly committed to maintaining accountability in Texas, so I wanted to respond to a few of Paul’s characterizations.

As to merit pay, which I have been deeply involved in supporting and helping to create in Texas, Governor Perry has been a strong and steadfast supporter. I recall his role in the early days in using some discretionary dollars to model pay for performance and then his leadership in seeking support from the legislature for our program, which became the largest in the country.

In this last session, Governor Perry did insist that we deal with our fiscal problems without tax increases. That meant some budget cuts, and the legislature did cut deeply (too deeply, in my view) into state education initiatives. This was unfortunate, but not Governor Perry’s doing, nor within his power to prevent.

I could spend more time than I have here to talk about the uphill politics behind creating and sustaining merit pay. But the main point I want to make is that Perry is a supporter, and that our loss was in no way due to his “giving in to special interests.”

As to the district waiver program, this initiative came out of the legislature, not from the Governor’s office. So it’s not at all like Secretary Duncan’s waiver program, which the Executive is doing on its own, without legislative authority. Further, while I worry a lot about the Administration’s watering down accountability across the country, I am convinced the Texas program will entail added accountability while under Robert Scott’s administration. That is to say, I believe he’ll look for additional and more rigorous measures for higher-end performance while maintaining student-specific, objective measures for students across the board.

This is not to say that I like the bill the legislature passed. I worry about its expansion and, mostly, its administration in a post-Perry period for precisely the same reasons Paul raises.

Finally, as to accountability generally, Governor Perry has been a stalwart supporter and defender of our accountability initiatives. Our state adopted a basic re-write of our accountability policies under HB 3 two years ago. It’s a fine model for states and has been widely designated as such by many groups around the country, including Achieve and the SREB. Make no mistake about it, it would never have been as strong as it was when passed, nor would it have survived this last session without being watered down, but for the looming veto pen of Governor Perry.

I know Paul has decided to support Romney and I respect his decision, but the record should be clear: Governor Perry has been a strong leader on education and a fervent supporter of accountability and other policies designed to improve student academic results.

- Sandy Kress

Sandy Kress served as senior advisor to President George W. Bush on education with respect to the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.

The study on which the Global Report Card is based, “When the Best is Mediocre: Developed countries far outperform our most affluent suburbs,” by Jay Greene and Josh McGee, will appear in the Winter 2012 issue of Ed Next and is now available online.

The rankings of 13,636 U.S. school districts can be found in the Global Report Card, available on the website of the George W. Bush Institute, where readers can see how students in each school district compare to students in 25 other nations.

A detailed explanation of the methods used to conduct the analysis is available here.

The study, “When the Best is Mediocre,” by Jay Greene and Josh McGee, will appear in the Winter 2012 issue of Education Next, and is now available online.

Readers can check out the rankings of 13,636 U.S. school districts, and see how students in each district compare to students in 25 other nations, in a Global Report Card available on the website of the George W. Bush Institute. There readers can also find a detailed explanation of the methods used to conduct the analysis.

A  more complete integration of testing, accountability, and teaching would be superior to dealing with the integrity of testing in isolation.   Let’s put the tests out in the sun instead of trying to lock them up in more and more secure rooms.

The use of student outcome measures for accountability is now firmly entrenched and is not about to go away.  But a variety of complaints about the current testing system exist.   First, the tests tend to narrow the teaching to just what is expected on the tests – with excessive teaching to the test and drilling on  practice tests.  Second, the tests are too easy for students in some schools and too hard for others, either wasting the time of some or frustrating others.  Third, using tests for accountability purposes encourages cheating and other ways to evade scrutiny.

To address these different issues, we need to think differently about aims and means.  Here is a brief proposal to deal with all of the problems.  It starts with developing a large item bank of test questions of varying difficulty.  Imagine 1,500 questions for fourth grade math that cover the entire scope of appropriate material from basic to advanced topics.  Next, make all of the test items – not just sample items – publicly available and encourage teachers to teach to the test, because the items cover the full range of the desired curriculum.  Making the items public will also ensure the quality of the test items.  One could invite feedback ratings or open sourcing to provide a path to improving the questions over time.  Then, move to computerized adaptive testing, where answers to an initial set of questions move the student to easier or more difficult items based on responses.  This testing permits accurate assessments at varying levels while lessening test burden from excessive questions that provide little information on individual student performance.  Such assessments would not be limited to minimally proficient levels that are the focus of today’s tests, and thus they could provide useful information to districts that find current testing too easy.  Students would be given a random selection of questions, and the answers would go directly into the computer – bypassing the erasure checks, the comparison of responses with other students, and the like.

This proposal actually follows the current testing by the FAA of knowledge needed to obtain a private pilot license.  While there are commercial books on these tests, replete with questions and answers, the efficient way to prepare for the tests is simply to learn the underlying concepts.  It is not to attempt to memorize the answers, because it is easy to confuse such an attempt.

What are the potential problems?  Some say developing test items would make this too costly, but remember that it is only necessary to have one item bank, not the continually changed banks of today.  Some worry about ensuring that sufficient computers are available in all schools, but with all of the digital devices currently in use, surely there are a range of possibilities to deliver the tests effectively and efficiently.  There is the problem that the testing companies would not particularly like the proposal.   They find they are happy with mindlessly developing slightly different variants of existing tests for different states, years, and administrations.  But, maybe there are more productive ways for them to enter into the process.

The proposed system would yield quick and reliable feedback on student achievement, would deal with the various cheating and gaming issues, and would more effectively define what students should know than the currently available standards.

-Eric A. Hanushek

Eric Hanushek is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University and member of the Koret Task Force on K-12 Education.

On August 17, 2011 Paul Peterson discussed the findings of this study in a free online webinar. An archived recording of this webinar can be found here.

At a time of persistent unemployment, especially among the less skilled, many wonder whether our schools are adequately preparing students for the 21st-century global economy. Despite high unemployment rates, firms are experiencing shortages of educated workers, outsourcing professional-level work to workers abroad, and competing for the limited number of employment visas set aside for highly skilled immigrants. As President Barack Obama said in his 2011 State of the Union address, “We know what it takes to compete for the jobs and industries of our time. We need to out-innovate, out-educate, and out-build the rest of the world.”

The challenge is particularly great in math, science, and engineering. According to Internet entrepreneur Vinton Cerf, “America simply is not producing enough of our own innovators, and the cause is twofold—a deteriorating K–12 education system and a national culture that does not emphasize the importance of education and the value of engineering and science.” To address the issue, the Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) Education Coalition was formed in 2006 to “raise awareness in Congress, the Administration, and other organizations about the critical role that STEM education plays in enabling the U.S. to remain the economic and technological leader of the global marketplace.” Tales of shortages of educated talent appear regularly in the media. According to a CBS News report, 22 percent of American businesses say they are ready to hire if they can find people with the right skills. As one factory owner put it, “It’s hard to fill these jobs because they require people who are good at math, good with their hands, and willing to work on a factory floor.” According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics report, of the 30 occupations projected to grow the most rapidly over the next decade, nearly half are professional jobs that require at least a college degree. On the basis of these projections, McKinsey’s Global Institute estimates that over the next few years there will be a gap of nearly 2 million workers with the necessary analytical and technical skills.

In this paper we view the proficiency of U.S. students from a global perspective. Although we provide information on performances in both reading and mathematics, our emphasis is on student proficiency in mathematics, the subject many feel to be of greatest concern.

Student Proficiency on NAEP

At one time it was left to teachers and administrators to decide exactly what level of math proficiency should be expected of students. But, increasingly, states, and the federal government itself, have established proficiency levels that students are asked to reach. A national proficiency standard was set by the board that governs the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), which is administered by the U.S. Department of Education and generally known as the nation’s report card.

In 2007, just 32 percent of 8th graders in public and private schools in the United States performed at or above the NAEP proficiency standard in mathematics, and 31 percent performed at or above that level in reading. When more than two-thirds of students fail to reach a proficiency bar, it raises serious questions. Are U.S. schools failing to teach their students adequately? Or has NAEP set its proficiency bar at a level beyond the normal reach of a student in 8th grade?

One way of tackling such questions is to take an international perspective. Are other countries able to lift a higher percentage—or even a majority—of their students to or above the NAEP proficiency bar? Another approach is to look at differences among states. What percentage of students in each state is performing at a proficient level? How does each state compare to students in other countries?

In this article, we report results from our second study of student achievement in global perspective conducted for Harvard’s Program on Education Policy and Governance (PEPG). In our 2010 PEPG report, we compared the percentage of U.S. public and private school students in the high-school graduating Class of 2009 who were performing at the advanced level in mathematics with rates of similar performance among their peers around the world (see “Teaching Math to the Talented,” features, Winter 2011). The current study continues this work by reporting proficiency rates in both mathematics and reading for the most recent cohort for which data are available, the high-school graduating Class of 2011.

Comparing U.S. Students with Peers in Other Countries

If the NAEP exams are the nation’s report card, the world’s report card is assembled by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which administers the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) to representative samples of 15-year-old students in 65 of the world’s school systems (which, to simplify the presentation, we shall refer to as countries; Hong Kong, Macao, and Shanghai are not independent nations but are nonetheless included in PISA reports). Since its launch in 2000, the PISA test has emerged as the yardstick by which countries measure changes in their performance over time and the level of their performance relative to that of other countries.

Since the United States participates in the PISA examinations, it is possible to make direct comparisons between the average performance of U.S. students and that of their peers elsewhere. But to compare the percentages of students deemed proficient in math or reading, one must ascertain the PISA equivalent of the NAEP standard of proficiency. To obtain that information, we perform a crosswalk between NAEP and PISA. The crosswalk is made possible by the fact that representative (but separate) samples of the high-school graduating Class of 2011 took the NAEP and PISA math and reading examinations. NAEP tests were taken in 2007 when the Class of 2011 was in 8th grade and PISA tested 15-year-olds in 2009, most of whom are members of the Class of 2011. Given that NAEP identified 32 percent of U.S. 8th-grade students as proficient in math, the PISA equivalent is estimated by calculating the minimum score reached by the top-performing 32 percent of U.S. students participating in the 2009 PISA test. (See methodological sidebar for further details.)

What It Means to Be Proficient

According to the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), which administers NAEP, the determination of proficiency in any given subject at a particular grade level “was the result of a comprehensive national process [which took into account]…what hundreds of educators, curriculum experts, policymakers, and members of the general public thought the assessment should test. After the completion of the framework, the NAEP [subject] Committee worked with measurement specialists to create the assessment questions and scoring criteria.” In other words, NAEP’s concept of proficiency is not based on any objective criterion, but reflects a consensus on what should be known by students who have reached a certain educational stage. NAEP says that 8th graders, if proficient, “understand the connections between fractions, percents, decimals, and other mathematical topics such as algebra and functions.”

PISA does not set a proficiency standard. Instead, it sets different levels of performance, ranging from one (the lowest) to six (the highest). A student who is at the proficiency level in math set by NAEP performs moderately above proficiency  level three on the PISA. (See sidebar for a statement of the 8th-grade proficiency standard and sample questions from PISA and NAEP that proficient students are expected to pass.)

Crossing the Proficiency Bar

Given that definition of math proficiency, U.S. students in the Class of 2011, with a 32 percent proficiency rate, came in 32nd among the nations that participated in PISA. Performance levels among the countries ranked 23rd to 31st are not significantly different from that of the U.S. in a statistical sense, yet 22 countries do significantly outperform the United States in the share of students reaching the proficiency level in math. Six countries plus Shanghai and Hong Kong had majorities of students performing at least at the proficiency level, while the United States had less than one-third. For example, 58 percent of Korean students and 56 percent of Finnish students performed at or above a proficient level. Other countries in which a majority—or near majority—of students performed at or above the proficiency level included Switzerland, Japan, Canada, and the Netherlands. Many other nations also had math proficiency rates well above that of the United States, including Germany (45 percent), Australia (44 percent), and France (39 percent). Figure 1 presents a detailed listing of the scores of all participating countries as well as the performance of the individual states within the United States.

Shanghai topped the list with a 75 percent math proficiency rate, well over twice the 32 percent rate of the United States. However, Shanghai students are from a prosperous metropolitan area within China, so their performance is more appropriately compared to Massachusetts and Minnesota, which are similarly favored and are the top performers among the U.S. states. When this comparison is made, Shanghai still performs at a distinctly higher level. Only a little more than half (51 percent) of Massachusetts students are proficient in math, while Minnesota, the runner-up state, has a math proficiency rate of just 43 percent.

Only four additional states—Vermont, North Dakota, New Jersey, and Kansas—have a math proficiency rate above 40 percent. Some of the country’s largest and richest states score below the average for the United States as a whole, including New York (30 percent), Missouri (30 percent), Michigan (29 percent), Florida (27 percent), and California (24 percent).

Click image to enlarge

Proficiency in Reading

According to NAEP, students proficient in reading “should be able to make and support inferences about a text, connect parts of a text, and analyze text features.” According to PISA, students at level four, a level of performance set very close to the NAEP proficiency level, should be “capable of difficult reading tasks, such as locating embedded information, construing meaning from nuances of languages critically evaluating a text.” (See sidebar for more specific definitions and sample questions.)

Click image to enlarge

The U.S. proficiency rate in reading, at 31 percent, compares reasonably well to those of most European countries other than Finland. It takes 17th place among the nations of the world, and only the top 10 countries on PISA outperform the United States by a statistically significant amount. In Korea, 47 percent of the students are proficient in reading. Other countries that outrank the United States include Finland (46 percent), Singapore,  New Zealand, and Japan (42 percent), Canada (41 percent), Australia (38 percent), and Belgium (37 percent).

Within the United States, Massachusetts is again the leader, with 43 percent of 8th-grade students performing at the NAEP proficiency level in reading. Shanghai students perform at a higher level, however, with 56 percent of its young people proficient in reading. Within the United States, Vermont is a close second to its neighbor to the south, with 42 percent proficiency. New Jersey and Montana come next, both with 39 percent of the students identified as proficient in reading. The District of Columbia, the nation’s worst, are at the level achieved in Turkey and Bulgaria, while the one-eighth of our students living in California are similar to those in Slovakia and Spain. (See Figure 2 for the international ranking of all states.)

Click image to enlarge

Ethnic Groups

The percentage proficient in the United States varies considerably among students from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. While 42 percent of white students were identified as proficient in math, only 11 percent of African American students, 15 percent of Hispanic students, and 16 percent of Native Americans were so identified. Fifty percent of students with an ethnic background from Asia and the Pacific Islands, however, were proficient in math, placing them at a level comparable to students in Belgium, Canada, and Japan.

In reading, 40 percent of white students and 41 percent of those from Asia and the Pacific Islands were identified as proficient. Only 13 percent of African American students, 5 percent of Hispanic students, and 18 percent of Native American students were so identified.

Given the disparate performances among students from various cultural backgrounds, it may be worth inquiring as to whether differences between the United States and other countries are due to the presence of a substantial minority population within the United States. To examine that question, we compare U.S. white students to all students in other countries. We do this not because we think this is the right comparison, but simply to consider the oft-expressed claim that education problems in the United States are confined to certain segments within the minority community.

While the 42 percent math efficiency rate for U.S. white students is considerably higher than that of African American and Hispanic students, they are still surpassed by all students in 16 other countries. White students in the United States trail well behind all students in Korea, Japan, Finland, Germany, Belgium, and Canada.

White students in Massachusetts outperform their peers in other states; 58 percent are at or above the math proficiency level. Maryland, New Jersey, and Texas are the other states in which a majority of white students is proficient in math. Given recent school-related political conflicts in Wisconsin, it is of interest that only 42 percent of that state’s white students are proficient in math, a rate no better than the nation as a whole.  (Results for all states are presented in the unabridged version of the paper.)

In reading, the picture looks better. As we mentioned above, only 40 percent of white students are proficient, but that proficiency rate would place the United States at 9th in the world. Its proficiency rate does not differ significantly (in a statistical sense) from that for all students in Canada, Japan, and New Zealand, but white students trail in reading by a significant margin all students in Shanghai, Korea, Finland, Hong Kong, and Singapore. In no state is a majority of white students proficient, although Massachusetts comes close with a 49 percent rate. The four states with the next highest levels of reading proficiency among white students are New Jersey, Connecticut, Maryland, and Colorado.

Are the Proficiency Standards the Same for Math as for Reading?

Has NAEP set a lower proficiency standard in math than in reading? If so, is the math standard too low or the reading bar too high?

At first glance it would seem that the standard is set at pretty much the same level. After all, 32 percent of U.S. students are deemed proficient in math and 31 percent are deemed proficient in reading.

But that coincidence is quite misleading. When compared to peers abroad, the U.S. Class of 2011 performed respectably in reading, trailing only 10 other nations by a statistically significant amount. Admittedly, the U.S. trails Korea by 16 percentage points, but it’s only 10 percentage points behind Canada. Meanwhile, U.S. performance in math significantly trails that of 22 countries. Korean performance is 26 percentage points higher than that of the United States, while Canadian performance is 18 percentage points higher. Judged by international standards, U.S. 8th graders are clearly doing worse in math than in reading, despite the fact that NAEP reports similar percentages proficient in the two subjects.

A direct comparison of NAEP’s proficiency standard with PISA’s proficiency levels three and four also indicates that a lower NAEP bar has been set in math than in reading. To meet NAEP’s standards currently, one needs to perform near the fourth level on PISA’s reading exam, but only modestly above the third level on its math exam.

Clearly, the experts set an 8th-grade math proficiency standard at a level lower than the one set in reading. Perhaps this is an indication that American society as a whole, including the experts who design NAEP standards, set lower expectations for students in math than in reading. If so, it is a sign that low performance in mathematics within the United States may be deeply rooted in the nation’s culture. Those who are setting the common core standards under discussion might well take note of this.

Of course, it could be argued that the math proficiency standard is correct but the reading standard has been set too high. In no country in the world does a majority of the students reach the NAEP proficiency bar set in 8th-grade reading.

What Does It Mean?

Many have concluded that the productivity of the U.S. economy could be greatly enhanced if a higher percentage of U.S. students were proficient in mathematics. As Michael Brown, Nobel Prize winner in medicine, has declared, “If America is to maintain our high standard of living, we must continue to innovate…. Math and science are the engines of innovation. With these engines we can lead the world.”

But others have argued that the overall past success of the U.S. economy suggests that high-school math performance is not that critical for sustained growth in economic productivity. After all, U.S. students trailed their peers in the very first international survey undertaken nearly 50 years ago. That is the wrong message to take away however. Other factors contributed to the relatively high rate of growth in economic productivity during the last half of the 20th century, including the openness of the country’s markets, respect for property rights, low levels of political corruption, and limited intrusion of government into the operations of the marketplace. The United States, moreover, has always benefited from the in-migration of talent from abroad.

Furthermore, the United States has historically had far higher levels of educational attainment than other countries, with many more students graduating from high school, continuing on to college, and earning an advanced degree. It appears that in the past the country made up for low quality in elementary and high school by educating students for longer periods of time.

As we proceed into the 21st century, none of these factors remains as favorable to the United States. While other countries are lifting restrictions on market operations, the opposite has been occurring within the United States. The U.S. has also placed sharp limits on the numbers of talented workers that can be legally admitted into the country. Our higher education system, though still perceived to be the best in the world, is recruiting an ever-increasing proportion of its faculty and students from outside the country. Meanwhile, educational attainment rates among U.S. citizens now trail the industrial-world average.

Even if some of these trends can be reversed, that hardly gainsays the desirability of enhancing the mathematical skills of the U.S. student population, especially at a time when the nation’s growth in productivity is badly trailing growth rates in China, India, Brazil, and many smaller Asian countries. Eric Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann have shown elsewhere that student performance on international tests such as those we consider here is closely related to long-term economic growth (see “Education and Economic Growth,” research, Spring 2008). Assuming past economic patterns continue, the country could enjoy a remarkable increment in its annual GDP growth per capita by enhancing the math proficiency of U.S. students. Increasing the percentage of proficient students to the levels attained in Canada and Korea would increase the annual U.S. growth rate by 0.9 percentage points and 1.3 percentage points, respectively. Since current average annual growth rates hover between 2 and 3 percentage points, that increment would lift growth rates by between 30 and 50 percent.

When translated into dollar terms, these magnitudes become staggering. If one calculates these percentage increases as national income projections over an 80-year period (providing for a 20-year delay before any school reform is completed and the newly proficient students begin their working careers), a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests gains of nothing less than $75 trillion over the period. That averages out to around a trillion dollars a year. Even if you tweak these numbers a bit in one direction or another to account for various uncertainties, you reach the same bottom line: Those who say that student math performance does not matter are clearly wrong.

Given the integration of the world economy, a global perspective is needed for assessing the performance of U.S. schools, districts, and states. High-school graduates in each and every state compete for jobs with graduates from all over the world. Charles Vest, president of the National Academy of Engineering and president emeritus at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has warned, “America faces many challenges…but the enemy I fear most is complacency. We are about to be hit by the full force of global competition. If we continue to ignore the obvious task at hand while others beat us at our own game, our children and grandchildren will pay the price. We must now establish a sense of urgency.”

Paul E. Peterson is the director of Harvard’s Program on Education Policy and Governance and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Ludger Woessmann is professor of economics at the University of Munich. Eric A. Hanushek is senior fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. Carlos X. Lastra-Anadón is a research fellow at the Program on Education Policy and Governance at Harvard University. An unabridged version of this paper is available here.

Teacher benefits, once a sleepy question primarily of interest to actuaries, have become a flash point in the education debate. With individual states on the hook for tens or hundreds of millions in unfunded pension and health insurance obligations, state leaders are trying to determine the severity of the situation and the appropriate response. In this forum, Robert Costrell of the University of Arkansas and Mike Podgursky of the University of Missouri argue that the situation is critical, but offer an opportunity for overdue reform, while Christian Weller of the University of Massachusetts-Boston argues that measured steps will put teacher pensions on sound footing.

Education Next: How bad is the teacher pension crisis?

Christian Weller: The states’ fiscal crisis necessitates that they address pension underfunding. Underfunding means that pension assets are lower than liabilities, or those benefits promised to beneficiaries. The underfunding often seems staggering. The Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, for instance, estimated the gap at more than $700 billion in 2009. The aggregate underfunding reflects the money that states will need to come up with over several decades. But the CRR also estimates that an additional 2 percent of payroll would cover the expected shortfall, making the problem manageable without ruining governments.

Christian Weller

States can take a balanced approach to managing pension underfunding that fits their particular circumstances. Thirty-nine states reduced benefits, increased contributions, or both between 2001 and 2009, according to the Pew Center on the States. The exact combination of benefit and tax changes depends on several factors, including public employees’ Social Security coverage, current benefits and contributions, and states’ human resource needs. States still want to make sure that their benefits allow them to hire the most-effective employees.

Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky:

Indeed, educator pension systems are becoming increasingly expensive and, in many states, are seriously underfunded (see “Teacher Retirement Benefits,” research, Spring 2009). One major source of this problem is the massive increase in benefits from several decades of legislative enhancements. The key to understanding this is the concept of “pension wealth,” the current dollar value of the expected stream of future benefits, in other words, the cash value of a retiree’s annuity. Pension wealth encompasses both the annual pension payment and, importantly, the number of years it is collected.

The two solid curves in Figure 1 show pension wealth for a typical Missouri teacher in 1975 and today. Each curve is calculated under the current salary schedule for teachers in the state capital, so the growth represents only pension rule changes. The bottom curve shows that under 1975 rules a teacher entering at age 25 would have accrued just under $400,000 in pension wealth by age 55. Today, the same teacher would have accrued pension wealth of just under $900,000 by the same age. Not surprisingly, these enhancements have come at a substantial cost: Combined contributions for teachers and districts increased from 16 to 29 percent of salary over this period. However, even this is inadequate; the portion of salary required to pay for pension wealth accruals of current teachers and to pay off the unfunded liability is 31.3 percent.

EN: What steps should states take to address the crisis?

RC & MP: Given concerns about cost and long-term sustainability, a number of states have cut benefits, usually for new teachers, and others are considering doing so. However, in making these changes, policymakers should carefully consider their labor market effects. Some of the proposed cuts reproduce, and even exacerbate, undesirable features of current systems. These shortcomings stem from a fundamental flaw: the failure to tie benefits to contributions. Thus the fix must expose and eliminate the gaps between the two. Below are three recommendations for reforming teacher pensions:

Robert Costrell

1. Report the gaps between contributions and pension wealth. In many respects, current defined benefit (DB) pension plans for teachers are opaque. Teachers rarely know what their plan is worth. By contrast, holders of 403(b) or 401(k) accounts typically know exactly what their account is worth at any point in time. To provide the same transparency for teachers, plans should not only disclose the projected annual pension payment, they should also report pension wealth. For comparison, the plan should disclose the cumulative value of contributions, both the employee’s and the employer’s, along with accumulated returns. In this way, each educator could see how the value of her accrued benefits compares with the value of the contributions. In the typical teacher pension plan, these are going to be very different numbers. Early in a teacher’s career, the value of the contributions will far exceed pension wealth, whereas for more senior teachers, the reverse is true. The dotted line in Figure 1 illustrates this point. It represents the cumulative value of contributions that is fiscally equivalent to the current pension plan, showing that the cumulative value of pension contributions exceeds pension wealth until age 50. However, between ages 50 and 62 pension wealth is typically well in excess of contributions. Not surprisingly, this is when the vast majority of full-career teachers choose to retire.

Michael Podgursky

2. Close the gaps between contributions and pension wealth. To make pensions more equitable and effective tools for staffing schools, we propose that retirement benefits paid to any teacher should be tied to the lifetime contributions made by or for that teacher. If $300,000 has been contributed on behalf of a teacher (including accumulated returns), then the cash value of an annuity provided to this teacher should also be $300,000.

Unfortunately, as we have seen, this fundamental principle is routinely violated in teacher plans. The gap (positive or negative) between the value of benefits and contributions is rarely considered in plan design. Instead, legislatures tinker with complex and arbitrary pension rules, such as the calculation of final average salary (how many years included, what counts as “salary”), the annual service “multiplier,” and the eligibility rules to receive the pension (“rule of 80,” “25-and-out,” etc.). Since these benefit rules are not tied to contributions, legislatures have, over the years, enhanced them, without regard to equity or efficiency, and often without adequate funding. These complex rules also encourage “gaming” by educators and districts in order to increase the gap between benefits and contributions.

Our analysis shows that current systems typically result in very large implicit transfers from young teachers working short spells to “long termers,” who work full careers in the same system (see “Golden Handcuffs,” research, Winter 2010). In our view, a teacher who works 10 years or 30 years should accrue pension wealth roughly equivalent to total pension contributions (with accumulated returns). Thus, in Figure 1, the pension wealth curve would coincide with the contributions curve depicted, for a fiscally equivalent plan, or with a lower curve if costs are to be reduced.

In addition to improving equity, tying benefits to contributions would have important workforce benefits. First, it would provide rational incentives for retirement versus continued work. Each year, an educator would accrue pension wealth in a smooth and transparent way, providing a steady addition to the annual salary she is earning. This would generate neutral incentives to work or retire based on individual preferences and effectiveness. That is not the case with current systems. In our own work, we have shown sharp “peaks and valleys” in pension wealth accrual, which distort incentives for retirement (see “Peaks, Cliffs, and Valleys,” features, Winter 2008). Some years (e.g., at 25 or 30 years of service) yield increases in pension wealth that are several times the teacher’s salary. This provides a huge incentive to stay on the job until that pension “spike,” regardless of classroom effectiveness. There is no economic rationale for favoring one year of work over another in this way. Nor should an additional year of work reduce pension wealth (net of employee contributions), as is the case in current teacher plans after a certain point, often at relatively young ages. This penalizes good teachers who wish to stay.

Tying benefits to contributions would also eliminate the massive penalties for mobility in current systems. It is well understood in the private sector that in order to recruit and retain talented young employees it is necessary to provide portable retirement benefits. This is accomplished by defined contribution (DC) or cash balance (CB) plans that vest immediately or nearly so. Current teacher plans typically have 5- and even 10-year vesting. Our research finds that even for vested educators, the loss in pension wealth for those who split a teaching career between two traditional plans is massive. In a system where benefits are tied to the cumulative value of contributions, it does not matter whether contributions have all been made in one or many jobs: Penalties for mobility are eliminated.

3. There is more than one way to do it right—and to do it wrong. We favor CB plans. These are a form of defined benefit plans that generate individual retirement accounts in bookkeeping form within the pension fund. They are funded by contributions from employer and employee just like most current teacher plans and carry an investment return guaranteed by the employer. Such plans resemble a DC plan, but without transferring investment risk or asset management to the teacher. They are transparent, offer smooth wealth accrual, and are readily turned into annuities at retirement, like traditional teacher plans. However, no one year of retirement is favored over any other. Large private employers such as IBM have converted to such plans, as have a few public employers. The TIAA guaranteed-return plans that are common in higher education are similar in operation. They have provided retirement security for generations of college professors, who often spread careers over multiple institutions.

By contrast, Illinois is a cautionary example of how not to reform teacher pensions. Illinois recently implemented a two-tiered plan, placing teachers hired after January 1, 2011, in the second tier. Tier 2 teachers make identical contributions (9.4 percent) as their Tier 1 colleagues, but take a drastic cut in pension wealth accrual over their work lives, as shown in Figure 2. The Tier 2 plan retains the same basic structure while raising the retirement age. This exacerbates the back-loading and mobility penalties, and widens the gaps between benefits and contributions. A new teacher entering the Illinois plan at age 25 will accrue no pension wealth, net of employee contributions, until age 51. This is not an attractive offer for young, mobile teachers. Indeed, the Tier 2 package is not actually a net “benefit” for entering teachers, since the teacher contributions are nearly double the cost of the average benefit they accrue; the rest is basically a tax to pay for benefits accrued but not funded, by previous cohorts of teachers.

As states grapple with the current pension crisis, a window of opportunity is open to implement more modern and strategic plans, or to make matters worse. Fundamental reforms are needed to fix these broken systems. Systems should first be required to report the gaps between benefits and contributions for all members. Then, as a matter of equity and efficiency, the plans should be restructured to close these gaps by tying benefits to contributions. This would give young teachers their fair share of the retirement benefit pie and rationalize the retirement incentives for all teachers.

CW: States can take a number of steps to alleviate the pension crisis:

1. Spread the pain of addressing underfunding, if adjustments are unavoidable. Changes to pension plans generally only apply to new hires. State constitutions and courts typically hold already-earned benefits and future not-yet-earned benefits for existing employees and beneficiaries inviolate. This protection is also occasionally applied to employee contributions. Governments cannot reduce benefits and raise contributions for current employees, even if they want to. Hence, adjustments fall disproportionately on new hires.

Private-sector pension benefits also enjoy substantial protections, but to a lesser degree than public-sector benefits. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 protects from reductions benefits that have already been earned, but it does not protect future benefits not yet earned. Private-sector employers can thus lower future benefits when a crisis requires a drastic change.

States should change their public benefit protections to permit adjustments to be distributed across a broader range of employees, if such adjustments become necessary. States could guarantee already-earned benefits but not those not yet earned, as the private sector does. States could also ease older employees’ distress about potential benefit changes by allowing future benefit reductions only for employees under a certain age.

There are several advantages to this approach: Current beneficiaries would remain fully protected, already-earned benefits could not be taken away, and older employees would receive the retirement benefits that they had earned. Arbitrary divisions in younger employees’ compensation arising from whether they were hired before or after the benefit change went into effect would also be eliminated.

2. Prevent underfunding in the future. The current underfunding resulted from massive stock and real-estate market declines. Public pensions were prudently managed before the crisis, as Jeff Wenger and Christian Weller have demonstrated elsewhere.

But many governments did not contribute as much as necessary to their pension funds, making them vulnerable in a crisis. The problems of pensions are more a result of low employer contributions than poor pension management. Governments often avoided paying the full amount of what was necessary to cover benefits earned in a given year. Even in 2011, Governor Chris Christie (R-NJ) considers the state’s contributions to its pension plan an optional expense. Governments, as employers, have exacerbated, and continue to exacerbate, their pension plans’ financial challenges.

One solution is to make governments pay the necessary amount to their pension plans. States could set a floor under employer pension contributions. The employer contributions could never fall to zero, commonly known as “taking a contribution holiday,” and employer contributions could never fall below the “floor” rate. DB pensions would receive money more regularly than is currently the case and thus underfunding would become less likely, particularly during a crisis.

If they set a floor for employer pension contributions, states would simultaneously have to change the rules that govern pension funding. Strong financial market performance could easily translate into overfunded pensions, which is desirable, since it means that DB pensions are prepared for a rainy day, such as the recent crisis. But overfunded plans could feed appetites for benefit improvements or contribution cuts, unless the law states that better benefits and lower contributions could only be considered if a DB pension has a minimum buffer for emergencies. Weller and Baker (2005) suggest a buffer of 20 percent of liabilities, which could be even smaller for state DB pension plans, since states cannot go bankrupt.

3. Beware of unintended consequences with alternative benefits. The wrong changes could have serious adverse effects. This would be the case if states also changed their retirement plans from DB pensions to an alternative design, particularly defined contribution (DC) savings accounts such as 403(b) plans, but also a cash balance plan. Cash balance plans look like DC plans to employees but operate like a DB pension for employers. Employers offer a guaranteed rate of return on current and past contributions to a cash balance plan and take the risk of higher contributions if the actual rate of return falls below the promised one.

Alternative benefits are less efficient than DB pensions. First, the average teacher effectiveness will likely decrease, as much higher employee turnover will easily offset any potential effectiveness gains. Second, alternative benefits come with substantial costs.

One unproven assertion about alternative benefits is that they would result in greater teacher effectiveness. Alternative retirement benefits are attractive to their proponents because these benefits would offer more compensation earlier in a teacher’s career and promote turnover later in a teacher’s career relative to a DB pension. Higher compensation earlier would attract to the profession people who could potentially become more-effective teachers, while fewer financial incentives to stay would supposedly lead ineffective teachers to leave earlier than they otherwise would.

The literature on teacher effectiveness and employee turnover associated with benefits shows that average teacher effectiveness will likely decline with alternative benefits. Higher early compensation will offer only a small incentive for promising though untested teachers to enter the profession. And the link between teacher pay and student achievement has been shown to be tentative at best. Since a benefit change would only marginally increase beginning teachers’ compensation, any initial bump in overall instructional effectiveness would be both fleeting and faint, if it exists at all. Any small initial improvement in teacher effectiveness will be quickly offset by higher turnover among more-experienced teachers. Experienced teachers who leave will be replaced by inexperienced teachers, who will need time to build their classroom skills. Small turnover increases can quickly offset small productivity gains to ultimately lower average teacher quality. The literature, in fact, shows that we can expect substantial increases in turnover with a switch to DC and cash balance plans from DB pensions so that higher turnover will eliminate any possible gains from higher initial compensation. We estimate, for instance, that the chance of worsening teacher effectiveness is about 60 percent with a cash balance plan and 70 percent with a DC plan under optimistic assumptions that favor alternative benefit designs based on the existing long-standing literature on pensions and turnover and the much smaller literature on initial compensation and teacher effectiveness.

Teacher turnover can be expected to increase with alternative benefits because employees will understand that their economic security is less well protected with a DC or cash balance plan than with a DB pension. National opinion polls routinely find very strong support for DB pensions, as individuals who do not like risk prefer to have some income guarantees for themselves and their families when they retire, become disabled, or pass away. Fewer income guarantees, or insurance, lead people to leave employment more quickly than they otherwise would. Thus, under these circumstances, teacher turnover would increase and average teacher effectiveness would fall.

Private-sector employers without DB pensions often use other tools to mirror the human resource effects, i.e., long tenure of skilled workers, of DB pensions, exactly because they are worried about turnover. Employers in the field of information technology, especially, offer, for instance, stock options and stock grants to recruit and retain skilled workers for long periods of time. States simply cannot offer these benefits and hence have no way to lower turnover among effective employees.

Alternative benefits also cost more. First, DB pensions would have to operate with a finite investment horizon, increasingly moving money to secure, low-return assets so that lower investment earnings would lend less of a helping hand to pay for benefits. Second, employers may have to cover any underfunding more quickly for closed plans than for ongoing ones, raising employer contributions. Third, higher turnover increases cost due to more recruitment and training of new hires. Fourth, there are substantial transition costs. Older employees will continue to earn DB pensions, they will earn more benefits as they stay longer on the job, and there will be more long-term employees under the DB pension, raising the cost per employee of the DB pension. New employees, in comparison, would be more prevalent in the new plan, earn initially higher benefits than with a DB pension, and thus raise costs relative to a DB pension. These transition costs would last for about four decades and could average 1 percent of payroll for many years, even if the costs of retirement benefits are the same before and after the transition. Fifth, DC plans offer fewer insurance benefits than DB pensions. The insurance exists largely because employees who happen to live through a prolonged period of prosperity share some of their gains with less fortunate employees. Researchers at the National Institute on Retirement Security estimated in 2008 that the loss of insurance features meant that each dollar invested in a DC plan generated 46 percent less in retirement benefits than a dollar invested in a DB pension. Finally, there are higher administrative costs due to a large number of small accounts, especially in DC plans, and increased movement of money between retirement plans.

The two states that have switched from DB pensions to DC plans, West Virginia and Alaska, had severe cases of buyers’ remorse. West Virginia eventually switched back to a DB plan for their teachers in 2008, and Alaska’s policymakers have been investigating the possibility of making a similar reversal.

The lessons from the evidence are clear: States can manage the financial challenges of their pension plans. The proposal to use the current crisis as an opportunity to switch retirement plans, though, will leave states with a much less efficient compensation system. The average effectiveness of teachers will likely drop, and costs will go up substantially. States will be better off managing the financial problems of their DB pensions by putting mechanisms in place that will prevent future underfunding instead of engaging in costly retirement-plan experiments that offer no benefits.

EN: What, then, are the main areas of disagreement?

RC & MP: We disagree on structure. We argue that benefits should be tied to contributions. Professor Weller believes this would have adverse consequences.

Weller assumes a shift to CB or DC would raise annual exits at all ages by a hefty rate, between 22 and 220 percent, according to his recent but as yet unpublished paper on which his efficiency claim is based. Thus, the share of novice teachers in the workforce would rise and average effectiveness would fall. However, the 22 percent estimate is drawn from a 1993 paper by Allen, Clark, and McDermed that compares private-sector workers “covered by a company retirement plan” to those who were not covered by any plan, so there are no implications for CB or DC. The 220 percent assumption is drawn from a 1996 paper by Even and MacPherson that actually shows no difference in quit rates between DB and DC.

Economic theory suggests mixed effects of CB on teacher quit rates, raising them for mid-career teachers who would otherwise hang on for early retirement and lowering them for late-career teachers, otherwise driven out by negative accrual. It might also lower quit rates for young teachers, since they accrue more pension wealth under CB than under current plans. This mixed pattern is supported by Costrell and McGee’s findings, in their 2010 peer-reviewed econometric study of teacher response to pension wealth accrual. Their simulation of a shift to CB, based on their behavioral estimates, found a slight rise in average teacher tenure, not a large fall.

Turning to transition costs, Weller claims that new plans raise costs on old plans by forcing changes in investment strategy or amortization schedules. However, pension plans often introduce new “tiers” without these effects, as new and old funds are commingled. Introducing CB as a new tier would be no different.

Weller’s simulation of transition costs, also from his unpublished paper, makes a different argument. He claims costs will rise for decades because entering cohorts have a different time pattern of pension wealth accrual than previous cohorts. But the time pattern is irrelevant here. Each cohort’s cost is the present value of its lifetime accruals, however they are distributed. Costs cannot rise unless some cohort enjoys higher benefits and, hence, higher lifetime accruals of pension wealth. Yet Weller assumes each cohort accrues the same pension wealth—10.25 percent of the cohort’s lifetime payroll. That is the cohort’s “normal cost,” the contributions required to fund the cohort’s lifetime benefits and accruals. The system’s required contributions are a blend of each cohort’s normal costs, but these are the same, 10.25 percent for each cohort. Thus, the system’s contributions are unchanged, and there are no transition costs.

Costs and contributions would fall if benefits were cut, as Weller recommends. Indeed, they would fall more quickly under his reasonable proposal to cut normal costs of current teachers, as a matter of equity between generations. However, we also favor equity for mobile young teachers, who will continue to receive benefits worth far less than contributions, absent fundamental reform.

CW: The evidence shows that defined benefit pensions work for education. Professors Costrell and Podgursky do not address the fact that both employers and employees prefer defined benefit pensions over other retirement benefits.

The vast majority of states underwent pension reforms in the past decade to address the financial challenges of pension underfunding and none abandoned their defined benefit pensions. And private-sector employers in key growth industries, such as information technology and banking, offer either defined benefit pensions or other forms of deferred compensation, such as stock options, to their employees to mimic the retention benefits of pensions when pensions are absent. A substantial literature both develops the theory and shows the supporting evidence for the efficacy of deferred compensation as a retention and recruitment tool for skilled employees. There is a clear economic rationale for deferred compensation, since it allows employers to recoup the investments made in hiring and training skilled employees, such as teachers.

Teachers equally prefer pensions. Opinion polls routinely show a preference for defined benefit pensions, even among younger employees. And when teachers (and other public employees) have been given a choice between defined benefit pensions and defined contribution plans, the vast majority typically chooses the defined benefit pension plan. The evidence contradicts Professors Costrell and Podgursky’s key assertion that alternative plans that offer more immediate compensation are more attractive to younger teachers.

Finally, transition costs from a defined benefit pension to a cash balance plan would quickly drain public coffers. There would be a growing concentration of more-experienced teachers under the defined benefit pension that favors more-experienced teachers and a high concentration of inexperienced teachers under a cash balance plan that favors inexperienced teachers. A long-standing literature has regularly shown that DB pensions substantially reduce turnover compared to other retirement benefits, suggesting that a benefit switch will increase turnover.

The increase in turnover will raise costs and pose the threat of lower average effectiveness, as my own simulations for a switch from DB pensions to cash balance plans show. The costs are predictable and substantial, while any benefits are highly uncertain and likely nonexistent.

NewSchools Venture Fund, a nonprofit grant-making organization, has been for more than a decade one of the leading private funders of CMOs serving low-income urban neighborhoods. Along the way, we have amassed data and direct experience that provide a window into this world. Our analysis suggests that most of the CMOs in our “portfolio” are outperforming the local districts, especially for low-income students. Nevertheless, there is significant variation across our sample. The highest-performing CMOs in the NewSchools portfolio tend to be those that have embraced a “no excuses” approach to teaching and learning. These CMOs have created organizational and school cultures based on explicit expectations for both academic achievement and behavior, with meaningful consequences when those high expectations are not met.

Creating a New Market

In 1999, NewSchools Venture Fund made its first grant to University Public Schools, an emerging charter school network founded by Don Shalvey and Reed Hastings in California that would soon be renamed Aspire Public Schools. Supported by follow-on investments from NewSchools and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Aspire became the nation’s first nonprofit charter management organization. Since then, NewSchools has helped launch and grow many more CMOs, mostly in California, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. Working alongside NewSchools have been national funders like the Walton Family Foundation, the Fisher Fund, the Robertson Foundation, the Dell Foundation, the Broad Foundation, and the Charter School Growth Fund (see “The $500 Million Question,” forum, Winter 2011). These and a variety of locally based investors, notably the Robin Hood Foundation in New York and the Renaissance Schools Fund in Chicago, have channeled hundreds of millions of dollars into developing an entirely new sector of public education.

What’s a CMO?

Unlike EMOs (education management organizations), their somewhat older cousins, CMOs are not-for-profit. Their nonprofit status has at least three advantages: access to philanthropic capital, greater mission alignment, and diminished political resistance. And, unlike more loosely organized school networks, CMOs manage their schools directly, either under contract to a school board of trustees or under a fully integrated governance structure (in states where single charter school boards can operate multiple schools or campuses). Under such arrangements, a CMO has effective authority to hire and fire a school’s leadership team and to establish most of the educational and operational systems in each of its schools.

Most CMOs are organized much like a typical school district, at least on paper. There are centralized functions, including executive leadership and several operations teams, which provide certain administrative, financial, and educational support services to each school in the network. The schools are generally distinct units (often with separate legal status and their own boards of directors), but they operate under the overall control of the central office.

By the most recent national accounting in 2008, there were more than 80 CMOs, operating almost 500 schools. The most well-known charter school network in the country is the Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP), but the KIPP Foundation is not a CMO. The 99 KIPP schools around the country are legally and operationally distinct from the foundation and, up until recently, each KIPP school stood on its own as an individual charter school. Over the past few years, several high-performing KIPP schools have begun to grow their own small clusters of schools, often managed in a way that qualifies them to be called CMOs.

My focus in this article is on the CMOs in the NewSchools portfolio, which often operate 10 to 20 schools or more, serve thousands of children, and are materially different from their smaller counterparts, especially in terms of finances and management. Beginning in the school year 2003–04, we began to collect data on our CMOs: their central offices, student performance, staffing, growth, and finances. The combination of quantitative data and a decade of firsthand observations of CMOs in action forms the basis for this analysis.

Although the data presented below represent a unique look inside some of the more well-established CMOs in the country, it is important to keep in mind their limitations. First, the NewSchools portfolio includes 18 CMOs, just a slice of the total market. Second, this sample was not randomly selected. Indeed, the NewSchools investment model is based on high standards and thorough diligence for each venture we support. Third, the achievement data that we have collected do not track individual student growth over time, but instead are based on annual snapshots of grade-level and school-level performance. Finally, the data are mostly self-reported by the CMOs, and although we have scrubbed the submissions, there may still be errors and inconsistencies.

It should also be noted that NewSchools is not an unbiased observer. We believe strongly in the potential of charter schools and CMOs to transform educational outcomes in historically underserved communities and on that basis have invested millions of dollars and thousands of hours. Nevertheless, we are committed to transparency and to letting the facts speak for themselves.

The Portfolio

If the NewSchools CMO portfolio were a single school district, it would rank in size among the top 50 in the country, comparable to that of Fresno or Fort Worth. These CMOs operate exclusively in urban neighborhoods, serving predominantly low-income, high-need students (see Figure 1). The demographics of the CMO schools are roughly similar to nearby district-run schools.

On average, each CMO operates about a dozen schools, with future growth projected to reach just over 20 schools each. Our CMOs have been adding an average of 1.6 schools per year, although the pace of new school openings in any CMO is often uneven from year to year. The average annual CMO enrollment growth rate has been just over 45 percent. Many schools open with one or two grades and grow upward, adding one grade per year, to keep pace with the original cohort of students. Average school size at full enrollment is 442 students. Half of our 18 CMOs serve (or will serve) students in grades K through 12, three serve middle and high school, three are networks of elementary schools (including K–8 schools), and three operate only high schools.

Closing the Achievement Gap

The first question in any discussion about CMO schools is, how good are they? Measuring school or student performance is fraught with problems, especially if the goal is to make comparisons across classrooms, schools, districts, or states. We do not propose to solve these problems here. Specifically, our analytical approach is to use statewide assessments to compare student performance in our CMOs’ schools to that of students in the local district and state. Although we are able to track school and grade-level performance over time, our data set does not capture individual student results. Consequently, we are unable to measure directly the value our schools are adding to their students’ learning growth, relative to other schools. Given the similar demographics between schools in our portfolio and those in their local districts, however, we believe it is possible to make reasonable, albeit imperfect, comparisons between these two samples.

Looking at each of the CMOs in the NewSchools portfolio individually, we find that half are producing breakthrough results, with average proficiency rates that are at least 15 percentage points higher than their local districts. About 20 percent are outperforming the districts by a modest amount (proficiency rates that are between 5 and 15 percent higher than the districts). Another 20 percent are performing about the same as the local district, and the remaining CMOs are underperforming their districts. Performance among schools within a CMO can also vary. When comparing school-to-district gaps within a CMO, the typical standard deviation is almost 10 percentage points. This level of variation seems to hold for large and small CMOs alike.

Viewed as a group, schools managed by our CMOs achieve rates of proficiency on state assessments in reading and math that average about 9 percentage points higher than those of schools in their local districts (see Figure 2). The gap widens to almost 12 percentage points when we compare only low-income students. Limiting the sample to schools open five years or more, the gap widens to more than 14 percentage points. Across the portfolio, CMO schools perform somewhat better in math than in reading, when benchmarked against their local peers on state assessments. On average, the math-reading proficiency gap is about 4 percentage points. Not surprisingly, the performance of these CMO schools relative to their non-low-income peers statewide is not as impressive.

Although the NewSchools data set does not include state test results for individual students, it does include grade-level performance for most schools, which makes it possible to track improvement of cohorts of students from one year to the next. Looking at these data across all the elementary and middle schools that had test results for at least one grade in 2007, one finds a fairly consistent pattern of improvement. Annual math gains between 2007 and 2010 were almost 6 percentage points, while reading gains averaged more than 8 points per year.

Critics often suggest that superior performance in the charter sector is a result of high levels of attrition, caused by implicit or explicit efforts on the part of school staff to “counsel out” the students who are hardest to educate. Excluding students who move away, our data show average attrition rates of about 12 percent, compared to many schools in high-poverty urban neighborhoods that have annual attrition rates of close to one-third. Interestingly, the highest performers in our portfolio have below-average attrition rates of approximately 9 percent, while the lowest performers have above-average attrition rates of close to 20 percent. Apparently, the dynamic is what one would hope for: Parents at higher-performing schools are more likely to stay put, while those at lower-performing schools are voting with their feet.

A recent study commissioned by America’s Promise Alliance found that the average four-year graduation rate nationally is approximately 75 percent. Graduation rates among minority students are typically less than 65 percent, and among large urban school systems, graduation rates fall below 55 percent. Across the NewSchools CMO portfolio, comparable graduation rates average 65 percent. According to a 2010 U.S. Labor Department study, just over 70 percent of the graduating class of 2009 enrolled in college the following fall. Statistics for low-income students show the college-going rate for high school graduates at 57 percent. Eighty-four percent of graduating seniors from our CMOs enrolled in college, almost 60 percent in four-year colleges.

Finances and Staffing

The second question about CMOs is inevitably, how much do they cost? To answer this question, one has to examine financial data at both the school and central-office levels. Even though most CMO schools operate at breakeven on public revenue, many require significant private financial support before they can survive on public revenue alone. Philanthropy plays a key role in financing CMO start-up and growth.

The underlying economic model of all CMOs is based on predictable public revenue streams, tied to school enrollment. Average per-pupil public revenues (from all sources, including federal Charter School Program start-up grants) across the NewSchools portfolio were more than $11,500 in 2010, ranging from about $9,000 to $16,000, depending on the states and cities where schools are located. Public revenue for charter schools is typically 10 to 20 percent below per-pupil funding levels at neighboring district-run schools. In addition, charter schools are generally required to spend a significant portion of their budgets on rent or facilities-related debt service, an extra cost that is generally not included in most charter-school funding formulas. Taken together, these two factors can reduce charter school resources available for educational programs by 25 to 35 percent, relative to comparable district-run schools.

With a few exceptions, the vast majority of charter schools operated by NewSchools CMOs are self-sufficient on public revenues (excluding major capital costs). These schools typically incur deficits prior to their first year of operation (although these deficits are sometimes carried on the books of the CMO central office), as they begin to hire staff, upgrade facilities, and purchase equipment and supplies, all before the first students arrive and before any public tuition payments are made. About half of new schools run at breakeven during their first year of operation, although school-level deficits are common in the first three years of operation for those schools that begin with only one or two grade levels. About 40 percent of schools in the NewSchools portfolio incur cumulative deficits through their first three years of operation. These early deficits are often partially offset by start-up grants from the federal Charter School Program and the Walton Family Foundation, which together typically amount to more than $500,000 per school, spread out over several years.

The largest component of a typical school operating budget within our CMO portfolio is instructional personnel, which comprises just under half of all school spending (see Figure 3). School administration and other noninstructional activities account for about 17 percent of expenditures on average, with facilities expenses close behind at 15 percent. Nonpersonnel instructional expenses are just under 10 percent of a typical budget, with the remainder going toward building reserves and CMO management fees.

Operational spending per pupil during the 2010 school year was approximately $10,200, with average school surpluses of just under $500,000. Typically, these surpluses are used to build operating reserves of about 5 percent of a school’s yearly budget, to insure against normal cash-flow needs, temporary revenue interruptions, or fluctuations in annual per-pupil funding levels. Additional reserves are occasionally required as part of debt covenants, especially regarding bonds or loans for school buildings. Many schools have larger reserves to lay a financial foundation for a future purchase or renovation of a permanent facility.

The net philanthropic need for all schools managed by CMOs in the NewSchools portfolio is effectively zero, but since the schools that operate with surpluses generally do not cross-subsidize those with deficits (sometimes even within the same CMO), the actual school-level philanthropic need across the 71 schools in the portfolio with operating deficits was more than $25 million in the 2010 school year, or just under $360,000 per school.

The average central-office budget in 2010 was about $5.3 million, or more than $1,500 per pupil. More than 60 percent of central-office costs were for personnel. On average, central offices employed about 45 staff, which is 14 percent of total CMO staff, including school-level personnel. Staffing in the average CMO home office is dominated by personnel providing educational services (including assessment, curriculum, and professional development) and operations (including finance and facilities). Over the past five years, the relative sizes of these two categories have been moving in the opposite direction: The education staff has been growing (from 21 percent to 34 percent), while the operations staff has been shrinking (from 33 percent to 25 percent).The ratio of central-office staff to total CMO staff tends to decline over time, averaging about 30 percent in year one and falling to 12 percent by year seven. The average number of central-office staff per school fluctuates from year to year within most CMOs, but does not seem to consistently trend up or down over time. Across the NewSchools portfolio, central offices tend to have about 4.5 staff per school, although some of the larger CMOs are beginning to see this ratio drop.

As Figure 3 shows, CMO management fees are typically about 7 percent of a school’s budget, although it is not uncommon for fees to reach 10 percent or higher, depending on the breadth of services provided by the central office. On average, these fees covered more than 55 percent of central-office costs in the 2009-10 school year.

During its first year of operation, a CMO central office earns relatively little of its revenue on management fees from preexisting schools. If the central office is established before the first school opens, annual fee revenue begins at zero. On average, fee revenue rises steadily as a percentage of total central-office costs, as the number of schools and students grows, exceeding 60 percent by year seven (see Figure 4).

Over the first seven years of operation, a typical CMO central office in the NewSchools portfolio incurred a cumulative operating deficit of more than $7.3 million, which translates into $800,000 to $900,000 per school, or up to $2,000 per seat at full enrollment. The distribution of deficits around this mean, however, is wide, ranging from under $300,000 per school to $2 million or more. Although it is difficult to allocate these costs precisely to specific activities, a significant portion of central-office expenditures is associated with growing the network of schools and building capacity for supporting new schools that are just beginning to come online.

Putting school-level and central-office economics together, CMOs in NewSchools’ portfolio have run cumulative deficits through the 2010 school year of more than $250 million, which amounts to about $3,150 per student at full enrollment for the schools that are currently up and running. Some school-level deficits are offset by surpluses at other schools within the same CMO network; other annual deficits at both the school and central-office levels are funded out of reserves built up through surpluses in prior years. As a result of these factors, the net philanthropic need to date has probably been closer to $200 million, which translates into an average per-seat need of about $2,600, or more than $1 million per school. In some cases, this figure has exceeded $4,000 per seat and in others it has been under $500 per seat. (These figures appear consistent with an unpublished analysis conducted by the Charter School Growth Fund on the CMOs it has supported.) To keep this in perspective, the 25 to 35 percent inequity in per-pupil funding for charter schools mentioned above amounted to approximately $275 million in lost revenue for our CMOs in the 2009-10 school year, an amount that swamps their annual philanthropic need, even if the public funding gap is greatly exaggerated.

Patterns and Connections

The final question about CMOs is, what makes the highest performers better than the rest? The data do not point consistently to the causes for this variation, but there are some differential patterns in spending, staffing, and school design that suggest possible sources. Based on direct observations by the New-Schools team over the years, the effectiveness of management and execution may be equally important, although it is not so easily quantified.

The five highest-performing CMOs in NewSchools’ portfolio operate 85 schools and serve more than 28,000 students. Their low-income students have proficiency rates that are more than 25 percentage points higher than those in their local districts. Comparing these CMOs with the bottom five performers in the NewSchools portfolio, we find similarities: school sizes are virtually the same; central-office spending as a share of total CMO spending is about the same, as is instructional spending as a percentage of total spending. Nevertheless, there are quantifiable differences: School-level spending per pupil is higher, central-office staff comprises a higher percentage of total CMO staff, and the share of central-office staff devoted to human resources is greater.

The 20 percent spending gap between the lowest and highest performers is clearly a significant factor, although at least one of the CMOs in the top five spends less per pupil than the portfolio average. Our high-performing organizations spend some of the extra money hiring more teachers. Although the average number of students per teacher among the top five performers is only slightly lower than among the bottom five (15.1 vs. 16.6), the average masks larger differences. Three of the top five performers have student-teacher ratios below 14, while three of the bottom five performers have ratios above 18.

Another important factor is the investment that the most successful CMOs are making in building the capacity of their central offices, especially the focus on recruiting and developing talent, as well as building instructional support systems that are grounded in the use of performance data. Based on our observations and feedback from school personnel, these deep levels of central-office investment appear to be adding significant value to student performance.

The rate and pattern of growth also appear to have some connection to performance differences. Although the high-performing CMOs have added new schools at a faster overall rate than the low performers (1.7 per year vs. 1.3), their average enrollment growth is slower (37 percent vs. 49 percent). At the same time, the pattern of growth among the high performers has been more consistent over time, while the low performers tended to grow faster early in their development.

Of at least equal importance are less easily quantifiable differences in school design. Specifically, the most successful organizations strive to create enthusiasm for learning and an expectation of college success for all, with a commitment to hard work and persistence in the face of initial failures or setbacks. They have adopted standards-based curricula, with an intensive focus on literacy and numeracy as the first foundation for academic achievement, which typically manifests itself in extra time for reading and math each day and a relatively heavy reliance on direct instruction and differentiated grouping, especially in the early grades. And they are increasingly focused on developing and deploying comprehensive student assessment and coaching systems to ensure more effective and consistent classroom practice, not just from year to year but during the course of each school year.

Although several factors appear to distinguish the highest from the lowest performers, there is no obvious or simple pattern. With respect to almost every variable that we have examined, there is a wide distribution of data from one CMO to another, even among organizations with comparable performance, operating in the same markets, serving similar grade levels. Although the data can give us some hints about where the answers lie, some of the differences in CMO performance are most likely tied to the quality of management and effectiveness of execution, factors that are difficult to measure. It has been said that high-performing schools are the result of a hundred 1-percent solutions. Not only is there no silver bullet, but there is not even a secret sauce. The key to success is an unflagging attention to detail and an uncompromising commitment to excellence in all things, from the classroom, to the hallway, to the principal’s office. As difficult as it is to do all of this while growing a new organization, it is even harder to sustain it over time, especially as the original founding teams give way to a new generation of leaders. Some CMOs are already beginning to take and pass this test, but it will remain one of their greatest enduring challenges.

James A. Peyser is managing partner for city funds at NewSchools Venture Fund and a former chairman of the Massachusetts Board of Education.

Let us look at what is happening, since this might be a direction in which other states consider moving.  As most people are aware, the budget problems in California were clear even before the recession put added pressure on the state.  The traditional California way to deal with these budget problems has been to shroud them in smoke and mirrors – doing budgetary manipulations that make it look like the budget is balanced but that only move the problem into the future.

This year, the new Governor, Jerry Brown, set out to deal with the budget honestly, including putting in place contingency spending reductions if revenues did not come in at the level anticipated in the budget.  This action leads to uncertainty in school district budgets, because there is a reasonable chance that the state may reduce funding midyear.

And here is where the California legislature showed the kind of leadership that makes a mockery of the idea that school policy is about the kids.  At the behest of the California Teachers Association, the legislature declared that to deal with the fiscal situation, none of the thousand school districts in California is permitted to lay off any teachers.  What can it do?  By this legislation, it can eliminate up to seven days from the school year (as long as the local union agrees to that action).

California is the 47^th ranked state in terms of achievement, and it educates one-eighth of the nation’s students.  Perhaps the ranking is more obvious to everybody after we see the kind of policies that are being made.

Nationally, the fiscal problems of schools have left many districts scrambling to figure out how to deal with budget shortfalls.  Hopefully no other state will follow this precedent.

-Eric A. Hanushek

Indeed, young Matthew Sprowl, “disruptive and easily distracted,” seems to be the poster child for what charter critics have long said is the unfair advantage that charters have over their traditional school counterparts: charters don’t have to take all kids, regular schools do. In his third week of kindergarten at Moskowitz’s Harlem Success Academy 3, Matthew was suspended for three days, writes Winerip, for “bothering other children.” The problems escalated and, with help from Harlem Success, Matthew soon found a regular public school, where he was later diagnosed as having “attention disorder” and, over the last three years, “has thrived.”

It’s an interesting story and Winerip tells it well – too well to make his argument against charters stick. He gives Moskowitz schools their due, pointing out that her “students earn top honors.”  Typically, that’s the setup for the skimming trap.  It didn’t work — Success 3 just has too many Special Ed and English Language Learners to make the charge stick.  Winerip makes another mistake (for his argument’s point of view) in allowing Moskowitz assistant Jenny Sedlis to explain what happened to Matthew. Even in the short space Winerip gives her, Sedlis makes the chase for charters, convincingly;  at least for these eyes and ears. In what Winerip says were “two voluminous e-mails totaling 5,701 words,” Sedlis writes:

We helped place him in a school that would better suit his needs…  His success today confirms the correctness of his placement. I believe that 100 percent of the time we were acting in Matthew’s best interest and that the end result benefited him and benefited P.S. 75, which now has a child excelling.

Though Winerip tries mightily to cloud the issue with statistics (cherry-picked?), this is exactly how choice is supposed to work.  Many children do not thrive in traditional public schools and now have a choice to “move” to one that might be a better fit.  If sometimes movement is in the other direction, will we accuse traditional schools of cherry-picking?  We should be applauding Matthew, his mother, and the educators that have given him this  opportunity to succeed.

–Peter Meyer

-Education Next

That said, I think we may be heading into new territory in the use of waivers. By now they have a moderately long history that was well summarized in an essay by Tom Gais and Jim Fossett, “Federalism and the Executive Branch,” in Joel Aberbach and Mark Peterson, eds., The Executive Branch (Oxford, 2005). Waivers have typically been used for adaptation to variation among states, which bedevils American public administration, and to encourage policy innovations sought by incumbent administrations. With NCLB, they begin to approach a way of undoing, at its core, an ill-conceived, unworkable law. Secretary Duncan—and a dilatory Congress, unable so far to rewrite the law–have me poised on the edge of my chair.

- Martha Derthick

‘Private school vouchers are not an effective way to improve student achievement,” said the White House in a statement on March 29. “The Administration strongly opposes expanding the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program and opening it to new students.” But less than three weeks later, President Obama signed a budget deal with Republicans that includes a renewal and expansion of the popular D.C. program, which finances tuition vouchers for low-income kids to attend private schools.

School reformers cheered the administration’s about-face though fully aware that it was motivated by political expediency rather than any acknowledgment that vouchers work.

When Mr. Obama first moved to phase out the D.C. voucher program in 2009, his Education Department was in possession of a federal study showing that voucher recipients, who number more than 3,300, made gains in reading scores and didn’t decline in math. The administration claims that the reading gains were not large enough to be significant. Yet even smaller positive effects were championed by the administration as justification for expanding Head Start….

The positive effects of the D.C. voucher program are not unique. A recent study of Milwaukee’s older and larger voucher program found that 94% of students who stayed in the program throughout high school graduated, versus just 75% of students in Milwaukee’s traditional public schools. And contrary to the claim that vouchers hurt public schools, the report found that students at Milwaukee public schools “are performing at somewhat higher levels as a result of competitive pressure from the school voucher program.” Thus can vouchers benefit even the children that don’t receive them.

Research gathered by Greg Forster of the Foundation for Educational Choice also calls into question the White House assertion that vouchers are ineffective. In a paper released in March, he says that “every empirical study ever conducted in Milwaukee, Florida, Ohio, Texas, Maine and Vermont finds that voucher programs in those places improved public schools.” Mr. Forster surveyed 10 empirical studies that use “random assignment, the gold standard of social science,” to assure that the groups being compared are as similar as possible. “Nine [of the 10] studies find that vouchers improve student outcomes, six that all students benefit and three that some benefit and some are not affected,” he writes. “One study finds no visible impact. None of these studies finds a negative impact.”

Such results might influence the thinking of an objective observer primarily interested in doing right by the nation’s poor children. But they are unlikely to sway a politician focused on getting re-elected with the help of teachers unions.

“I think Obama and Duncan really care about school reform,” says Terry Moe, who teaches at Stanford and is the author of a timely new book, “Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America’s Public Schools.” “On the other hand they have to be sensitive to their Democratic coalition, which includes teachers unions. And one way they do that is by opposing school vouchers.”

The reality is that Mr. Obama’s opposition to school vouchers has to do with Democratic politics, not the available evidence on whether they improve outcomes for disadvantaged kids. They do—and he knows it.

So Boehner deserves a thank you from the children of the District of Columbia for knowing how to play the one best policy card at his disposal.  But Boehner could not have played that card had he not had convincing evidence that the voucher program he was trying to restore had been effective.  For that evidence, we must thank the official evaluation of the voucher program conducted by University of Arkansas Professor Patrick Wolf and his research team.  That evaluation was conducted as a randomized experiment—something akin to a pill-placebo comparison that informs medical research.  All sides admit that these kinds of experiments are the gold standard for establishing what works and what does not.

A randomized evaluation proved possible in DC because more students wanted to use a voucher to go to private school than the number of vouchers available and the vouchers were distributed by means of a lottery (a la “Waiting for Superman”). When the results from the DC voucher experiment showed that the voucher students, who won the lottery, were going to college at a noticeably higher rate than those who had lost the lottery and remained in public schools, few could question the effectiveness of the program.

Just before this study was released, Obama signed into law a bill killing the program. Although government officials knew the study’s results at the time the president affixed his signature, the results were released to the public by the U.S. Department of Education only after the program had been killed.

So two years ago, the DC voucher story seemed to prove that research, no matter how well conducted, is generally too little and too late to have any impact.  Having conducted much of the early voucher research that led up to the DC evaluation, all these events were truly disappointing.  So in the account given in my book on the history of school reform (Saving Schools, Ch 7 & 8), I reluctantly came to the conclusion that the school choice movement may have to look to alternatives to school vouchers.

Boehner has proven me wrong. His tactical skill and personal commitment has resurrected a program in the District of Columbia—and a strategy for reform—that seemed as dead as Jack Robin. And policy researchers can be pleased that their work can, if circumstances are correct, provide a Speaker with the instrument needed to recall even politically contested programs, like school vouchers, to life.

- Paul E. Peterson

The proposal would also convert Medicaid, the health program for the poor, into a series of block grants to give states more flexibility. And it is expected to suggest significant cuts in Social Security, while proposing fewer details on how to achieve them.

No doubt this will enrage the senior lobby—who will declare all of this dead on arrival. But to my eye, it puts Republicans firmly on the side of the young. If we don’t address these entitlements, we’ll have no choice but to devastate K-12 education budgets (and other social spending for children) for decades to come. Even huge tax increases won’t be enough to address the long-term fiscal challenges (and most economists would tell you that those would be counterproductive anyway, as they would cripple the economy).

As for Medicaid, as we know from our home-state of Ohio, it has become the major competitor to K-12 funding—and more often than not is winning that fight.

I understand the downside to declaring generational warfare, but still, let’s be honest: We can’t keep spending so much on lavish retirement and health-care benefits for the old if we want to do right by the young. So before you reflexively deride this week’s GOP budget proposal consider this: It just might pave the way for greater investments in our schools.

—Mike Petrilli

The legitimacy of test score increases in District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS),  in particular those at Crosby S. Noyes Education Campus, are the focus of the latest installment in USA Today’s “Testing the System,” a multi-part series exploring the extent and causes of cheating — by teachers, principals and schools — on standardized tests. At the heart of the allegations are multiple erasures — presumably adults correcting test answer sheets — that were detected by the test scanning computers that grade the multiple choice tests. In one classroom at Noyes, USA Today reports, seventh-graders averaged 12.7 wrong-to-right erasures per student. Perhaps the students were lucky, but statisticians say they would have been more likely to pick winning lottery ticket numbers than to make that many wrong-to-right erasures by chance.

If the USA Today allegations are true, then the adults who changed students’ answers did much more than just cheat on a test. They also cheated those students, by allowing them — and their families — to think that they had learned material they clearly hadn’t.

But these deceptions are not new. For decades, less was expected from students attending schools in poor communities. Expectations were even lower for children with disabilities or in special education programs. It was virtually impossible to learn how these children were doing. Because scores were reported only as averages, it was easy to mask the fact that entire groups of students were not learning. Educators and policymakers knew–but the absence of hard data made it easy to turn a blind eye.

The federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), which mandated yearly testing and public reporting of schools’ results in grades 3-8 and once in high school, was written in part to respond to these issues. Lawmakers wanted to ensure that test results would be comparable from student to student and create common standards for all students, regardless of their backgrounds. That’s why the law requires that tests align with state content standards and that students be assessed at their official grade level. It’s also why the law requires that schools report results for smaller groups of students–those who don’t speak English, for example, or those with disabilities–separately.

So, before we heed reactionary calls to end standardized testing, it’s important to remember the decades of willful neglect prior to NCLB. Most notably, the implementation of standards-based reform, first in the states in the 1990s and then by the federal government under NCLB in 2002, spurred an unprecedented focus on the deficiencies of schools that serve poor and minority students–students who were long ignored and whose outcomes were mostly hidden from view.

Still, the law is almost a decade old and its flaws are increasingly clear. Few people would defend the quality of most state tests and the low bar that they set to proclaim a student “proficient.” Part of the solution is a better assessment system. The Obama Administration agrees and is investing $350 million in two different consortia of states to develop these assessments. Ideally, improved assessment practices will show us not only what students are learning but also how they are learning and why they may or may not be gaining particular skills or knowledge. We also need to continue explorations of data of all types (not just test scores), building on, for example, important research that’s helping us develop early warning indicators to prevent students from dropping out.

We need voices and ideas from many places to continue to improve our understanding of how well students are learning in our public schools. But there’s no excuse for cheating, whether it’s done by children or adults. And let’s remember that the system before NCLB also cheated children, denying them a chance to get a good education. Ignoring the past and taking us back to those days–however you score it–is definitely a wrong answer.

-Bill Tucker

(Post cross-posted from the Huffington Post.)

While the Administration appreciates that H.R. 471 would provide Federal support for improving public schools in the District of Columbia (D.C.), including expanding and improving high-quality D.C. public charter schools, the Administration opposes the creation or expansion of private school voucher programs that are authorized by this bill. The Federal Government should focus its attention and available resources on improving the quality of public schools for all students. Private school vouchers are not an effective way to improve student achievement. The Administration strongly opposes expanding the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program and opening it to new students.

Rigorous evaluation over several years demonstrates that the D.C. program has not yielded improved student achievement by its scholarship recipients compared to other students in D.C. While the President’s FY 2012 Budget requests funding to improve D.C. public schools and expand high-quality public charter schools, the Administration opposes targeting resources to help a small number of individuals attend private schools rather than creating access to great public schools for every child.

A few quick thoughts:

1. The path to ESEA reauthorization just got a lot steeper, as many Republicans will refuse to play ball with an Administration not willing to compromise on a top GOP priority.

2. The Administration is being dishonest about the evaluation data, which show strong positive effects for the recipients of the DC vouchers. In fact, if anything, the current research shows stronger impacts for students receiving vouchers than for students attending charter schools.

3. The NEA: 1. Poor black kids in DC: Zero.

-Mike Petrilli

Fischel’s basic argument is that our educational institutions have largely evolved in response to consumer demands.  That is, the consolidation of one-room schoolhouses into larger districts, the development of schools with separate grades, the September to June calendar, and the relatively common curriculum across the country all came into being because families wanted those measures.  And in a highly mobile society, even more than a century ago, people often preferred to move to areas with schools that had these desired features.  In the competitive market between communities, school districts had to cater to this consumer demand.  All of this resulted in a remarkable amount of standardization and uniformity across the country on basic features of K-12 education.

Hearing Fischel’s argument made me think about how ill-conceived the nationalization effort led by Gates, Fordham, the AFT, and the US Department of Education really is.  Most of the important elements of American education are already standardized.  No central government authority had to tell school districts to divide their schools into grades or start in the Fall and end in the Spring. Even details of the curriculum, like teaching long division in 4th grade or Romeo and Juliet in 9th grade, are remarkably consistent from place to place without the national government ordering schools to do so.

Schools arrived at these arrangements through a gradual process of market competition and adaptation.  Parents didn’t want to move from one district to another only to discover that their children would be repeating what they had already been taught or were  inadequately prepared for what was going to be taught.  To attract mobile families, districts informally and naturally began to coordinate what they taught in each grade.  Of course, not everything is synced, but the items that are most important to consumers often are.

That’s how standardization in market settings works and we have a lot of positive experience with this in industry.  VHS became the standard medium for home entertainment because the market gravitated to it, not because some government authority mandated it.  If we followed the logic of Gates-Fordham-AFT-USDOE we would want some government-backed committee to decide on the best format and provide government subsidies only to those companies that complied.

Instead of ending up with VHS, they may well have imposed Betamax on the country, even though market competition would have shown that approach to be inferior.  Sony was the industry leader and if a government-backed committee were in charge they almost certainly would have had the most influence.  The Fordham folks might want to keep this in mind.  A government-backed committee is almost certain to prefer what the AFT wants over what Fordham may envision since the teacher unions are like Sony except only 100 times more powerful.

Even worse, once government-enforced standardization occurs it becomes extremely difficult to change.  If we had a government-backed panel decide on Betamax, we may have been stuck with that format for decades.  We almost certainly would have stifled the innovation that led to DVDs and now Blue-Ray.  Once Sony had entrenched their format, what incentive would they have had to change it?

Similarly, once the Gates-Fordham-AFT-USDOE coalition settles on the details of nationalizing standards, curriculum, and testing, it will become extremely difficult to change anything about education.  Terry Moe and Paul Peterson’s dreams of technology-based instruction may never leave the dream stage because it may fail to comply with certain provisions of the national regime.  If I were the AFT, I’d almost certainly insert those details into the regime to prevent the reductions that technology may bring to the need for teaching labor.  No one should be naive enough to think the Edublob won’t figure out how to use nationalization to block that and other threatening innovations.

I’m also sure that Bill Gates would have preferred being able to get a government-backed committee to enshrine Microsoft-DOS or Windows forever.  But thanks to market competition we have Google innovating with cloud computing.  And I’d bet that Google would love to get government backing for their approach if they could.  Dominant companies almost always favor government regulation.

So I understand why the AFT, USDOE, and Gates favor the current effort to nationalize education.  The mystery to me is why Fordham is protecting the right-flank of this movement or why some conservative governors have gone along.  Don’t they realize that it will enshrine arrangements that favor the teacher unions and are bad for kids?

-Jay P. Greene

According to an Associated Press report on the Kansas decision,  allowing individual jurisdictions to set their own tax “could bring down the state’s entire school financing system.” The parents in Shawnee Mission wanted just the right to ask local voters if they wanted to pay more. The court said No. (Read the 21-page order here.)

As the pressure to hold down school costs mounts, property tax caps have become a favored option because they remain a favorite form of funding local government agencies, including school districts.  But the objections from wealthier communities, which can afford to pay more, are also mounting.  Twelve towns in New Jersey have announced plans to have votes on exceeding the Garden State’s new property tax cap, a local opt-out option that the new cap law allows.

Though there is more to learn about this case and its legal implications,  if the press reports are accurate, the Kansas ruling appears to mean that there can be no opting out of the cap, even if local voters wanted to.  This hits hard at some core American principles. “The local option tax is capped so wealthy districts do not have an unfair advantage over poorer ones,” reports the A.P.  In the battle to get poor school districts adequate or equitable funding, at least there seemed a moral purpose to the argument.  But the Kansas case seems to issue a different kind of challenge,  especially as more states opt for centralized funding mechanisms.  Will we allow the kind of inequity which allows for excellence?  I predict a new Lake Wobegon, where  all the children and their teachers are average.

–Peter Meyer

—Chester E. Finn, Jr.

Additional photographs of the Catalyst Schools are available here.

It wasn’t exactly a marriage made in heaven. In fact, the idea that one of the Catholic Church’s most respected religious orders might run a public school sounded odd, maybe even, as Francis Cardinal George, head of the Archdiocese of Chicago, conjectured, illegal.

But a decade ago several trends in American education, and in the Catholic Church, made a Catholic-operated public school seem increasingly possible: 1) the traditional, parish-based Catholic school system, especially in the inner cities, was crumbling; 2) equally troubled urban public-school systems were failing to educate most of their students; and 3) a burgeoning charter school movement, born in the early 1990s, was beginning to turn heads among educators in both the private and public sectors.

The various currents merged in the Windy City in 2006 and 2007 when the Christian Brothers helped open two charter schools in impoverished neighborhoods on Chicago’s west side, embarking on a unique experiment in public education. Could Catholics run a school without mentioning Jesus, Mary, or Joseph? Without prayer, Mass, the rosary, the sacraments? Without God? And could the high wall between church and state be kept intact?

Back to Their Roots

The Christian Brothers—known in France, where the Catholic order was founded in 1680, as Frères des écoles chrétiennes or Brothers of the Christian Schools—have had some experience in education. The order’s founder, Jean-Baptist de La Salle, is the church’s patron saint of teachers and today the order serves nearly 1 million students in more than 80 countries, including some 20,000, mostly middle-class, students in 90 Catholic middle and high schools and education centers in the United States.

But what caught the eye of Arne Duncan, while he directed Chicago Public Schools (CPS), was the success the brothers were having with an initiative the order had launched in the early 1990s. They had opened San Miguel schools, named after a Christian Brother saint from Ecuador, in American pockets of poverty, including an Indian reservation in Montana, the Tenderloin district of San Francisco, and inner-city Camden, New Jersey. (In 2006 San Miguel merged with the Jesuits’ Nativity Schools; today the NativityMiguel Network operates over 70 schools for the poor in 26 states and the District of Columbia.)

The first Chicago San Miguel school opened in 1995, behind the infamous (now gone) stockyards. The goal was simple enough: bring to poor children, tuition-free, what the brothers were delivering to middle- and upper-class students in their other American schools, including small class sizes and a college-prep academic program.

It worked. Within a few years of opening, San Miguel Back of the Yards School’s low-income students were outperforming their Chicago Public Schools counterparts. The school’s success prompted Lands’ End company founder Gary Comer to donate $1.2 million to open a second school, now known as the Gary Comer Campus, in the blighted Austin neighborhood.

The schools employ a year-round academic calendar, have a 9:1 student-to-teacher ratio, and a core academic curriculum. They put heavy emphasis on reading—80 minutes a day, an average of 165 books read per year—and individualized instruction.

“Our model is not rocket science,” says Mike Anderer-McClelland, a former brother who is now president of the San Miguel organization in Chicago. “It is a lot of reading, writing, and arithmetic.”

The schools also have a Family and Graduate Support Program that not only tracks students through high school but helps them and their parents with tutoring and counseling, long after they leave left San Miguel at the end of 8th grade.

“We graduate 85 percent of our kids from high school in a neighborhood that traditionally graduates less than 40 percent,” says Anderer-McClelland. “Sixteen percent of our kids graduate from four-year colleges, compared to less than 5 percent of public school kids in our neighborhoods; and it’s only 3 percent of CPS Latinos and 4 percent of CPS blacks who graduate from college.”

Brother Ed Siderewicz and former Brother Gordon Hannon discuss the future of the Catalyst Schools.

Getting from No to Yes

A faith-based or church-sponsored charter school had been the subject of some discussion among Catholics in Chicago almost from the moment that Illinois passed a charter school law in 1996. Though the law initially allowed just 20 charters statewide, 15 of the slots were assigned to Chicago.

Coincidentally, the Archdiocese of Chicago, which ran the nation’s largest parochial school system with more than 130,000 students, was in the midst of a demographic and financial crisis. The archdiocese had closed 55 of its schools in the previous 10 years. (See my story, “Can Catholic Schools Be Saved?” features, Spring 2007.) At the time, CPS CEO Paul Vallas and others encouraged the church to consider converting their closed and closing schools to charters. But in 1999 Cardinal George said “No.” It was “a square circle,” he remarked, “not because of archdiocesan protocols but because of the nature of the beast.”

That view was shared by others, including the National Catholic Educational Association (NCEA). “Are charter schools another way to keep Catholic schools alive, as some proponents suggest?” the NCEA asked in a 2009 press release. “Absolutely not.”

Catholic leaders could not support schools that were not grounded in religious instruction.

However, in what was perhaps an unintended consequence of the church’s crisis, a former priest became one of the first to open a public charter school in Chicago. John Horan, director of the Archdiocese’s Catholic Youth Organization when he was a priest, opened the public North Lawndale College Prep charter in 1998 as a layperson. “Catholic schools were terrific,” says Horan today, “but there just wasn’t enough financial support to send all of our poor kids to Catholic schools. So we thought, we…have to make public schools work.”

This is what Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan were thinking, too. Vallas had floated the idea of the Christian Brothers running a public school as early as 1997, recalls Ed Siderewicz, a young Christian Brother who helped start the San Miguel Back of the Yards School, “but we shrugged it off as compromising our mission.”

The question would keep coming up.

“The [San Miguel] board really wrestled with this,” recalls Sister Margaret Farley, director of personnel for the archdiocesan schools of Chicago and a founding board member of San Miguel. “We thought we could do a values-based school, but many members of the board were superparanoid about anyone thinking it would be a Catholic school.”

Early on in the discussions, Brother Gordon Hannon, a Chicago native and cofounder of San Miguel Back of the Yards School, researched the question in a paper for a graduate course at DePaul University. He concluded that though the San Miguel model “meets a clear and urgent secular need,” it was an open question whether “a faith-based group of competent, licensed educators” could run a publicly funded school without crossing the church/state line.

Brother Mike Fehrenbach, head of the Christian Brothers’ Midwest District, saw an opening in the “values-based” charter idea (instead of faith- or religious-based) and convinced the San Miguel board that the question was worth exploring. And in July of 2004 they formed a special charter-school planning committee.

Money was a significant consideration.

“We are probably near the limit of our ability to raise the dollars necessary to expand effectively,” wrote Fehrenbach in a one-page memo to the group, referring to the cost of running the two private San Miguel schools. He suggested that a charter school, which was publicly financed, might be a way of bringing education to the poor without having to spend so much time fundraising.

“This sounded like a growth company,” smiled Terry Toth, recalling his initial reaction to the idea. Toth, a lifelong Catholic, was a member of the San Miguel board as well as head of the world’s 12th largest investment bank, Northern Trust. “We would get 85 percent of our costs paid for—versus the need to fundraise 100 percent,” he laughs. “Win-win.” Toth also recognized that it was an opportunity to have an impact on more people. “Obviously, there was a church/state issue. But it was worth trying.”

“We Can Do This”

That is what Arne Duncan said, Ed Siderewicz recalls, when Gary Comer brought him to visit the San Miguel Austin campus in 2004. “You get your team behind it and I’ll make it work.”

“We asked a few questions,” recalls Siderewicz, “but I remember thinking that if our starting point is how to make it work rather than what we have to give up, then we should continue talking.”

And they did continue talking, with more and more detailed attention given to the question of San Miguel’s core mission. God or no God? For his part, Mike Fehrenbach didn’t see the charter undertaking as a challenge to the brothers’ mission, which he believed was “about offering people an opportunity for a future worth living.” They could do this by exemplifying Christian and Catholic values; they didn’t have to preach them. (This was not unknown territory for the Christian Brothers. In many countries they ran secular schools; in Indonesia, in fact, they operated a Muslim school.)

At the end of January 2005, the order’s district council voted to launch the charter school. And a month later, Brother John Johnston, then the order’s Superior General in Rome, weighed in: he saw “no important reasons for saying no” and “important reasons why we should say yes.”

Brother Mike Fehrenbach suggested that a publicly financed charter school might be a better way of bringing education to the poor.

Too Good to Be True

But the Christian Brothers were suddenly given another challenge. In the middle of writing the application for the charter school they wanted to open, Arne Duncan asked them to take over a public school he was closing in the North Lawndale neighborhood. This was part of the “turnaround” strategy that Duncan initiated in Chicago and would bring to his job as secretary of education in the Obama administration: improve some schools by closing them, then reopening under new management.

This was fine except that the brothers had already found the neighborhood for their new charter school: Austin, near the Gary Comer Campus San Miguel School. Austin was clearly needy; it had the highest number of homicides in Chicago in 2003 and nearly 30 percent of families with children under 18 lived in poverty. The neighborhood high school had the second-highest dropout rate in the state of Illinois. And the brothers had good connections in Austin, including with Circle Urban Ministries and the Rock of Our Salvation Church, an active evangelical Baptist congregation that owned a former Catholic school there.

“It was like manna from heaven,” recalls Rev. Abraham Lincoln Washington, pastor of the congregation, remembering Brother Ed Siderewicz’s request to open a charter school in his facility. Circle Rock had been struggling to keep open its 185-student religious school for the poor. “We had a vacant building and they had 300 years of experience educating kids.”

Reverend Washington’s congregation was also a strong one, providing a rich mix of social services, including a food pantry, legal and medical services, transitional housing, and education. “Education is like preventive medicine,” he says. “It’s so important.”

But the perfect union between Christian Brothers and Baptists would have to wait.

“At the last moment, Duncan asked us to take over the Howland School in North Lawndale,” recalls Siderewicz, “before we opened Austin Circle Rock. Naively, we said ‘Okay.’”

Although the neighborhoods are, technically, adjacent, Austin and North Lawndale are among Chicago’s largest neighborhoods and so the Howland School was more than five miles south of Austin Circle Rock—a world away. Especially for the Christian Brothers, who had no presence there.

Worse, North Lawndale was even needier than Austin. At the time of the 2000 U.S. Census, approximately 10,000 adult males from the neighborhood were in prison. Says Father Lawrence Dowling, pastor of St. Agatha Parish, which is just four blocks from the Howland School, “We have the highest incidence of HIV in the state, the highest rate of asthma for kids in the state, and the highest percentage of grandparents raising grandchildren in the nation.”

“As poor a census tract as you can find,” says John Horan, who had established his North Lawndale charter high school in one part of the sprawling Howland building. “Do I know the neighborhood?” he chuckles. “I am completely grey because of it.”

But the Christian Brothers didn’t know the neighborhood, and the neighborhood didn’t know them. Recalls Fehrenbach, “The community was in an uproar over the closing of their school—and then we came in.”

At an initial public meeting, a group calling itself “The Voice of the ExCon” sent dozens of people, who shouted and screamed. “It was a bit scary,” recalled Siderewicz. “But we made it through.”

The Christian Brothers eventually won the group over by giving them a tour of their San Miguel schools, but the initial animosity was a sign of things to come.

At the time of the 2000 census, approximately 10,000 adult males from the North Lawndale neighborhood were in prison.

A Tale of Two Schools

The brothers opened Howland Catalyst Charter School, on schedule, in the fall of 2006 and Austin’s Circle Rock Catalyst in 2007. The Howland plan called for starting with 4th and 5th grades, with two classes of 15 students in each grade; it would add 3rd and 6th grades in year two, 2nd and 7th grades in year three, 1st and 8th grades in year four, and kindergarten in year five, growing to 540 students in grades K through 8 by 2010. The Austin plan was to start with 5th and 6th grades beginning in 2007, add 7th and 8th grades in the second year, then build up from kindergarten to 4th grade in the next two years.

Both plans reflected the brothers’ belief in the importance of middle school, which was the focus of their San Miguel initiative. And true to the San Miguel model, they brought to the Catalyst charters their 9:1 student-to-teacher ratio, a belief in academic excellence, graduate and family support, and the goal of having every child reading at or above grade level before graduation (8th grade). They also brought modern assessment tools, including standardized testing several times a year, teacher-designed testing on a weekly basis, nightly homework that was checked each day by the teacher, and daily testing/assessment in core subject areas.

Despite the model, the polished floors, new banners, and students outfitted in spiffy olive and khaki uniforms, the staff at Howland was quickly overwhelmed by the outsized needs of its student population, which was 100 percent African American and 98 percent eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.

“These children live in a world where you can’t appear weak—it can be deadly,” says assistant principal Igbazenda Moses, a Nigerian native and former Christian Brother who came to Chicago in 2002 and joined the Catalyst staff in 2006. “All of this makes the kids very uptight and creates a huge barrier to learning.”

Howland’s was a student population suffering from enormous environmental, economic, and social trauma—a kind of permanent Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.

“Three weeks ago we had a child whose dad was shot and killed,” Moses says. “We have two kids like that here now. There is so much violence in their daily lives. They hit you—and they’re used to getting hit back. Self-control is a big issue for these kids.”

Howland’s leaders were caught off guard by the severity of the social and environmental ills, and the effort it would take to address them. As Brother Ed Siderewicz recalls, “We had every problem in the book and more. I had forgotten how hard it was to start a school.”

In 2009, Austin Circle Rock outperformed the other Austin neighborhood schools on the composite Illinois Standards Assessment Test.

God Help Us!

Assistant Principal Moses believes that the inability to teach religion was a significant part of the problem. “Talking about how to be respectful and trustworthy is not the same as talking about a person’s life being grounded in the knowledge of God,” he says. “And that’s what these children and their families need. ‘Character Counts’ just doesn’t do the trick.”

Brother Mike Fehrenbach smiles at this in-house dissent. “We’re doing fine.”

Both Catalyst schools use the popular youth ethics program developed in the early 1990s by the Josephson Institute of Ethics. Character Counts includes “six pillars”: Trustworthiness, Respect, Responsibility, Fairness, Caring, and Citizenship. Banners with those words are hanging throughout the school.

“Yes, we’re doing character education,” says Gordon Hannon, no longer a Christian Brother, but who was brought back in as Catalyst CEO at the end of the 2009 school year to help right the Howland ship. “But we have to go beyond that. To capture the essence of Catholic education, one of our core values is reverence. We must instill a sense of reverence for each other and show how that is different than respect.”

“You can get lost in debates about whether you should have a crucifix on the wall or not,” says John Horan. “It’s more about violence and drugs and poverty than the decorations.”

And leadership.

“I had a bad feeling in the pit of my stomach,” says Megan Dougherty, who arrived in August 2007, at the beginning of Howland’s second year, and was assigned a 5th-grade classroom. “There was no new teacher training,” she recalls. “And there was a new principal and a brand-new administrative team. The kids were being bad and teachers didn’t feel they had any support.”

Five teachers quit that year; another five didn’t return the next year. Dougherty would have been gone early except that when she came back from Christmas holiday, she realized that “my kids really missed me. I had to stay for them.” But she did eventually leave. “No one was happy with their job,” says Dougherty. “I loved the school. I loved the kids. But I couldn’t stay another year.”

Fourth-grade teacher Tina Corsby calls herself “the last of the Mohicans.” A veteran of CPS, she started at Howland Catalyst when it opened in 2006 and is still there in 2010. “It’s better than a regular public school,” she says. “Here, they really do care about the kids.”

But Corsby and her teacher colleagues were caught in the classic bind: trying to do a good job, they seemed to get no help from the top. “Job one in a school like this is to establish a culture of peace and high academic expectations and do rigorous social supports,” says John Horan. “Stable leadership makes all the difference in the world. You can’t end-run this one. The principal makes it all happen.” Howland has had three principals in three years.

“We’ve struggled from the get-go,” says Catalyst CEO Hannon. “We had everything we had at San Miguel, but we weren’t clear enough or deliberate enough about who we are. We were hesitant. We were not tough enough about the teaching, about embracing reading as the number one priority…. The bottom line is that the leadership wasn’t there.”

“It’s better than a regular public school,” says 4th-grade teacher Tina Corsby. “Here, they really do care about the kids.”

While these lessons were being learned, the San Miguel team opened its second Catalyst charter school, at Austin Circle Rock, in 2007. Perhaps it was just luck that Sala Sims, a seven-year veteran of CPS classrooms, applied for the job of principal. “I knew I wanted to start a school,” she recalls. The Chicago native met Brothers Mike and Ed in early 2007 “and never looked back.”

“She gets it,” says Brother Mike Fehrenbach.

And it showed. After just two years, Austin Circle Rock had an air of order that eluded Howland after three. From the front desk to the back offices and faculty lunchrooms, students and adults at Austin Circle Rock were both more relaxed and more disciplined. And the test scores proved it.

In 2009, Austin Circle Rock students outperformed the other Austin neighborhood schools on the composite (reading, math, and science combined) Illinois Standards Assessment Test (ISAT), with from 68 to 76 percent of students in grades 4 through 8 meeting or exceeding the state standard.

“It’s part of the Resurrection before our very eyes,” says Brother Ed Siderewicz.

Perhaps it was just luck that Sala Sims applied for the job of principal. “I knew I wanted to start a school,” she recalls.

How was Howland doing on its test scores?

“Flat would be generous,” says Hannon. In fact, Howland ISAT scores in 2009, with just 49.8 percent of its students meeting or exceeding the state standard, tied for last place among five public schools in North Lawndale.

How could the “formula for success” have gone so far wrong in Howland?

In many respects, it is as simple as what Donnell Harrison, the safety manager at Austin Circle Rock, calls, “following the model.” Donnell has manned the front desk at Austin since it opened. “At Howland they’re conforming to the community instead of to the model.”

This point has not been lost on Catalyst leaders, especially as they work on turning Howland around.

With Hannon as the new Catalyst CEO came a new principal, Chaun Johnson, and the two have become a veritable tag team. Johnson grew up in the Austin neighborhood, where Circle Rock is located and where his wife Natalie now teaches, and he attended Our Lady of Lourdes Catholic School (now closed) in Lawndale. Johnson is articulate, self-assured, and, at over six feet tall, a commanding presence in a room full of teachers and students. (The photograph on page 40 shows him leading the “principal’s choir.”)

“This is a community of potential,” Johnson says. “It would appear that nothing can grow here. I’m here to change that.”

And it would appear, at the beginning of his second year, that he has done that.

Fehrenbach noticed the change “just after Christmas,” he says. “The tone shifted radically. Kids in the classrooms were actually smiling; there was less shouting.”

There is an air of discipline—in the old sense of the word, order—in the school that had not been there the previous two years. All children are now wearing uniforms with shirts tucked in. Test scores have improved markedly. Among Chicago’s 91 charters, Howland showed the fourth-best improvement on ISAT composite test scores in 2010, jumping from a 49.8 percent to a 60.8 percent passing rate.

With Hannon’s help, Johnson began conducting weekly teacher and staff training sessions. They brought in a curriculum instructor, and he brought in trainers for grade-level teacher meetings. The eventual goal, says Hannon, is to send teachers to a Lasallian Leadership Institute. Run by the Christian Brothers and named for the founder of the order, these three-year programs, including a one-week intensive training session during the summer and several weekend sessions, are meant to introduce teachers and administrators to the Lasallian mission and show them how to implement it in their classrooms and schools.

“This is a community of potential,” says Principal Chaun Johnson. “It would appear that nothing can grow here. I’m here to change that.”

Though the church/state question will no doubt live on, for now the leaders of the Catalyst charter experiment are convinced that the essence of their San Miguel schools can work in a public school setting. “We will live the values and virtues of the Christian Brothers without speaking the words,” says Chaun Johnson. “And that will open the doors so that our education plan can work.”

Johnson represents what it is that the Catalyst backers believe is the point of their charter: they bring a Catholic ethos, not the catechism, to children. And they educate them in reading, writing, and ’rithmetic.

While admitting that Howland still has challenges, Catalyst leaders believe they have turned the corner. And they have learned some hard lessons.

First, they did inadequate relationship building in the community. As many of those involved in the early discussions with the city have said, the Christian Brothers were “naive” or “stupid” to have taken on the Howland project before getting to know the neighborhood.

“A second mistake was starting Howland with grades 4 and 5,” says Ed Siderewicz. Taking on older kids, the brothers now know, requires the kind of knowledge of and relationships with a community that they did not have in North Lawndale.

Third, leadership and staff must understand the model. “Reforming the academic leadership team was our biggest challenge,” says Hannon.

And finally, “we worried too much about the church/state issue,” says Terry Toth. “We run a public school. We don’t have crucifixes on the wall. We don’t teach religion. We teach truth and honesty.”

Is there any one ingredient of success in these matters?

Says North Lawndale College Prep charter school’s John Horan, “You have to have a community of full-grown adults who understand the culture piece and the academic expectation piece. The kids will come around.”

“Hard work,” adds Hannon, who has all but lived at Howland for the last year and shows no signs of slowing down.

And Terry Toth remains bullish on Catalyst’s future. “We’re working on a strategic plan,” he says. “We’re trying to button down the academics and get more consistency there. We’ve taken faith-based and made it values-based. We’re even exploring opportunities to add more schools. The Circle Rock campus got more traction because of Rock of Our Salvation Baptist church and there was community support. So, we’ll be looking for similar things as we expand: a pastor, a supportive community, etc. We’ve learned that you can’t just plop a school down in a neighborhood and expect it to work.”

Brother Mike Fehrenbach would agree. “Be good citizens,” he told a Circle Rock graduation class. “We pledge to stand by you. Failure is not an option.”

Peter Meyer, former news editor at Life Magazine, is currently senior policy fellow with the Thomas B. Fordham Institute and contributing editor at Education Next.

Additional photographs of the Catalyst Schools are available here.